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ABSTRACT

TEACHING A TRANSFORMATIVE STORY: CRAFTING CRITICAL
FEMINIST NARRATIVE PEDAGOGIES THROUGH
WOMEN’S AND QUEER LIFE WRITING

Rhiannon Catherwood, PhD
Department of English
Northern Illinois University, 2017
Diana L. Swanson, Director

This dissertation bridges narrative psychology, pedagogical theory, and the study of
marginalized life writing. Narrative psychologists argue that human beings instinctively process
their experiences in terms of story, including educational experiences. Literary critics focusing
on life writing argue that authors of differing backgrounds produce distinctly different genres of
life narrative, evidencing different patterns of thought and reasoning. The principal concern of
teaching professionals should be to create an inclusive atmosphere which maximizes the learning
potential of a diverse body of students. This means developing educational practices which
reflect the diverse ways in which students perceive and relate to the world around them. This
dissertation incorporates queer and feminist literary theory and criticism, textual analysis of a
variety of autobiographies, memoirs, and personal essays, research on the application of
narrative theory to pedagogy, and critical feminist pedagogy. Building on existing research on
narrative pedagogy with analysis of the distinct qualities of women’s autobiography and queer
autobiography, this project suggests changes to both classroom practices and curriculum
development. By changing the genre of our educational narratives, we can transform the
atmosphere of campuses and classrooms into one in which previously marginalized students are
centralized and empowered.
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CHAPTER 1
ANDROCENTRISM AND HETERONORMATIVITY
IN HIGHER EDUCATION

Years ago, at an interdisciplinary academic conference, I met a professor of mathematics.
When he flipped through the program to find my name and learned that my presentation focused
on feminism and academics, he told me that he was entirely fed up with hearing about gender in
the classroom. In his view, as soon as universities stopped prohibiting women from attending,
the issue was resolved; all that remained was bickering over trivialities. He told me that recently,
for example, a freshman student had raised her hand in a lecture hall to take issue with the realworld, situational examples he would use to give concrete representation to mathematical
theories and concepts. According to her, his examples revolving around American sports left
many women, some men, and most international students scratching their heads. He then told me
quite proudly how he shamed the student into silence.
“Mathematics,” he pronounced, finger raised, “is logic and abstraction. I told her, if you
have a head for it, the example doesn’t matter. And if she didn’t, she should focus harder instead
of wasting the class’s time.”
Setting aside for a moment the inappropriate antagonism with which he handled a
question from a young student, I asked him, “If the example doesn’t matter, why use it at all?
Why demonstrate the idea with a story?”
He explained, “It’s just something you do when you teach. It helps them understand.”
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He was right about that much. Giving his students a tangible example of the concept, a
story through which they could observe the application of class material, was one (very
simplistic) manifestation of narrative pedagogy, which could be most broadly defined as
teaching practices which engage students in the narrative mode of thinking. Jerome Bruner
explains this mode of thinking as “the form of thought that goes into the construction not of
logical or inductive arguments but of stories or narratives” (“Life as Narrative” 691). What the
professor clearly understood, on some level, was that narrative thinking is a powerful and
meaningful cognitive practice. This may be the reason he told me the story of the student’s
objection to demonstrate his point. For the same reason, I begin this chapter with the story of the
professor to demonstrate my own.
What the professor failed to understand is that while mathematics may be, as he said, a
matter solely of logic and abstraction, pedagogy is a very different matter. Teaching and learning
are subjective, human experiences where success depends upon much more than simply aptitude
for the subject matter. Successful teaching depends, rather, on crafting a situation that optimizes
the students’ potential for mastering that subject matter, which necessitates understanding the
background, experience, and knowledge base of those students; this certainly does mean
considering the impact of gender among many other factors. Otherwise, as surely as if one were
to hold office hours when only half the class could attend or speak in a language which only half
of the class understood, one is inevitably teaching more effectively to some students than to
others.
Naturally, the students in this situation to whom the professor’s lectures were tailored
were those students most commonly privileged and centralized in math and science (to say
nothing of the academy as a whole let alone American culture as a whole) – gender normative
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American men. Contrary to his assertion that issues of gender in higher education were resolved
as soon as women were allowed a seat in the lecture hall, an abundance of research illustrates the
hostility which women students have faced. In a widely read study, “The Classroom Climate: A
Chilly One For Women,” Roberta M. Hall and Bernice R. Sandler argued that a variety of
behaviors of faculty members, some purposeful and others inadvertent, contributed to “a learning
climate that subtly or overtly communicates different expectations for women than for men”
which “can interfere with the educational process itself” (3). Hall and Sandler document a
variety of classroom inequalities such as disparities in which students receive more eye contact
(7), differences in which students are more likely to be called on (7), and prevailing tendencies to
address the class as though no women were present (8). What all of these behaviors have in
common is that they combine to communicate that the university classroom is a space in which
men are centralized and women are peripheral.
Hall and Sandler’s study was published in 1982. More recent research, however, does not
contradict their findings, though it does complicate them. In 1998, Ana Maria Martinez-Aleman
surveyed female students regarding communication styles inside and outside of the classroom.
Martinez-Aleman concluded that women felt that to be recognized and respected by faculty, they
had to emulate men by being combative and aggressive (4). What is interesting here is that while
Hall and Sandler rightly point out problematic differences in the treatment of women students,
Martinez-Aleman points out the corollary problem of expecting women to effectively think and
behave in ways which they have been socialized not to think and behave – namely, to think and
behave as men. Ultimately, this communicates the same essential message – that the college
classroom is a male space.
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There are of course many factors contributing to the androcentrism of higher education,
and among those factors is the gendered quality of our classroom narratives. By this I mean not
simply those stories we use to demonstrate concepts, to make abstract ideas concrete. Rather, just
as Martinez-Aleman wished to consider not simply those behaviors directed toward women
students but also those behaviors which women students were expected to emulate, I wish to
consider both the stories which we tell our students and, perhaps more importantly, the stories
which we expect our students to enact.

Genres of Educational Narrative
In “The Narrative as a Root Metaphor for Psychology,” Theodore R. Sarbin proposes
what he calls:
The narratory principle: that human beings think, perceive, imagine, and make moral
choices according to narrative structures. Present two or three pictures, or descriptive
phrases, to a person and he or she will connect them to form a story, an account that
relates the pictures or the meanings of the phrases in some patterned way. (8)
Sarbin pioneered what would become the field of narrative psychology. From this basic principle
comes the understanding that it is a universal human trait to comprehend ourselves and the world
around us by contextualizing information and experiences into stories. Thus, narrative structure
is central to how we think and how we learn. On a basic level, any parent who has ever read their
child a fable or a fairytale understands the usefulness of narrative for teaching; they do so in the
hope that the child can see parallels between themselves and the characters, between their own
circumstances and the story, giving them a framework with which to understand their own
experience.
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Many pedagogues have come to recognize that the learning process itself is experienced
as a narrative. For example, in “From Concept to Application: Student Narratives of ProblemSolving as a Basis for Writing Assignments in Science Classes,” Jennifer Rich, Daisy Miller, and
Lisa DeTora write, “Students who produced sensible narratives about problem-solving . . . were
consistently more successful in problem-solving.” That students assigned to narrate their own
learning experiences demonstrate greater overall comprehension certainly supports the
suggestion that narrative thought guides our processing of every experience; thus, to activate
conscious narrative thought during and about the learning process is naturally beneficial.
While the examples discussed thus far have remained on a small scale – the use of stories
as examples for individual lessons, prompting students to narrate solving particular problems –
education is in fact a long series of layered narratives. We can narrate the story of learning a
single concept or the story of a unit of study or the story of a course or a major or minor program
or of the entire university experience or of education from early childhood to graduate school. In
any given course, there may or may not be much value in asking students to narrate their entire
education; however, considering these larger scale narratives allows educators to structure their
courses, even their curriculum, by the principles of narrative. In “An Anatomy of Narrative
Curricula,” Carola Conle explains that “curricular complexity and meaningfulness result from
connections to life and quest-like inquiry experiences” (13). Such experiences do not occur by
accident. They require more than simply the practice of reflection; they require careful design to
be recognizable, intelligible, and useful. That is, they require forethought on narrative structure.
A narrative can have many different structures, many different patterns of action and
development, dependent on the genre of the narrative. While most pedagogues exploring the
usefulness of narrative thinking in education take the time to explicate what a narrative is and
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among those some note that every narrative has a genre, few seem to explicitly recognize that the
narrative of a learning experience will necessarily follow some generic conventions of structure.
Bruner points out in “The Narrative Construction of Reality” that narrative genre provides “a
guide for using mind, insofar as the use of mind is guided by the use of an enabling language”
(15). Considering that genres are “ways of telling that predispose us to use our minds and
sensibilities in particular ways” (15), there would seem to be an enormous potential in planning
our lessons, our courses, our curricula by the structures of recognizable genres to trigger students
to use their minds and sensibilities most productively.
For example: like many teachers of first-year writing, I struggled less with student
comprehension than with student engagement. My most significant problems were not students
failing to grasp the material but students failing to show up and failing to turn in assignments. I
decided to ask a class at the end of one semester to tell me about the kind of television they
watched, and after gaining a clear understanding of the genre of narrative with which many of
them were highly familiar, I set about transforming my course to proceed along the structural
conventions of that genre. In the first week of the following semester, I explained to the new
class that students would be organized into teams, that each Monday I would teach them a skill
and each Wednesday they would have a team challenge using that skill, and that the following
Monday, two finalists I would select would compete in oral delivery of their composition to be
awarded extra credit. Sure enough, one student raised his hand to ask me if the lowest ranking
team would have to vote a member off the island; the students recognized the structure of a
reality TV show immediately. Also, sure enough, this class was better attended and more
students turned in every assignment than in any other section I had taught of the same course. By
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using a narrative structure that was familiar to them, I was able to engage the students in a way I
never had with previous versions of this course.
This success was due not simply to a conscious and purposeful narrative design, but to
the fact that the genre of narrative I chose was based on what I knew my students would be most
likely to recognize and connect with. Inevitably, however, as we probe the question of which
narrative genres are most recognizable, the diversity of the student body makes rapidly apparent
that the same genres recognizable to one student will not be so familiar to another. Just as certain
narrative examples might imply an intended audience, centralizing that audience to the exclusion
of others, so too might certain narrative structures on which an educational experience might be
based. Moreover, the classroom narrative would undoubtedly default to the most dominant
cultural narratives, which in effect are the narratives of the most dominant groups.
Consider: presuming no purposeful narrative design, if one were to ask a student at the
end of any given course to tell a story of the learning process from the start of the semester to the
end, what kind of story might it be? It might resemble a detective story – following a deductive
path from one clue to the next to an eventual epiphany. It may be something like a classic hero’s
journey, striking out to attain new skills and bringing them back to incorporate them into the
world outside of the classroom. It could look something like a small-scale bildungsroman, a story
of personal maturation and development. What all of these genres have in common is an origin
in a male-dominated and heteronormative tradition of literature. It stands to reason that the
students best able to progress through a course designed along a male-dominated and
heteronormative narrative structure would be students who were themselves heterosexual males,
to whom such structures would be most identifiable and recognizable.
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Many literary critics have explored the distinct qualities of women’s literature and queer
literature in general, but considering that the issue here is the conventions by which we narrate
our own experiences, it seems particularly relevant to recognize the differing structural and
thematic properties of how women and queer people narrate their lives in relation to cisgender
heterosexual men. For example, texts such as Carolyn G. Heilbrun’s Writing a Woman’s Life
explore the distinct character of women’s autobiography. Heilbrun dissects differences between
autobiographies by women which she believes resist their own truth to conform to male-centered
literary conventions and those which embrace their difference (12-13). The latter includes,
among other differences, the recognition of a flawed social system that devalues the perspective
of the author. It is difficult to miss the relevance of this difference to classroom discourse.
Likewise, Marilyn Farwell’s Heterosexual Plots and Lesbian Narratives describes how “queer”
genres (specifically lesbian narratives) mean more than simply the inclusion of queer characters
or explicitly queer topics, but rather deal with particular themes and narrative structures. Farwell
defines a lesbian narrative as one which challenges and dismantles the heterosexual and
patriarchal values inherent to traditional genres of literature. Lesbian narratives, she writes, are
multifaceted, non-linear, and experimental. Such observations could easily be translated to
contribute to the discourse on pedagogical technique.
Considering first the idea that we ground our understanding of ourselves and the world in
narrative and second that the narrative structures differ for those of different gendered and sexual
identities, it comes as no surprise to find psychological research suggesting that there is a
gendered component to reasoning styles. Pioneering such research, Carol Gilligan’s work, In a
Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, explores differences between
men’s and women’s experiences and ways of interacting with the world. She writes, “The failure
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to see the different reality of women’s lives and to hear the differences in their voices stems in
part from the assumption that there is a single mode of social experience and interpretation”
(174). If there are indeed gendered patterns in reasoning styles, it stands to reason that a
classroom experience which centralized a particular reasoning style and marginalized others
would centralize certain students and marginalize others along gendered lines.
The principal concern of teaching professionals should be to create an inclusive
atmosphere which maximizes the learning potential of a diverse body of students. This means
developing educational practices which not only influence but also reflect the diverse ways in
which students perceive and relate to the world around them. To do so, we must be willing to try
new techniques; we need to learn to teach different kinds of stories.
By building on existing research on narrative pedagogy with analysis of the distinct
qualities of women’s autobiography and queer autobiography, this project aims to propose
changes to both classroom practices and curriculum development. By changing the genre of
educational narratives, we can transform the atmosphere of campuses and classrooms into one in
which previously marginalized students are centralized and empowered.

From a Standpoint Feminist Theoretical Framework

The impetus to change the genre of educational narratives to better reflect the
perspectives and experiences of women and queer people grows from the groundwork of
standpoint feminism. In “Women’s Lives / Feminist Knowledge: Feminist Standpoint as
Ideology Critique,” Rosemary Hennessy defines standpoint theory in the simplest possible terms.
She writes, “Feminist standpoint theorists have posited feminism as this sort of position, a way
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of conceptualizing reality from the vantage point of women’s lives” (14). One’s particular
“standpoint” as determined by intersecting racial, class, and gender identities (to name only a
few) necessarily leads to a particular perspective and a situated, contextualized knowledge of the
world.
Standpoint feminist theory stands most starkly in contrast with any claim of a purely
objective way of knowing the world. Hennessy explains,
Feminist standpoint theory acknowledges the inadequacies of an empiricist notion of
experience in which the individual subject's relationship to her world is taken to be direct
and concrete, unmediated by the ways of making sense historically available to her. (15)
This is to say, we are inevitably only capable of understanding the world through the conceptual
framework granted by our culture. In Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza, Gloria
Anzaldúa writes, “Culture forms our beliefs. We perceive the version of reality that it
communicates. Dominant paradigms, predefined concepts that exist as unquestionable,
unchallengeable, are transmitted to us through the culture. Culture is made by those in power—
men” (16). As such, the dominant paradigms to which Anzaldúa refers are so pervasive as to be
invisible, as not to be recognized as a standpoint at all, to be mistakenly considered objective.
It bears special mention that even in what might be considered the most empirical of
fields, the researcher is inescapably in a subjective position. In “Hand, Brain, and Heart: A
Feminist Epistemology for the Natural Sciences,” Hillary Rose discusses the misconception that
certain disciplines – for example hard scientific disciplines – produce objective, value-free
knowledge, as she explains that “a neutral science was seen as uninfluenced by class, race,
gender, nationality, or politics,” but “those in charge of neutral science were overwhelmingly
white, male, and privileged” (69). What has been considered neutral, uninfluenced by
perspective, has historically been that which comes from the perspective of the privileged, while
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the perspectives of the oppressed are more likely to be scrutinized for a bias stemming from their
position. Even recent history provides an abundance of examples of the devastating
consequences of such systemic bias in science. However it may be purported to be inherently
objective, the scientific method, as utilized solely by straight white men, has resulted in
“scientific proof” of the inferiority of people of color, of women’s unsuitability for work in the
public sphere, and of the mental illness of queer people.
As Sandra Harding points out in the introduction to The Feminist Standpoint Theory
Reader, among the goals of standpoint feminism is to begin to recognize and listen to the voices
of the oppressed, to recognize their value. Harding writes, “Each oppressed group will have its
own critical insights about nature and the larger social order to contribute to the collection of
human knowledge” (9). Whether in the hard sciences, the social sciences, or the humanities, to
marginalize the perspectives of the oppressed is ultimately detrimental to the pursuit of
knowledge. Indeed, to marginalize, neglect, and ignore the standpoint of any group is
detrimental. In “Feminist Politics and Epistemology: The Standpoint of Women,” Alison Jaggar
explains:
A standpoint is a position in society from which certain features of reality come into
prominence and from which others are obscured. Although a standpoint makes certain
features of reality visible, however, it does not necessarily reveal them clearly nor in their
essential interconnectedness with each other. (60)
It is a crucial point that all standpoints are unique and valuable and that all are limited and
incomplete.
Of course, the central aim at the time when standpoint feminism first emerged was to
centralize women’s standpoint in contrast to the existing androcentric perspectives. However, the
theory itself problematized the search for a definitive “women’s standpoint” in multiple ways.
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First, to search for “women’s standpoint” is to examine women’s lives and listen to women’s
voices. But as Hennessy writes, to acknowledge that no research is entirely objective is to
acknowledge the subjective standpoint of “the feminist critic, scholar, or theorist who appeals to
women’s lives as the basis for her knowledge. Women’s lives are only intelligible at all as a
result of the ways of making sense of the world available in any historical moment” (24). That is,
we can only observe women’s lives from the vantage point of our own.
Second, the very term “women’s standpoint” is problematic, as “basing feminist
knowledge in any transparent appeal to women’s experience tends to homogenize ‘woman’ as a
universal and obvious category” (15). Early standpoint feminism was plagued by a myopic focus
on gender as the single most culturally significant identifier. As a result, differences among
women went unacknowledged, and just as the privileged cultural paradigm was so pervasively
thought to be the only paradigm, so too was the privileged women’s paradigm thought to be the
only one. As the feminist movement evolved, however, so too did standpoint feminist theory. In
the introduction to Decentering the Center: Philosophy for a Multicultural, Postcolonial, and
Feminist World, Uma Narayan and Sandra Harding write, “feminist work is increasingly
attentive to factors such as class, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and religion that configure
the lives of different groups of women and men in multiple ways within contemporary cultures”
(vii). That is, standpoint feminism has been strengthened by an infusion of intersectionality.
An intersectional approach recognizes that the standpoints of white women and women
of color are not alike, nor those of able bodied women and disabled women, of wealthy women
and impoverished women, of straight women and queer women, etc. It recognizes that the
privileges and oppressions which shape our experiences and perspectives likewise differ. Jack
Halberstam discusses some of these radical differences in In a Queer Time & Place:
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Transgender Bodies, Subcultural Lives. As he explains, the radical difference and profound
marginalization of the experiences of same sex loving and transgender people result in very
distinctive ways of interacting with and inhabiting culture: “Queer uses of time and space
develop, at least in part, in opposition to the institutions of family, heterosexuality, and
reproduction. They also develop according to other logics of location, movement, and
identification” (1). The life patterns, and thus inevitably the standpoints, of queer people will
differ significantly from those of heterosexual and cisgender people.
An intersectional approach recognizes too that each of us is a confluence of multiple
identities, some privileged, some oppressed, and that those identities and viewpoints may be seen
to conflict with each other. For example, Anzaldúa explains the particular mindset of a MexicanAmerican woman in the United States: “Within la cultura chicana, commonly held beliefs of the
white culture attack commonly held beliefs of the Mexican culture, and both attack commonly
held beliefs of the indigenous culture” (78). An intersectional approach respects the value of
such convergences and conflicts.
I do not mean to suggest, however, that a fully intersectional approach has been
perfected. In Narayan’s “Essence of Culture and a Sense of History: A Feminist Critique of
Cultural Essentialism,” she points out that while standpoint feminism has evolved from a
(perhaps ironic) gender essentialism which presumed a commonality among all women’s
experiences, its newfound respect for cultural difference in fact manifests as a kind of cultural
essentialism: “While gender essentialism often conflates socially dominant norms of femininity
with . . . actual particular women, cultural essentialism often conflates socially dominant cultural
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Halberstam has published under both “Judith” and “Jack.” He personally and professionally uses the name “Jack
Halberstam,” but publishes certain works under the name “Judith.”
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norms with the actual values and practices of a culture” (82). If this is indeed the case, then
intersectionality becomes little but lip service. Halberstam seems to note a similar issue when he
comments, “we have become adept within postmodernism at talking about ‘normativity,’ but far
less adept at describing in rich detail the practices and structures that both oppose and sustain
conventional forms of association, belonging, and identification” (4). The further we advance
through the evolution of standpoint theory, the more we seem to discover deeper and deeper tiers
of essentialist assumptions and generalizations.
It may well be, however, that more recently, standpoint feminism’s evolution has
redirected. Dick Pels’ “Strange Standpoints, or How to Define the Situation for Situated
Knowledge” suggests that the conversation is in fact turning away from the specificities of
gender, sexuality, race, class, religion, etc. Pels writes, “Departing from their primary anchorages
in class, gender, or race, and shedding all residues of ‘last instance’ thinking, recent standpoint
theories thus tend to converge upon a generalized discourse of marginality” (277), that is, on a
more broadly defined distinction between centralized perspectives and marginal perspectives.
While there would seem to be a severe risk of oversimplification in this approach, it serves a
certain purpose. Pels explains:
This convergent theme of the ‘outsider within’ who enjoys ‘double vision’ establishes a
powerful epistemological point, which might even be taken as the enduringly relevant
‘summary’ of standpoint theory in its various historical manifestations. What standpoint
theories ultimately seem to offer is a more general or abstract social epistemology of the
stranger rather than a more concrete and particularized epistemology of class, gender, or
race; an epistemology of diversity or multiplicity rather than of singular identity. (278)
While it may seem over-simplified or vague, perhaps such an approach is the ideal means of
clarifying the original intended goals of standpoint feminism: to centralize the marginalized and
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to achieve an intersectional understanding that each of us has certain identities and perspectives
which are centralized and others which are marginalized.
The dilemma, then, if we are to return to the matter of culturally situated perspectives and
research, is how, if we acknowledge the value of so many diverse perspectives, we are to truly
evaluate claims to knowledge. In Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?: Thinking From Women’s
Lives, Harding describes the prevailing fear that if we embrace a multiplicity of standpoints, we
will have “no way to argue rationally against the possibility that each person’s judgment about
the regularities of nature and their underlying causal tendencies must be regarded as equally
valid” (139). Such total epistemological relativism would not seem to be the goal of standpoint
feminism. In contrast to both relativism and the false objectivism of traditional research, Harding
offers a mode of thinking she describes as “strong objectivity” which calls “for the
acknowledgment that all human beliefs—including our best scientific beliefs—are socially
situated” and at the same time incorporates “critical evaluation to determine which social
situations tend to generate the most objective knowledge claims . . . scientifically examining the
social location of scientific claims” (142). Researchers practicing strong objectivity thus
explicate and critically address their own standpoints in the research process. Perhaps this
practice is capable of achieving the goal Rose suggests, to “bring together subjective and
objective ways of knowing the world” (76).
One certainly shouldn’t miss that Harding does make explicit that some perspectives are
more useful than others for generating knowledge. She is hardly the only one to address this
question. In considering which perspectives are likely to be the strongest, feminist standpoint
epistemology reminds us of the special value of marginalized perspectives, of the capacity of a
person of an oppressed gender, class, or racial group to understand social systems in ways that
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privileged groups cannot. Patricia Hill Collins develops this concept in “Learning from the
Outsider Within: The Sociological Significance of Black Feminist Thought.” Collins ascribes
African American women who engage in academic or political dialogue an “outsider within”
status and argues that “bringing this group–as well as others who share an outsider within status
vis-à-vis sociology–into the center of analysis may reveal aspects of reality obscured by more
orthodox approaches” (15). Collins considers this theory primarily in terms of its academic
potential as she notes that such perspectives may produce “distinctive analyses of race, class, and
gender” (14-15). Clearly, however, there are implications beyond academics. To posit that
“benefits of outsider within status include the ability of the ‘stranger’ to see patterns that may be
more difficult for those immersed in the situation to see” (15) is to point out that the privilege
enjoyed by persons in dominant social groups has the effect of blinding them to aspects of their
own social reality – aspects which only the oppressed have the ability to see.
Such theories are hardly unique to feminist standpoint epistemology. Nancy Hartsock
describes standpoint feminism’s ideological foundations in “The Feminist Standpoint:
Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism.” Hartsock writes:
Like the lives of proletarians according to Marxian theory, women’s lives make available
a particular and privileged vantage point on male supremacy, a vantage point which can
ground a powerful critique of the phallocratic institutions and ideology which constitute
the capitalist form of patriarchy. (284)
Hartsock’s feminist standpoint is thus inherited and adapted from the Marxist understanding that
the perspective of the proletariat is more complete, more accurate, and in some sense more
important than the perspective of the bourgeoisie. Just as the economically oppressed can see
things that the economically privileged cannot, women can see things that men cannot. Harding
would seem to agree as she writes in “Rethinking Standpoint Epistemologies: What is ‘Strong
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Objectivity,’” “starting research from women’s lives will generate less partial and distorted
accounts not only of women’s lives but also of men’s lives and of the whole social order” (56).
Or, in the language of the more evolved manifestations of standpoint feminism, starting research
from the margins will generate better knowledge not only about the margins but about the center
as well.
Finally, in the spirit of strong objectivity, and in consideration of Hennessy’s warning
that we can only examine the lives of others from the vantage point of our own, it seems
appropriate to close this section by acknowledging my own standpoint as a researcher. I
approach the study of marginalized life narratives from the perspective of an “out” male-tofemale transsexual and open lesbian. Naturally, I cannot avoid processing the narratives of any
author, much less other women, other same sex loving people, other trans people, in relation to
my own.
However, I do so consciously, and I would argue that this standpoint enhances my
effectiveness as a researcher in this case. As a trans woman, I am particularly sensitive to the
tendency of privileged researchers to appropriate, distort, and use the life narratives of the
oppressed to argue specific political points. As Julia Serano explains in Whipping Girl: A
Transsexual Woman on Sexism and the Scapegoating of Femininity:
Many academics have focused on the transsexual transition process to argue that gender
does not arise ‘naturally,’ but that it is learned, practiced, and performed. However, these
same academics tend to overlook (or dismiss outright) the fact that most transsexuals
experience a lifelong self-knowing that they should be the other sex. (210)
In instances like those Serano describes, the agenda of the researcher actually occludes the
subject by twisting their first-hand descriptions of their experience in order to prove a pre-
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determined point. In purposeful contrast, as I conduct this research, I commit myself to actively
listening to the life narratives of my authors.

Toward a Critical Feminist Narrative Pedagogy

A large body of scholarship explores how feminist theory can and should be applied to
transforming education. Exploring that tradition of scholarship reveals that narrative pedagogy
and feminist pedagogy share a great deal of common ground in terms of practice. However,
feminist pedagogues most commonly describe their ideological background in critical pedagogy.
In Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Paulo Freire developed the concepts of critical pedagogy
which would be so influential in the development of feminist pedagogy decades later. Freire
recognized that despite the potential for education to be a liberating, empowering cultural force,
education too often becomes simply another means of furthering an oppressive system, as it is
designed to serve “the oppressors, whose tranquility rests on how well people fit the world the
oppressors have created, and how little they question it” (76). Thus, while access to education is
potentially liberating, that education can be “an instrument which is used to facilitate integration
of the younger generation into the logic of the present system and bring about conformity” (34).
Freire writes a great deal about social systems and what education should look like if it is to
become a revolutionary force. Particularly relevant to feminist and narrative pedagogy, Freire
writes, “One cannot expect positive results from an educational or political action program which
fails to respect the particular view of the world held by the people” (95). That is, a respect for the
particular knowledge base and ways of viewing and interacting with the world of one’s students
is paramount.
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Few feminist pedagogues reference Freire so extensively or explicitly as bell hooks;
Teaching to Transgress contains numerous direct references and allusions to Freire’s work as she
translates his theories into the realms of gender and race. Hooks touches on many of the shared
principles of critical and feminist pedagogies in practice, for example in arguing that a student
should be an “active participant, not a passive consumer” (14) in the classroom, opposing the
“banking system of education” (40). Just as Freire discusses the importance of respect for
students’ ways of viewing the world, hooks describes her own practices aimed at utilizing the
experience of students to link abstract concepts to a concrete reality (86). The intended result is a
classroom in which traditional power dynamics are disrupted. Hooks condemns educators who
are “enthralled by the exercise of power and authority within their mini-kingdom, the classroom”
(17). In contrast, she explains how she will “redirect [students’] attention away from my voice to
one another’s voices” (150), decentralizing the production of knowledge. All of this feeds into
the simple core concept that our lives and our work should reflect our politics (48).
Scholarship on feminist pedagogy has most certainly kept the political nature of its
project central in the discourse. In “Feminist Pedagogy: Transformations, Standpoints, and
Politics,” Ann Manicom writes:
Feminist pedagogy is teaching with a political intent and with visions of social change
and liberation—not simply with an aim to have (some) women ‘make it’ in the world of
(some) men, but to learn to act in and on the world in order to transform oppressive
relations of class, race, and gender. (366)
In part, this political intent is accomplished by listening to the voices of women students:
“Attention to women’s experiences is a cornerstone of feminist pedagogy” (370). However,
accomplishing this mission of social change requires not only changes in the subject-matter but
also structural changes that redistribute power in the classroom. Manicom writes, “Transforming

20

classroom practices is centrally about transforming relations of power in the classroom, relations
between teacher and student, and relations among students” (367), and in doing so,
“transforming ways of knowing the world and acting in/on the world” (368). This proposed shift
in power and authority is among the most central and also the most debated concepts in feminist
pedagogy.
In “Feminist Pedagogy Theory: Reflections on Power and Authority,” Carmen Luke
questions the prevailing feminist discourse on knowledge and authority in the classroom. In part,
she points out the sheer difficulty of breaking these systems, suggesting that “authority and
power are semiotically framed by the privilege of position at the raised lectern, the amplified
voice, the lights focused on the speaker” (286). More than simply a matter of difficulty, however,
she criticizes the idea that the feminist teacher “does not see herself as authoritative arbiter of
student interpretation and understanding. Instead, she . . . acknowledges her own experience and
knowledge as no more and no less valid” (293) than her students. Luke is concerned, perhaps
with good reason, that teachers attempting to “transform top-down transmission models of
knowledge by reconceptualizing the teacher role as ‘equal’ to the diversity of student differences,
run the risk of giving up authority over and claims to knowledge altogether” (297). It would be
easy but ultimately unfair to write off Luke’s concerns as an anxious unwillingness to relinquish
power. There should, after all, be some reason that the teacher exists in the room, some special
role to be played.
As others have pointed out, there is potential to exert positive influence through that
special role. In “Power, Authority, and Critical Pedagogy,” Patricia Bizzell describes the
dilemma of the feminist teacher: “we want to serve the common good with the power we possess
by virtue of our position as teachers, and yet we are deeply suspicious of any exercise of power
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in the classroom” (54). In considering methods of influencing students toward productive and
positive ends, she points out that simply introducing them to the correct subject matter is not
enough, because “if we leave the choice and handling of this material entirely up to the students .
. . they are often stunningly successful at normalizing or defusing material that we might have
thought was politically explosive” (66). Bizzell theorizes an ideal classroom in which teacher
and students “[join] together in a liberatory educational project [that] will serve all of their best
interests” (58). Within that seemingly egalitarian partnership, though, the teacher utilizes skills in
argument to subtly and productively exercise a power that is persuasive rather than coercive,
which is “exercised by [the teacher] over [the student] only with [the student’s] consent, which is
given only if [the student] is convinced that doing as [the teacher] suggests will serve [the
student’s] best interests” (56). This model recognizes the existence and the productive potential
of the teacher’s power and authority while also requiring the teacher continuously to justify that
power and authority through thought and action rather than the simple fact of their position.
Ultimately, resolving this dilemma may best be accomplished by first taking a step away
from the political dimensions of pedagogy and turning to one of the more central concepts of
educational philosophy – differentiated instruction. In The Differentiated Classroom:
Responding to the Needs of All Learners, Carol Tomlinson argues that teachers must “accept and
act on the premise that they must be ready to engage students in instruction through different
approaches to learning” (3). She cautions against “assuming that one student’s roadmap to
learning is identical to anyone else’s” (4). While Tomlinson’s argument is intended primarily to
respond to the differing skill levels of students within a single classroom, differentiated
instruction developed also in response to Howard Gardner’s theory of multiple intelligences,
which holds that different students have different types of intellectual skill, not simply different
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degrees. In The Unschooled Mind: How Children Think and How Schools Should Teach,
Gardner interestingly notes that there is a cultural dimension to learning style: “Contrasting
cultural practices and expectations accumulate over time to yield children and adults who are
characteristic of their own culture and who may appear dysfunctional in a culture that embraces a
divergent or opposing set of assumptions” (53). Tomlinson and Gardner both recognize that
different students have different learning styles which require different kinds of instruction.
Tomlinson focuses on diversity of ability levels, Gardner on diversity of intelligences. I believe
these same principles may be applied to the diversities of gender and sexuality.
When Adrienne Rich spoke to a convocation of university students (“Claiming an
Education”), she famously explained to the women in the audience that “What you can learn here
. . . is how men have perceived and organized their experience . . . what men, above all white
men, in their male subjectivity, have decided is important” (232). In referring to perception and
organization, to subjectivity, Rich clearly speaks to more than simply androcentrism in course
content, but also to androcentrism in perspective, in style, in structure. As political as this speech
is, it raises questions that are not only political but also practical and functional. It is particularly
interesting that Rich’s speech was delivered to a women’s college; even in this space devoted to
the education of women, students are expected to proceed through an educational experience
designed for men.
In Reclaiming a Conversation: The Ideal of the Educated Woman, Jane Roland Martin
points out that while today the only standard educational experience is that which is designed for
men, this has not always been so. She questions “why educational theorists in our day take no
notice of gender and why feminist theorists, in turn, pay so little attention to questions of
educational philosophy” (1). While gender studies and educational philosophy seem to have
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become entirely disconnected fields, Martin explains that this was not always the case; she traces
a discourse on the idea of an educational experience designed to foster women from Plato to
Mary Wollstonecraft. We ignore this conversation to the detriment of all of our students, as she
points out that “not only women are led astray in this circumstance; men also suffer when they
are denied knowledge of the range of educational ideals past philosophers have held up for half
the population” (4). Ultimately, the continuance of this discourse would mean a reunification of
gender studies and educational philosophy.
Danielle D. Flannery and Elisabeth Hayes echo Rich and Martin when they explain,
“inattention to gender is linked to a broader philosophical stance in adult learning theory that
assumes the universal relevance and applicability of dominant learning theories to all adult
learning settings and participants in adult education” (“Women’s Learning: A Kaleidoscope” 5).
The reason that this issue has been invisible to many lies in the presumption that these dominant
learning theories are not gendered, are not tailored to a specific and privileged part of the
population. Flannery and Hayes point out, for example, that “self-direction and autonomy as
learning goals reinforce a Western, middle-class, White masculinist value system” (5-6).
Theorists like Flannery and Hayes would revitalize the latent discourse Martin describes. Their
arguments on transforming pedagogy for women students have less to do with issues of power
and authority than they do with gendered styles of learning, their ultimate goal being “to
establish women’s ways of knowing as legitimate and as valuable as those of men” (11).
While narrative psychologists would agree that narrative thought is not gendered but one
of perhaps very few true human universals, and while many feminist pedagogues would be sure
to point out that feminist pedagogy is beneficial for male students as well, some theorists point
out that narrative thought, story-based learning, may have a special significance for women. In
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“Feminist Pedagogies,” Elizabeth J. Tisdell discusses the transformation of education for women
as being “about stories—about sharing stories, feeling stories, analyzing stories, theorizing
stories, reframing them in some sort of educational space, and encouraging new action in light of
our educational re-storying experience” (155). While my goal in this project is of course the
improvement of educational experiences for all students, I admit that like Tisdell, I have a
special degree of concern for the educational experiences of women. Like her, I believe that
feminist pedagogy should be especially concerned with:
what facilitates women’s learning . . . . Feminist pedagogy is about women’s education. It
is aimed primarily, although not exclusively, at their educational needs, and it assumes
that the traditional educational system has focused on the needs of men from privileged
race and class groups. (155-56)
Considering the gendered connotations of story-based thinking, I believe that narrative pedagogy
even in its most basic forms is loaded with potential as a feminist practice. At the same time, I
believe that a conscious reunification of gender theory, educational philosophy, and narrative
psychology can lead us to a more fully realized feminist narrative pedagogy.
My goal is just such a reunification. Consider how a transformation of teaching practices
to reflect the structure of the life narratives of women grows out of the theories described in the
previous section. The very foundation of this project is the understanding that our social
positions – as defined by gender, sexual orientation, race, class, citizenship, religion, mental
dis/ability, physical dis/ability, and many other factors – shape not only the ease or hardship with
which we move through the world but also the way in which we perceive, understand, and relate
to it. This project takes as a guiding principle that our pedagogy should reflect the diversity of
our students’ standpoints.
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This project also proceeds with a feminist epistemological mindset regarding those
standpoints and perspectives. A feminist narrative pedagogy is a pedagogy shaped by strong
objectivity. Diverse perspectives are not only important to understand in order to find the most
effective teaching style but also because the knowledge discovered and shared in a classroom is
unavoidably shaped by culture, just as our narratives are.
While gender, sexual orientation, and gender identity are the primary variables I will
examine in comparing life narratives, the corpus of texts informing this project includes the
voices of people of color, of immigrants, of people with disabilities, of people in poverty. My
approach will be conscious of and attentive to intersectionality, recognizing that there will be
distinctive qualities of the writing of women of different backgrounds and of queer people of
different backgrounds. Discussions of these differences will run throughout discussions of
differences based on gender and sexuality.
Moreover, while the primary goals of a feminist narrative pedagogy are the better
facilitation of learning, this model also answers the more political concerns of mainstream
feminist pedagogues. It absolutely necessitates listening to the voices of students and
understanding their backgrounds to guide the design of learning experiences. Students’ life
stories thus become more than simply a part of the course content; they influence and shape its
structure. A feminist narrative pedagogy would likely look very different in different schools
with different student demographics.
A feminist narrative pedagogy offers new language and paradigms with which to
consider central issues in critical pedagogy. Recall the imperative to abolish classroom models in
which the students are passive consumers of knowledge distributed by the instructor. If we
consider an educational experience in narrative terms, within that story, it should go without
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saying that students should be the protagonists of that story, the most active agents driving the
plot. A feminist narrative pedagogy does not centralize the role of the teacher.
That is not to say, however, that the role of the teacher is not significant. A feminist
narrative pedagogy offers an interesting new framework in which to consider questions about
authority in the classroom. This model does not seek to abolish authority or to pretend that the
teacher’s position does not confer authority. Rather, it re-considers how that authority should
manifest specifically by examining life writing. Autobiographical narratives are so often stories
of learning, growth, maturation, and development, and within those narratives, we can observe
not only the narrators but also the figures – family, friends, mentors, teachers – from whom
those narrators learn. We can examine the characteristics of these figures to ask ourselves what
qualities inspire the narrators to willingly confer authority onto them, to use them as models, and
emulate those characteristics as much as possible.
Before we can achieve any of these goals, however, there is a great deal of background to
establish.
Chapter two is devoted to a detailed look at the existing scholarship linking narratology
to educational practice. I explore scholarship related to how we learn about and give order to the
world around us as well as comprehend our own identities and places within that world through
narrative. More importantly, I proceed into the application of narrative theory to developing
curriculum. If we understand that human beings instinctively learn through narrative, then we
should be able to consciously use that understanding in developing lessons and courses to follow
these natural learning patterns. Both to demonstrate the application of narrative thinking in a
general sense to educational practice and to provide a topic for later analysis, I explore current
academic sources describing the ways “narrative thinking” is utilized in effective teaching.
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Among them, I include articles dealing with the use of narratives within the classroom – that is,
storytelling as a teaching practice. I also include material describing the use of narrative thinking
on what I will call the “macro” level of course design and curriculum planning. By the end of
this chapter, I establish that narrative pedagogy should be and in many cases is already being
employed at multiple levels in the education system. As I have explained, though, it isn’t enough
to ask whether we are employing “narrative thinking” in our classes; next we have to consider
what kind of narrative we are trying to foster. I explore the question of what “genres”
characterize the stories we tell in the classroom and those we expect students to follow leading
up to their degrees.
Chapter three is the first of two chapters designed to demonstrate the importance of
narrative genre to maximizing the potential for narrative thinking in pedagogy. Though we may
learn and understand our lives as narratives, not everyone constructs their reality according to the
same conventions. The same stories will not speak to every student; the same stages of inquiry
will not make sense to every student. To help establish this importance, I turn my attention to
theoretical and critical texts dealing with women’s life narratives and queer life narratives to
explicate their differences from male and heteronormative narratives. In terms of women’s life
writing, I explore scholarship on both the differing conventions exhibited by women authors in
traditionally male genres and the particular genres of life writing which are specific to women
authors by virtue of the material realities of their lived experiences – for example, narratives
centered on pregnancy, childbirth, and motherhood. Likewise, memoirs of girlhood, often
centering on struggles with a patriarchal and misogynistic environment, so differ from boyhood
memoirs as to arguably be considered their own genre. In terms of queer life writing, I explore
scholarship on queer genres such as the “coming out” story, the lesbian narrative, and the gender
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transition narrative. In addition to theoretical scholarship, I examine a wide selection of works in
each of these genres. My critical approach is devoted to exploring how the conventions of these
genres – methods of organization, narrative structure, stages of plot, choices in focus – function
in non-masculine or non-heteronormative ways. By the end of this chapter, I describe a number
of genre conventions and patterns of development particular to women’s and queer life writing.
Chapter four builds on the literary critique of the third to demonstrate that these differing
genre conventions are indicative of differing reasoning styles, broaching the delicate discourse
regarding the gendered qualities of different reasoning styles. I draw on scholarship which
criticizes traditional models of cognitive development as being male-centered theories which fail
to accurately describe some of the developmental processes and methods of knowledge
acquisition of girls and opposes the centralization of “masculine” thinking and the assumption
that “feminine” thinking is inferior. Likewise, I explore what queer theorists have written on the
unique patterns of psychological development and knowledge acquisition among LGBT people. I
navigate these texts carefully. I am consistently explicit about the fact that these differences are
not biologically essential, but have rather to do with the influence of different socially
constructed developmental experiences. In connection with the previous chapter, I argue that the
different genre conventions I have described demonstrate these different patterns of
psychological development and knowledge acquisition, which we can and should use to
construct new narrative pedagogical models.
Chapter five suggests new educational practices designed to bring these suppressed and
marginalized life narrative genres, indicative of different patterns of thinking and reasoning, into
the education process to create both individual lessons and curriculum designs which centralize
them. I detail a number of sample lesson plans and curriculum models. For example, I describe
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individual lessons and units which follow the narrative structure of a coming-out story as a mode
of learning and personal development. I detail courses and plans of study (inquiry experiences)
favoring the reasoning styles made apparent by lesbian narratives: engaging in non-linear
thinking, viewing the same subject through diverse perspectives, and encouraging
experimentation and finding one’s own path. I suggest adaptations and reformulations of existing
pedagogical practices to centralize the reasoning styles distinct to women’s life writing. Finally, I
review the hypotheses I have argued and expand on their significance and applications as well as
provide suggestions for future research. Although I make efforts to incorporate intersectionality
into this research process, my central focus in terms of literary genres is on women’s and queer
literature. This focus naturally includes the life writing of women and queer authors of diverse
racial, religious, economic, and cultural backgrounds, but my primary focus remains on the role
of gender and sexual orientation in their work. While I feel there are many connections between
women’s and queer literature and other suppressed genres, I have no doubt that additional
research could be done which would more fully explore narrative pedagogy with attention to
African American literature or Native American Literature, for instance. It is my hope to provide
a foundation on which such research may proceed. Likewise, although it is my intention to
provide models and examples which would serve many different fields, my expertise is in
English and thus, teachers in the humanities may find my research more immediately applicable
than teachers in the sciences. Ideally, at some point, additional scholarship may be conducted by
those with expertise in math and the sciences to better apply these theories to their own
disciplines.
The potential uses of narrative pedagogy to reach diverse students are as numerous and
varied as the students themselves. My hope is that this potential will be recognized and these
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techniques will be used to centralize formerly marginalized students and increase educational
opportunities in every field.

CHAPTER 2
NARRATIVE IN PSYCHOLOGY AND PEDAGOGY:
DEFINITIONS AND GROUNDWORK

In 1944, psychologists Fritz Heider and Marianne Simmel conducted a now famous
experiment designed to reveal the degree to which humans are naturally inclined toward
processing their observations in terms of narrative. As described in “An Experimental Study of
Human Behavior,” Heider and Simmel produced a short film depicting geometric shapes – a
larger triangle, a smaller triangle, a circle, and a very large rectangle – moving around the screen,
bumping into each other, circling each other, opening, and moving in and out of each other. After
viewing the film, subjects were asked to describe what they just watched.
Of over 100 participants, only one subject responded with a straightforward description
of the movement of shapes. All remaining subjects personified the moving shapes, assigned them
emotions and motivations, their movements becoming conscious actions and reactions to each
other, using the large, unmoving rectangle as a set-piece. To them, it wasn’t a large triangle and a
small triangle moving around a rectangle while a circle moved into the rectangle; it was a bigger
person chasing a smaller person around a house while a different person entered the house. As
one subject described the film: “A man has planned to meet a girl and the girl comes along with
another man . . . Then the two men have a fight, and the girl starts to go into the room to get out
of the way . . . She apparently does not want to be with the first man” (Heider and Simmel 24647). From the minimal input of the film, most subjects interpreted precise and complex
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narratives, even going so far as to conjure up backstories and predict the futures of the
characters.
The results of Heider and Simmel’s experiment would seem to support the suggestion
that human beings automatically process the world around them as narrative. In the decades
since, a vast collection of scholarship connecting psychology, anthropology, and literary studies,
has explored this human tendency toward story. More recently, pedagogues have joined the
discourse to consider the potential for making use of that tendency in various aspects of the
education process. This chapter will review this scholarship, highlighting the significance of
narrative thought to curriculum design.
Before proceeding into an exploration of narrative psychology and narrative pedagogy,
however, it seems prudent to establish a working definition of “narrative,” as scholars vary
somewhat in what they consider to be the requisite characteristics of a narrative. I aim for an
open and widely inclusive definition; for the purposes of this project, a narrative need only meet
three fairly flexible criteria.
1. A narrative is, first and most simply, a representation of events. The events may have
actually occurred or they may be entirely imagined; I will use the term narrative to refer to both
fiction and nonfiction. The representation itself may be linguistic or it may be purely visual or
any combination thereof; it seems ridiculous, for example, to suggest that a silent film could not
qualify as narrative. The term “events” encompasses both physical actions and psychological
responses (a narrative might consist solely of one or the other but will generally be a
combination of the two). The term should also be taken to imply the presence of character agents
and setting.
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2. To qualify as a narrative, the events represented must be selected for representation. As
I will explore in more detail in the next section, the significance of narrative lies in the human
mind’s ability to distinguish particular events as relevant ones, thus a strong definition of
narrative should distinguish storymaking from mere recordkeeping. Take, for example, the
difference between the account of a criminal trial as typed by the court stenographer and that as
related later by a member of the jury. One will include every detail regardless of significance; the
other will select events for representation. That selection indicates the development of a
narrative.
3. The third criterion is closely related, perhaps even unavoidably implied by, the second;
in a narrative, the events selected for representation will be selected purposefully. This is to say,
events will be chosen because they are deemed meaningful, because they contribute to a whole
representation that is itself meaningful in one way or another. The representation may be
designed to teach a lesson, to argue a point, to elicit a particular emotional response, or for a
variety of other purposes, but it is designed for something.
If this definition seems far more concise and far less restrictive than certain others, it is
because I’ve come to find that the longer and more complex a definition for narrative is, the
more that definition seems to be describing a particularly good narrative rather than defining
narrative per se. For example, while I have a great respect for Jerome Bruner’s work in narrative
psychology and pedagogy, his explanation of the requisite features of narrative seems needlessly
demanding. In The Culture of Education, for example, his criteria include “Implied Canonicity,”
by which he means that “to be worth telling, a narrative must run counter to expectancy” (139).
Perhaps a narrative might be more engaging, more striking, if its events surprised the audience,
but the predictability of plot events should hardly be considered a qualifying factor for whether
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something is a narrative at all. Likewise, Bruner includes “Ambiguity of Reference,” which is to
say that “what a narrative is ‘about’ is always open to some question” (140). This seems rather a
problematic qualifier. Suppose every member of an audience perceived the meaning of a simple
narrative; suppose a narrative included a lengthy bit of exposition as to its intended meaning. In
these cases, the purposeful, meaningful representation of events is nevertheless certainly no less
a narrative.
Understanding “narrative” to mean a representation, linguistic or otherwise, of events,
real or imagined, purposefully selected to convey some kind of meaning, we can proceed to
consider narrative’s origins, function, and potential.

Narrative Psychology

A wealth of anthropological research addresses the question of what most prominently
distinguishes the evolution of humankind from other animals, including most other primates,
such as our capacity for language, our complex use of tools, or simply our opposable thumbs. A
recent wave of interdisciplinary scholarship has offered a fresh suggestion: that humankind’s
most unique and distinguishing characteristic is that we are a species with the capacity for
narrative thought.
Since 1984, when Walter Fisher coined the term homo narrans to designate human
beings as a narrating species, many have followed his lead in exploring this uniquely human
trait. Literary scholar and evolutionary psychologist Michelle Scalise Sugiyama considers
narrative’s origins and function. In “Reverse Engineering Narrative: Evidence of Special
Design,” she notes evidence from cave paintings to the earliest written records to establish first
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that storytelling has been a part of every human culture in one way or another, even arguing for
“the universality of narrative structural components . . . the essence of the story—character and
motive, events and constraints, actions and reactions, failure and triumph” (180-81) across
different cultures. Sugiyama believes, thus, that narrative must have played a role in natural
selection (177), that it must have served some vital function for the species. Considering those
basic universal characteristics of narrative, she suggests that “the function of narrative, then,
would appear to be the representation of the problems humans encounter in their lives and the
constraints individuals struggle against in their efforts to solve them” (186). If so, then from our
earliest existence, narrative has been a kind of cognitive problem-solving mechanism. If
Sugiyama is correct that even among early homo sapiens, “narrative provide[d] us with the
opportunity to expand our knowledge of human nature and the conditions that constrain it, both
universal and local” (189), then narrative has its origins as a teaching tool.
In “Narrating the Self,” anthropologists Elinor Ochs and Lisa Capps likewise point to
narrative as a means of expanding understanding about other people and the social systems in
which they must function; “one on the most important functions of narrative is to situate
particular events against a larger horizon of what we consider to be human passions, virtues,
philosophies, actions, and relationships” (30). That is, it gives us a complex framework with
which to process our own experience as well as connecting us to our communities. As Ochs and
Capps explain, humans still use narrative to connect and to problem solve in every part of our
culture: “Whether in the courtroom, workplace, scientific laboratory, classroom, athletic field, or
simply in the course of conversing with family and friends, narrative activity challenges
participants to make sense of enigmatic and frustrating situations” (32). Additionally, these
anthropologists reason one step further than recognizing narrative as a means of understanding
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the world, asserting that “narrative simultaneously is born out of experience and gives shape to
experience” (20). We create and share narratives of what we have experienced, but the narratives
which have been shared with us will necessarily impact our processing of new experiences.
Scholars in the field of narrative psychology have explored the many ways in which
narrative remains a core element of human life today. Jerome Bruner stands at the forefront of
this field, as he has written extensively on how humans employ narrative as a means of
understanding both ourselves and the physical and social world around us. In “The Narrative
Construction of Reality,” Bruner explains how we process our own experiences: “we organize
our experience and our memory of human happenings mainly in the form of narrative—stories,
excuses, myths, reasons for doing and not doing, and so on” (4). This is not to say that human
beings only use narrative as a tool for storing and recalling and communicating those
experiences. Rather, when Bruner calls narrative “a form not only of representing but of
constituting reality” (5), he seems to imply that without creating narratives of our experiences,
we would have no grasp of their significance, no understanding of other people and the world in
which we live.
Bruner’s argument may be best understood in relation to James Britton’s “Shaping at the
Point of Utterance.” Britton considers the matter of invention in such a way as to highlight the
importance of spontaneous and free writing, ideas which no doubt greatly influenced the
development of “writing to learn” techniques. Britton poses the question, “How often have we
had a student come to us with his problem, and in the course of verbalizing what that problem is
reach a solution with no help from us?” (148). Undoubtedly, most teachers can recall many such
student conferences. With these experiences in mind, Britton makes the case to “associate
spontaneous shaping, whether in speech or writing, with the moment by moment interpretative
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process by which we make sense of what is happening around us” (149). That interpretive
process, “our moment by moment shaping of the data of the senses” (151), is what Bruner would
describe as a narrative thought process. Just as Britton explains that the act of speaking or
writing about a concept can be the key to grasping it, Bruner explains that the act of encoding
our experiences into narrative – even if only internally, to ourselves – is how we are able to
comprehend our experiences. In Acts of Meaning, Bruner points out from observation that
subjects tend to tell stories, even those which may have occurred years ago, in the present tense,
“the narrator not telling about the past, which is almost always told in the past tense, but deciding
what to make of the past narratively at the moment of telling” (122). In other words, until we
narrate them, our experiences do not have meaning; the act of narration is the source of
understanding.
The act of narration is likewise the means by which we understand ourselves and our
place within those experiences. In “Life as Narrative,” Bruner explains that we are all, in a sense,
tireless autobiographers, engaged in a ceaseless process of narrating our own experiences for
ourselves and for others, and this process is vital. He writes, “‘world making’ is the principal
function of mind, whether in the sciences or in the arts . . . so autobiography (formal or informal)
should be viewed as a set of procedures for ‘life making’” (691-92). He describes this theory
elsewhere as “the notion of Self as a storyteller . . . the Self telling stories that included a
delineation of Self as part of the story” (Acts of Meaning 111). To have a self is to narrate the
self.
It is little wonder, then, that other narrative psychologists have found that we begin
narrating – if only to ourselves – from a very young age, when our sense of self first begins to
take shape. In On the Origin of Stories: Evolution, Cognition, and Fiction, Brian Boyd discusses
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studies in which barely verbal children demonstrate that, much like Heider and Simmel’s adult
subjects, they interpret even abstract images as narratives: “we will interpret something as story
if we can. Babies and adults alike cannot help seeing a sequence of moving dots in terms of
animate causality” (137). Boyd determines that:
In pretend play, young children perform better than they can explicitly articulate . . . .
Infants can understand some of the temporal and causal structure of events. One and twoyear-olds can imitate action sequences in the order in which they were presented. (150)
Fascinatingly, as the children he observed became verbal, he found that: “Infants retain
memories for several months without language, and can later superimpose language on
previously encoded preverbal memories” (153). This suggests that at less than one year old,
before we are able to verbalize a narrative, we are able to create it by imitating what we see.
In fact, a great deal of our narrating amounts to imitation of one form or another. Bruner
writes, “Narrative imitates life, life imitates narrative. ‘Life’ in this sense is the same kind of
construction of the human imagination as ‘a narrative’ is” (“Life as Narrative” 692). Narrative
serves both to describe and prescribe our lives as we process new experience through the
narrative models with which we are familiar. Thus, inevitably, the culture and the narratives
surrounding us largely determine what narratives we are able to tell and imagine: “Given their
constructed nature and their dependence upon the cultural conventions and language usage, life
narratives obviously reflect the prevailing theories about ‘possible lives’ that are part of one’s
culture” (694).
As certain literary scholars concerned with autobiography and memoir point out,
however, life narratives are also a means of pulling apart and critiquing those very models. In
The Situation and the Story, Vivian Gornick argues that truly meaningful life writing occurs
when “the narrator is involved not in confession but in this kind of self-investigation, the kind
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that means to provide motion, purpose, and dramatic tension” (35). That is, truly meaningful life
writing occurs when one probes one’s own experiences to gain new understanding of them. Nor
is the self the only possible subject of critique through life writing; life writing can be a tool to
analyze social institutions. Gornick cites an author writing on the subject of marriage to find “the
mysteriousness of the familiar. Looking hard at an experience on which everyone in the world
has an opinion, she sees that she is a principal in a beloved situation about which she has serious
misgivings” (74-75). Narrative thus has the ability also to disrupt and problematize the carelessly
accepted.
In terms of what is even available to us for critique and re-imagining, however, we are, to
some extent, bound by narratives to which we have been exposed. In Actual Minds, Possible
Worlds, Bruner describes narration as a process which we employ “to initiate and guide a search
for meanings among a spectrum of possible meanings” (25), but what determines which
meanings exist as possibilities within that spectrum? Bruner explains that our stories about
ourselves or anything else will inevitably be an “instantiation of models we carry in our own
minds” (7), or rather, one might say, an instantiation of genres. Bruner comes to use this term as
he points out that we will instinctively attempt to fit narratives we encounter into a
“psychological genre,” which he defines as “the reader’s conception of what kind of story or text
he is encountering or ‘recreating’” (7). Genre functions thus as a guide to understanding the
meaning of the story.
In analyzing the life stories of research subjects as the subjects told them, Bruner found
that
the larger overall narratives were told in easily recognizable genres—the tale of a victim,
a Bildungsroman, antihero forms, Wandering stories, black comedy, and so on. The
storied events that they comprised made sense only in terms of the larger picture. . . . It
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soon became apparent not only that life imitated art but that it did so by choosing art’s
genres and its other devices of storytelling as its modes of expression. (121)
It is no small point here that by “art’s genres,” Bruner is clearly referring to genres which may
primarily or at least frequently be placed in the realm of fiction. Curiously, Bruner does not
dwell on this question.
Other researchers have had a great deal more to say on the meaningfulness of fiction in
narrative psychology. Jonathan Gottschall, evolutionary literary scholar and author of The
Storytelling Animal, argues that even invented narratives – fictional stories – may serve a similar
evolutionary purpose as “true” stories. For as far back in our history as we are able to uncover,
we find that humans have employed fiction of one sort or another to exercise, prepare, and one
might even say program the mind for how to handle new experiences, or as Gottschall writes,
“our continuous immersion in fictional problem solving would improve our ability to deal with
real problems” (63). When we consider the morally instructional nature of various fables,
folklore, and mythology, this is hardly a novel concept, but it remains significant in reminding us
that the delineation between “true” stories and fiction may be less consequential than one might
expect when it comes to narrative thought.
I would linger on this point for a moment, as many might consider it self-evident that we
do harbor a strong concern for the factuality of the narratives we encounter. On the surface,
audiences certainly seem to consider factuality to be consequential. They clearly did when James
Frey finally admitted that the addiction-centered “memoir” A Million Little Pieces was a blend of
fact and fiction2, or more recently when Chris Kyle’s American Sniper was found to be rife with

2

Frey’s work received widespread critical attention as a drug rehabilitation memoir; it is now considered a fictional
novel following numerous allegations of literary forgery.
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inaccuracies – though I would contend that the factual aspects of Kyle’s work are at least as
3

offensive as the fictional ones. Even my eighth-grade students felt cheated and dismayed when I
revealed to them that the teenage girl’s diary they had been reading under the title Go Ask Alice4
is now known to be a work of fiction.
On the other hand, those same students, and I would suspect many among the audiences
of A Million Little Pieces and American Sniper, are happy to invest themselves in narratives
presented as fiction. Is this because we take fictional narratives solely for frivolous entertainment
and deftly avoid using them as models for understanding ourselves, our place in social systems,
and the world around us? This hardly seems the case when we consider that we continue to use
fables and fairytales to instruct young children, or that we readily relate to and model ourselves
after fictional heroes, or that it is quite impossible to read the entire Harry Potter series without
pausing to consider into which house we would be sorted5. One need only browse through the
personality quizzes available on Buzzfeed6 designed to determine whether you are a Jedi or a
Sith,7 which X-Men hero you should marry8, to which race of Middle Earth you belong, which
Dr. Who companion you are, or (my personal favorite) which Disney villain should be your
midwife, to see how enthusiastically we seek to understand ourselves through the lenses of
fiction.9

3

Kyle’s memoir of his tours as a sniper during the Iraq War was a bestselling book in 2015; controversies soon
followed regarding Kyle’s embellishment of his military record as well as his racist undertones.
4
Beatrice Sparks produced a number of novels in the guise of troubled teenagers’ diaries in the 1970s; she initially
presented these as the factual writings of teens themselves.
5
At the school of magic which serves as the setting for the young adult fantasy novels, students are sorted into
one of four houses based on their personalities.
6
Buzzfeed is a popular news and entertainment website; its content includes many “quizzes” for users.
7
Jedi and Sith are the heroes and villains of the Star Wars franchise.
8
X-Men is a popular superhero comic book and film franchise.
9
In the interest of diligence in research, I will report that I am River Song, an elf Jedi who should marry Gambit and
recruit Ursula the sea witch to deliver our child.

42

We are so well versed in the many genres of fictional narrative surrounding us that it is
inevitable that we process our own experience through them. The revulsion with which certain
faux autobiographies have been greeted has perhaps much less to do with their fictional nature
than with their presentation as fact. Audiences are more than willing to embrace and even,
consciously or subconsciously, mine fictional narratives for truths which might lie at the heart of
them. They are unwilling, however, to forgive anything which appears to be deception.
This acceptance of the varying forms of narrative truth and the intolerance for deception
stand as strong evidence that humans universally grasp the personal and social importance of
narrative, that consciously or otherwise, we understand that narrative thought is key to our
understanding of ourselves and our world. With that understanding, we can proceed then to
discuss the next logical step of employing this cognitive tool in purposeful ways in the learning
process.

Narrative Pedagogy

In the previous section, I suggested that if narrative psychologists and evolutionary
literary scholars are correct, if, as Gottschall writes, “the human mind was shaped for story, so
that it could be shaped by story” (56), then narrative structure could be described as a kind of
programming language that human minds use to assimilate and process information and prepare
for future input. In this case, to teach effectively, one should be skilled in the application of
narrative.
Many experts in pedagogy have reached the same conclusion in recent years. In “Critical
Narrative as Pedagogy,” Scherto Gill writes that students are able to employ narrative as a “quest

43

for meaning” (73), that “people tell stories of their actions to render them meaningful” (74). At
the same time, part of the role of a teacher is to train students to narrate consciously,
thoughtfully, reflectively, as opposed to automatically. As a result, students will be able to
question assumptions and re-interpret experiences using narrative: “critical self reflection is
connected to one’s ability to deconstruct certain assumptions and to construct and reconstruct
meaning” (75). In the kind of classroom model Gill describes, teacher and students become conarrators who “develop meaning together by telling and listening, interpreting the narrative
themes, analyzing the situations within which one lives and placing them in a wider scheme of
things” (75), making members of the class “both learners and pedagogues as they embark on a
narrative journey of inquiry, questioning, facilitating and learning” (88). Though Gill does not
explicitly say so, this model also fulfills goals shared by critical and feminist pedagogues.
However, not all teachers are so quick to embrace narrative thought in education. In part,
the division between those quicker to embrace narrative pedagogy and those slower to embrace it
is a matter of disciplinary standards for knowledge. In “That’s Just a Story: Academic Genres
and Teaching Anecdotes in Writing-Across-the-Curriculum Projects,” Michael Charlton
describes the challenges he encounters in bridging understanding between educators in the
humanities and those in the sciences while conferencing regarding the Writing Across the
Curriculum movement. As he explains, “fields outside the humanities tend to resist the extensive
use of personal narrative as a tool for pedagogical inquiry, often preferring more quantitative or
empirical evidence . . . and rejecting stories as hopelessly subjective” (19). The irony, Charlton
points out, is that while trying to convince him of the lack of substance that individual narratives
have, teachers in the sciences will employ teaching anecdotes of their own, anecdotes which may
themselves center upon empirical data. As a point of commonality, Charlton finds that in both
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the humanities and the sciences, teachers will share “teacher lore,” or stories of the classroom, to
help each other improve their practice, but that those stories will vary in structure by discipline:
“Teacher lore exists in other disciplines—it simply takes different forms and applies different
standards of evidence . . . . Just as the humanities and social sciences practice different genres of
writing, they practice different genres of teaching” (25-26). For example, while teachers in the
humanities may be more apt to frame their teacher lore as individual anecdotes of interactions
with students, teachers in the sciences may more often frame their lore in statistical terms. It
would be fair to argue, that even reports of scientific experiments and explanations of
mathematic proofs may be considered to constitute a sort of narrative. Even if certain disciplines
may more consciously employ narrative, if all experiences are processed as narrative, then all
classroom experiences are inevitably processed as narrative – by students and teachers alike.
As Linda Hobbs and Rob Davis explore in “Narrative Pedagogies in Science,
Mathematics, and Technology,” ignoring the natural inclination toward narrative even in
disciplines more traditionally considered in the realm of logical-scientific thought wastes a
valuable cognitive resource. Inevitably students will not only experience the classroom as
narrative, they will experience it in very human terms as opposed to purely technical terms. As
Hobbs and Davis explain, even in the sciences, there is an “aesthetic dimension of learning, for
emotion and cognition are inextricably linked in the process of student learning” (1290).
Teachers can encourage students to tap into this aesthetic dimension “as they build narratives
about, and through, their learning, and as they construct narratives from their lived experiences”
(1290), including experiences in the classroom.
Even some educators within the humanities are suspicious of narrative as a learning tool,
as Meg Peterson-Gonzalez discusses in “In Defense of Storytelling.” Many who teach research
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writing, such as composition instructors, “seem to accept the implicit assumption that fiction has
no place in college writing instruction outside of ‘creative writing.’ To many, even personal
narrative is suspect” (63). Narrative may be considered “suspect” because of its supposed lack of
rigor and the misconception that narrative need not have a logical foundation. As PetersonGonzalez argues, however, narration and exposition have a great deal more in common than
might be expected: “The same type of crafting goes on in narrative writing as in expository
prose. The writer still needs to gather information. The details need to be as specific as the
statistics compiled for a research paper” (31). In other words, narratives on the whole do not
necessarily lack rigor and rhetorical purpose, but poorly executed narratives which do not stand
up to critical inquiry lack rigor and purpose; certainly, poorly executed expository prose which
fails to withstand critical inquiry is just as common as poorly executed narrative. As we are so
naturally inclined toward narrative, training students to produce reasoned and effective narratives
makes a great deal more sense than shunning the entire mode of thought.
There is hardly a professional field in which narrative skills are not useful in a practical
sense. Gottschall reminds us:
Business executives are increasingly told that they must be creative storytellers: they
have to spin compelling narratives about their products and brands that emotionally
transport consumers. Political commentators see a presidential election not only as a
contest between charismatic politicians and their ideas but also as a competition between
conflicting stories about the nation’s past and future. Legal scholars envision a trial as a
story contest, too, in which opposing counsels construct narratives of guilt and innocence.
(15-16)
Considering the ubiquitous nature of narrative in a wide variety of professions, it would seem to
be the duty of those of us tasked with preparing students to enter these professions to give them
practice in the skillful application of narrative thought. While strict empiricists might question
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whether we can afford to indulge in narrative, a better question might be whether we can afford
not to.
The research I have cited so far covers a considerable range of narrative activity in
education, and that range will only grow as we proceed further. Before doing so, I would like to
suggest two broad categories for practices under the umbrella of narrative pedagogy, two levels
on which narrative thought may be applied to the learning process; I will refer to narrative
pedagogy on a “micro” level and on a “macro” level.
Micro-level applications of narrative pedagogy involve the sharing of specific stories
within the classroom. This level includes any instance in which students are given stories by any
medium (including orally by the teacher), and are expected to interpret or critique them. It also
covers any instance in which students are prompted to narrate orally or through writing
assignments. In micro-level narrative pedagogy, students are using narrative.
Macro-level applications of narrative pedagogy involve considering the storied nature of
educational experiences themselves. This level includes any preparatory thought a teacher or
administrator makes about the narrative structure of lessons, courses, or programs, the “plotting”
of experiences for students to move through as character agents. This thinking could be
considered “behind the scenes” work that students may or may not be consciously aware of, but
which uses narrative thought to create sequences of learning activities that will be familiar and
recognizable for students. In many cases, macro-level and micro-level narrative pedagogies can
be utilized together to maximize their potential.
To clarify both of these levels, consider Carola Conle’s “An Anatomy of Narrative
Curricula,” in which she breaks down a variety of practices, some of which I would classify as
micro-level and others macro-level. For example, she describes how students being prepared for
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particular professions might be presented with case studies from the field, which would be
intended “to prompt engagement during follow-up discussion or reflection” (6). Thus, teachers
give students narratives to analyze and derive meaning from, and they will later apply this
knowledge in their own work. Or, students may be prompted to share experiential stories that
could be similarly applicable: “Taken from real life situations, [they are] used to explore the
narrator’s own experience and [are] also presented to colleagues as an experiential repertoirebuilding exercise” (7). Students are thus taught to mine their own experiences for useful
knowledge. These are both examples of micro-level narrative pedagogy as they involve the use
of specific stories in the classroom.
On the other end of the spectrum, Conle describes how teachers may create participant
observation projects such as clinical experiences: “Certain narrative curricular practices are
incorporated into participant-observer research. This incorporation usually happens in two areas:
narrative field notes and narrative accounts” (8). While writing or otherwise sharing a narrative
of the project would be micro-level, the design of such a research project, if it is to be effective,
necessarily means structuring a kind of plot for students to move through, considering what
challenges they will encounter and what meaning they will uncover along the way, or as Conle
describes it, developing a “quest-like” (13) experience. It is safe to say that if a teacher could
describe her practice in terms similar to planning and facilitating a Dungeons and Dragons
game, she is utilizing macro-level narrative pedagogy.
Perhaps because micro-level narrative pedagogy is more immediately tangible and
visible, scholars more commonly extol its benefits. For example, in “Storytelling as a
Pedagogical Tool in Higher Education,” Craig Eilert Abrahamson argues that storytelling within
the classroom can both enhance understanding and build community. First, “the positive impact
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of storytelling is the ability to build connections with personal experience, thus enhancing the
facilitation of inquiry into the educational content of the course itself” (446). Naturally, students
can better grasp information with which they can personally connect; stories are a means of
making that connection. Storytelling likewise allows them to contextualize the course material
within the larger scope of their education, which Abrahamson sees as the solution to a common
problem: “Far too often course content is delivered to the student in such a way that its meaning
has little context outside of its own content, which creates isolated learning that rarely is
connected together for the student through the curriculum” (447). Second, the sharing of stories
has additional benefits for the culture of the classroom as students come to better understand not
only course content, but also each other: “the sharing of experiences through the device of
storytelling enables individuals to build the bridge of understanding between one another” (441).
I consider the two kinds of benefits Abrahamson describes – building community and personally
contextualizing the material – to be reciprocal in that students develop a more personal
investment in the class itself.
In “Narrative Discourse and the Basic Writer,” Norbert Elliot describes why this
opportunity to personally contextualize course content through narrative is especially important
for struggling students and does a great deal more than allow students to build interest. To begin
with, for writers not quite ready to enter into highly formalized academic discourse, narrative can
be their only means of cognitive access: “To the basic writer, everything is personal . . . . The
most significant form of discourse for these writers, therefore, is narrative. Through narrative,
basic writers incorporate the world of the academy into their own lives” (19). Elliot challenges
readers to bear in mind that narrative appears in a great deal of professional scholarship,
criticizing experts in pedagogy who “use narrative in their own writing but refuse to provide
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tasks for their students that allow for the use of that mode of discourse” (25). He reminds us that
“narrative can provide legitimacy,” “narrative can provide metacognition,” and “narrative can
provide access to the numinous of human consciousness” (26). While I would suggest that
narrative has this capacity for everyone, it is particularly empowering and enriching for those
students lacking traditional formal training in academic discourse.
Those who might object to this form of discourse may argue that the personal nature of
narrative damages the objectivity which is meant to characterize more formal academic inquiry.
In Narrative Learning, Ivor Goodson, Gert J.J. Biesta, Michael Tedder, and Norma Adair
suggest quite the opposite. They assert that “narrative learning can be evidenced in the substance
of the narrative but also in the act of narration. Narrative learning . . . is therefore not solely
learning from the narrative; it is also the learning that goes on in the act of narration” (127).
They remind us that incorporating story into classroom discourse is about more than just sharing
stories but rather about teaching students how to narrate and how to analyze and use their
narratives. By teaching storytelling as a tool for reflection, we can create a situation in which
“life stories allow [a storyteller] to ‘objectify’ [her or] his life, to make it into an object of
reflection” (121). In this sense, incorporating personal narrative into the classroom could actually
increase objectivity. In terms of growing into a capacity for more formal discourse, they explain
that “storying has an integrative role: it is possible to achieve synthesis of different aspects of
experience, the integration of different forms of learning over time, through the process of
making stories” (121). Thus, properly utilized, storytelling is not something which holds students
back from formal academics; rather narrative thought allows them to bridge new forms of
discourse.
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There is no shortage of pedagogues arguing the benefits of micro-level narrative
pedagogy; there is also no shortage of scholarship which recognizes that the educational process
is itself a kind of narrative and an experience which will inevitably be processed in narrative
terms. However, there are far fewer pieces of research making specific arguments for conscious
macro-level narrative structuring of curricula. This lack of attention to conscious structuring is a
bit unsettling when we consider that, without conscious shaping, the educational narrative can
easily default to one that many – certainly critical and feminist pedagogues – would not
consciously choose.
In Inquiry and Reflection: Framing Narrative Practice in Higher Education, Diane
Dubose Brunner describes the genre of the default educational narrative as gleaned from various
fictional and nonfictional portrayals: “Often in both literature and other media texts we see one
vision of schooling, and it is powerful. That vision is largely negative, authoritarian, skill driven,
and uncaring” (75). That “vision” includes traits for the teacher characters, and “of the dominant
images of teachers, controlling stands out. In almost every form of media, we see the stern,
severe looks that have tended to characterize teachers over the decades” (116). Likewise, that
vision dictates the power and value structure of educational institutions, one which places the
school board at the top and students at the bottom, just below teachers (169). Brunner describes
operating within this narrative and feeling powerless against it: “I always blamed the structures
that were in place. Now I wonder if those structures actually prevented anything or did their
existence simply give me the impression that there was nothing I could do about them” (138).
Whether or not teachers consider the narrative structure of their curricula, a certain narrative
structure will inevitably exist, but it will often be a problematic narrative structure; to consider it
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consciously affords us the opportunity both to utilize narrative thought and to change the nature
of our institutions.
In “Narrative Inquiry as Pedagogy in Education: The Extraordinary Potential of Living,
Telling, Retelling, and Reliving Stories of Experience,” Janice Huber, Vera Caine, Marilyn
Huber, and Pam Steeves explain that conscious consideration of the educational narrative in
which teachers and students operate means considering all aspects of it just as one would study a
piece of literature: roles and function, the implications of setting, differences and relationships
among characters, characters’ motivations, and their internal and external lives. They explain
that the narrative of the classroom is only part of the overall narrative of each student’s life, and
thus it should be crafted as “a curriculum of lives that continuously seeks to hear and to learn
from the tensions experienced by children, families, teachers, and administrators as their lives
meet, and bump against each other’s storied lives and with school stories and stories of school”
(233). Creating an effective educational narrative means “attending to the life composing of
diverse people on school landscapes, including teachers and administrators” (232). Considering
the push toward standardization in the education system today, it seems more important than
ever to consider how the narrative of the school fits (or fails to fit) into the life narratives of
students and teachers.
Some teachers most definitely do take the time to consider the educational narrative. In
“The Narrative Nature of Pedagogical Content Knowledge,” Sigrun Gudmundsdottir points out
the inevitable narrative nature of pedagogy, as it is a teacher’s job to shape experiences for
students, and students will necessarily use narrative to organize those experiences (29). This does
not mean, however, that the narrative will necessarily be structured logically and effectively. To
consciously plot a course using narrative form, however, “we assign meaning to events and
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invest them with coherence, integrity, fullness, and closure” (31). In other words, at the end of a
course, students should be able to relate a narrative of that course which is coherent and
meaningful. Gudmundsdottir writes that teachers experienced in this sort of pedagogy “have a
large supply of well-organized curriculum units that are constantly renarratized, or put into a
larger narrative structure in the curriculum . . . . These are coherent stretches of narratives that
are combined in different ways to create a larger narrative” (34). Part of the coherence narrative
pedagogy affords is the ability to properly contextualize smaller narratives (class sessions, units)
within the continuity of larger ones (courses, degree programs).
I suggested above that in a sense, macro-level narrative pedagogy is “behind the scenes,”
that it may not always be immediately apparent to students. In “Narrative Learning: Its Contours
and Possibilities,” however, M. Carolyn Clark explains that in some cases, students should be
aware, as human beings learn from stories by hearing them, by telling them, and also “by
recognizing the narratives in which we are positioned” (6). This awareness can be achieved by
combining micro and macro-level narrative pedagogy – plotting students’ experience and then
prompting them to narrate it: “A narrative theory of learning [is] one that connects experiential
learning and the notion of narrative as a sense-making medium . . . We access [experience],
reflect on it, make sense of it through languaging it, which is to say, through narrating it” (5).
Incidentally, this sequence simultaneously offers opportunities for assessment and selfassessment on the part of both student and teacher: “This process of narrating our evolving
understanding of something is how we make our learning visible to ourselves and to others” (6).
Students can gain a better grasp of the context of the subject matter while also self-assessing
their own progress; teachers can use narratives as an assessment tool and also reflect on them to
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determine whether the narrative structure of the course has been recognized by the students as
intended.
Ultimately, the most basic and primary point of macro-level narrative pedagogy is not to
better fit course content into a curriculum, but to better fit it into the minds of students. Paul
Hazel clarifies how narrative pedagogy can accomplish this in “Toward a Narrative Pedagogy
for Interactive Learning Environments.” Returning to the underlying question of narrative
psychology, Hazel points out that we organize information by “story schemas,” and “these
schemas are learnt. They are generalizations about environments, sequences of events, and
stories, that over time and through constant exposure have established themselves as stable, yet
dynamic, structural elements in declarative memory” (203). We use these existing schemas to
make sense of new information and situations we encounter. Thus, the more student-centered
and student-directed learning becomes, the more important it is to consider the classroom as a
“narrative environment” to help subjects to maintain a conscious understanding of learning goals
and methods of achieving them along with encouraging self-assessment and reflection (206).
Hazel explains, “Narrative can be used as a constraint, keeping the learning within the bounds of
the curriculum, and as a sequencing device to maintain event order,” allowing students to use
their own story schemas as “navigational and semantic cognitive tool[s]” for progressing through
the course (207). Quite simply, macro-level narrative pedagogy makes a course more
recognizable, its content more intelligible, the experience of it more meaningful.
In the following section, I will review several specific examples of activities and course
structures which should be classified as narrative pedagogy. I will also consider the “genres”
which these educational narratives most resemble and what this may mean in terms of potential
for further development.
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Educational Narratives and Genre
Educational experiences – lessons, units, courses, degree programs – are inevitably
processed as narrative, consciously or subconsciously, by both students and teachers. Likewise,
those narratives inevitably share characteristics with certain genres of narrative – fictional or
nonfictional. Recall how Brunner described the default educational narrative, which was one in
which disempowered students moved through an environment which was disconnected from and
uninterested in their home lives, in which they were at the lowest part of a social hierarchy
overseen by authoritarian teachers and administrators. To these thematic elements we might add
the expectation of bullying which frequently goes unaddressed by faculty, an unofficial social
hierarchy based on money, beauty, and athletic ability, and the significance of developing
friendships in the community of students. While this list of features could easily describe the
experience of most American public schools, they are inherited from a long pedagogical tradition
dating back to antiquity. Many cultures’ institutions of learning, from Plato’s Academy in
Athens to the Neo-Confucian Yushima Seido in Japan considered strict discipline and rigid
hierarchies essential parts of the learning process. In Anglophone culture, however, this vision of
an educational environment and experience arguably derives from the genre of English boarding
school novels popularized in the nineteenth century by works such as Thomas Hughes’ Tom
Brown’s School Days. If we wish to change the experience of education, we need to be willing to
recognize its current genre and consider how to plot it into a different one.
Our expectations for educational experiences bear resemblance to novels of education.
More interestingly, within this overall narrative, many other plot structures appear which
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resemble a wider variety of genres. I do not mean to suggest that the characteristics of such
genres have an inherently negative influence on the educational experience, but rather that for
the intended audience, these genres may be poorly chosen (or inadvertently stumbled into).
Very few researchers, even those who explicitly address what I’ve termed macro-level
narrative pedagogy, seem to consider the importance of genre and audience. Kieran Egan,
however, does so in “Narrative and Learning: A Voyage of Implications.” Egan focuses on early
childhood education and questions the wisdom of “expanding horizons” curricula. As he
explains, such curricula are “structured on the assumption that what is most relevant, and thus
meaningful, to young children is content to do with themselves . . . . the curriculum is designed
to expand gradually outward” (119). In other words, the genre of expanding horizons curricula is
within the realm of literary realism, characterized by explorations of the familiar as many
assume this is most appropriate for young children, something to be moved beyond only
gradually. Egan points out, however, that this assumption seems wildly inaccurate when we
observe the genres of narrative with which children readily engage:
If it is familiarity with the child’s experience that makes the story accessible or
manageable, wouldn’t it be better if Peter was a child not a rabbit? . . . Clearly something
other than familiarity with everyday experience makes narratives and their content
engaging to children. (119)
If, as evidenced by the genres of narrative that make sense to them, children are apt to engage
with the distant and the fantastic, then why should the genre of their educational experience be
one grounded in the everyday and the familiar? This curricular choice reflects a lack of
conscious thought about genre and audience of the educational narrative. To be clear, this is not
to say that educational experiences following the structure of fantasy are necessarily better than
those following the structures of literary realism in a broad general sense. The key here, rather, is
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that Egan is arguing for a pedagogical design based on the genre with which the audience is most
comfortable and familiar. Both genres could serve as useful bases for curriculum design; which
one is best in any given situation depends on the audience – the students.
What Egan does on a small scale in this article – examining the genre characteristics of
an educational narrative as it stands and explaining why a different genre would be more
appropriate for a particular audience – is precisely the goal of my entire project on a larger scale.
The first step, then, is examining instances of narrative pedagogy and uncovering their genres.
In “Narrative Pedagogy for Introduction to Philosophy,” Kevin J. Harrelson argues for a
shift in the style of discourse used in undergraduate philosophy classrooms with the reasoning
that “people are more likely to reject a previously held belief or opinion as a result of narrative
persuasion than they are by most other techniques, such as the abstract argument that
philosophers hold so dearly” (115). Harrelson describes a micro-level narrative pedagogy in
which a student “tells her own story, or those of her acquaintances, and investigates the reasons
underlying her decisions and her actions. She will also make sense of her everyday observations,
and generally use philosophy to correct and improve her own thinking” (120). He also writes,
“Assignments can be constructed that require the students to inhabit the position of their
adversaries in lived disputes or disagreements” (121).
While Harrelson does not quite come to the point of describing these student-produced
narratives as having a genre, anyone who has taken an introductory course in philosophy cannot
possibly miss that he is effectively asking students to produce narratives which very much
resemble the ancient Greek Socratic dialogues of Plato and Xenophon – or even, to begin to
broach a macro-level of pedagogy, to act those narratives out. They are, after all, producing and
even enacting layered narratives in which characters explain their reasoning using examples from
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experience, at times feigning the opposition’s side only to dismantle it. It may or may not be the
case that Harrelson intended for students to write in this genre, but as a philosopher who would
naturally be versed in these texts, he would clearly default to it.
Emily Golson, a teacher of rhetoric, describes a similar approach in “Using Stories to
Probe Assumptions, Question Authority, and Stabilize Meaning,” though she has more clearly
utilized narrative pedagogy on multiple levels. As she teaches essay writing, she shares
Harrelson’s belief in the value of narrative discourse:
Viewed through the lens of storytelling, the essay becomes an organic response to the
visible and invisible forces that make up our lives. The stories prompt essays; the essays
contain and prompt stories, forming a rich hypertext of meaning. (93)
Both orally and in assigned reading, Golson shares many stories with her class over the course of
the semester, using them to connect otherwise disconnected concepts and repeating certain
stories as fundamental ones through which other stories may be interpreted: “If narrated
throughout the term, stories also offer the illusion of coherence . . . . As many stories embody
universal meanings, they can be referenced again and again” (79). Considering the course as a
whole begins to suggest a macro-level narrative pedagogy is at work. The method becomes
clearer when Golson describes how on the first day of the semester, she prompts students to
consider just what rhetoric is: “we begin with the stories that have informed rhetoric for over two
thousand years . . . . We continue with stories that introduce notions of veritas, of Kairos, of
wisdom, knowledge, and learning” (79).
Golson’s course structure begins with an exploration of rhetoric where rhetoric began, by
prompting the question of precisely what it is – in fact, just as some ancient Greeks did, a
number of her students suggest that it is simply empty manipulation (77). She proceeds then
through the significant dialogues and treatises by rhetoricians through the centuries to explore
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key concepts. Thus, in a very common move for teachers in many disciplines, the genre of
Golson’s course is a narrative history, and from the sound of it, a very traditionally organized
and inspired one which flows in a chronological and linear direction relying on the accounts of
well-recognized historical figures.
In “From Concept to Application: Student Narratives of Problem-Solving as a Basis for
Writing Assignments in Science Classes,” Jennifer Rich, Daisy Miller, and Lisa DeTora observe
and document the activities of college-level chemistry students to analyze differences in the
success rates of those who consciously apply narrative thinking strategies and those who do not.
They find that “students who solved problems correctly tended either to self-check or annotate
their responses,” and that students who solved more problems incorrectly would more often
simply “apply algebraic, symbolic, or algorithmic methods without expressing an understanding
of why these methods might work.” Conscious narrative thought means consistently reflective
and recursive learning with an awareness of context:
The distinctive characteristic of the students we considered to be self-checkers is a
consistent questioning about whether the work and answers make sense in the context in
which they are working. In addition, self-checkers will either backtrack or review their
steps to confirm their answers before moving to the next problem.
While Rich, Miller, and DeTora’s article centers on observation of students in a typical
classroom rather than a specific pedagogy in use, it certainly implies that an effective pedagogy
would be a micro-level narrative one which would prompt all students to consciously apply the
kind of narrative thinking that the more successful students already do.
Rich, Miller, and DeTora describe these successful students as producing “sensible
narratives about problem-solving.” Problem-solving narratives most certainly exist in a broad
assortment of literary pieces, films, and television programs derivative of works by Arthur
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Conan Doyle and Edgar Allen Poe. Effectively, successful students in the science classes Rich et
al. observed are those producing narratives in the genre of Mystery or Detective Fiction, or
possibly more in the vein of procedural programs such as Law and Order or CSI. Considering
that in this case, students were not prompted to produce narratives at all, one cannot help but
wonder if there might be a correlation between the success of students and their experience with
these kinds of fiction to provide a functional genre model for their narrative thought.
Many successful educational strategies imply a macro-level narrative pedagogy, if not
necessarily by name. Consider the kind of “cooperative learning” techniques described by
teachers such as Sue Steiner, Layne K. Stromwall, Stephanie Brzuzy, and Karen Gerdes in
“Using Cooperative Learning Strategies in Social Work Education.” In such strategies, students
work in groups toward clear learning goals as they move through sequenced activities and
projects (254-55). Beyond teaching accountability, self-assessment, and communication skills,
careful selection of groups can encourage respect for diversity (255). Steiner, Stromwall, Brzuzy,
and Gerdes write, “Cooperative learning allows students the opportunity to practice small group
skills such as group facilitation, keeping the group on task, managing conflict, reaching
consensus, and experiencing various group roles” (256). Reading about a carefully crafted
environment in which students are given learning tasks and work to complete them as a group
brings to mind Conle’s description of narrative pedagogy as providing “quest-like” inquiry
experiences. Indeed, while my comparison of macro-level narrative pedagogy to playing
Dungeons and Dragons may have come off as a joke, in terms of narrative genre, a diverse
group of students setting off on such a learning “quest,” functioning relatively independently of
the whole class but highly interdependently on each other, in which each student has a specific
role and set of responsibilities, bears considerable resemblance to classic works of fantasy.
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A certain degree of macro-level narrative pedagogy also necessarily characterizes
professionalization programs such as clinical experiences in teaching, nursing, and law – in
which teachers must plot out experiential learning activities for students to progress through,
anticipating challenges and rewards. Thus, narrative pedagogy has seen such a considerable
boom in these fields. Janice McDrury and Maxine Alterio discuss narrative pedagogy in
professionalization in Learning Through Storytelling in Higher Education: Using Reflection &
Experience to Improve Learning. McDrury and Alterio discuss how to maximize the potential of
the macro-level narrative structure with micro-level classroom activities, believing that “it is
necessary to engage students in storytelling processes that assist them to understand practice
events and enable layers of meaning to be uncovered” (86). By relating stories of clinical
experiences in class, students more consciously explore the meaning of those experiences
beyond initial impressions: “By talking through actions, reactions, thoughts and feelings it is
possible for students to uncover alternative interpretations of events and explore various practice
options” (121).
McDrury and Alterio refer to these narratives as “practice stories,” but there is hardly a
need to invent any new language to describe the genre of narrative their students produce. They
are telling stories of apprenticeship, of self-transformation under the guidance of more
experienced professionals upon whose behavior they might model their own, of attaining new
levels of comfort in unfamiliar environments and situations. It is a familiar arc of any
bildungsroman from David Copperfield to Dune.
These educators should certainly be applauded for their work, which is important enough
to be built upon and expanded to improve both its accessibility for diverse students and the scope
of its impact for all students. Remember that a large part of the benefit of narrative pedagogy is
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the framing of learning experiences in a familiar, accessible framework; recall also that the
narrative frameworks through which we process experiences are based on fictional and
nonfictional genres. Finally, review the genres which characterize the micro-level and macrolevel narrative pedagogies described above: philosophical dialogue, traditional narrative history,
fantasy, mystery or detective story, and traditional bildungsroman. All of these are genres which
originated in a male-dominated tradition, in which women and other marginalized groups have
long been neglected, decentralized, and underrepresented. My intention is not to abandon these
specific pedagogies but rather to add to them and develop them based on the theoretical
frameworks explored in the previous chapter and the narrative genres to be explored in the
following chapter.
For an example of how to add to and further develop existing narrative pedagogies,
compare those described by McDruty and Alterio to those described by Pamela M. Irsonside in
“Enabling Narrative Pedagogy: Inviting, Waiting, and Letting Be.” Like McDruty and Alterio,
Ironside describes narrative pedagogy as part of the process of professionalization (in this case,
of future nurses), but the class she observes includes different specific practices which foster a
different mindset in preparation for the experience. The teacher “began a unit on family-centered
nursing care not in the conventional way, with students ‘just sitting in a lecture setting,’ but by
inviting students to write accounts of their experiences to elucidate ‘why families are important’”
(482). When students are progressing into a unit on the care of patients with cancer, “practice
stories” are supplemented with students’ personal narratives relating to family and friends who
have cancer, such that the student “begins to understand that ‘cancer is . . . a huge deal to every
person it affects’ . . . . [the student] understands its meaning, and realizes that the ways people
experience illness matters (‘if they think they are sick that is all that matters’)” (483). As will
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become clear in the next chapter, the genre of narrative these students are producing and enacting
shares distinct qualities with literary genres developed by a tradition of women and queer
authors, and as a result, Ironside even describes how this results in the development of
“postmodern and feminist ways of considering the meaning of cancer in families” (483). The
class thus becomes more recognizable, more accommodating, for students who are a part of these
groups, and more enriching for everyone.
Just as every educational experience will be processed as a narrative whether the
instructor designs a purposeful narrative pedagogy or not, every narrative pedagogy will have a
genre whether it is intentionally crafted with one or not. Bruner describes one of the
requirements of narrative to be generic particularity; “Narratives deal with (or are ‘realized’ in)
particulars. But . . . particular stories are construed as falling into genres or types: bad-boy-woosnice-girl, bully-gets-his-comeuppance, power-doth-corrupt, whatever” (Culture of Education
133). I would once again describe generic particularity not so much as a “requirement” but as an
inevitability; furthermore, inevitably, genres most fundamental to how we process the world will
differ from person to person based on many factors including gender and sexual orientation.
Recall for moment Heider and Simmel’s famous experiment. I explained above that in
this experiment, subjects who viewed a short film depicting moving geometric shapes inferred
clear and complex narratives, assigning personalities and motivations to the shapes, predicting
their backgrounds and futures. While many trends emerged, however, there were significant
variations in the particulars of the inferred narratives. Many of the subjects interpreted the shapes
as people, but some interpreted them as animals. Genders of the subjects likewise varied. Many
interpreted a romance between the characters, some saw a kind of parent-child dynamic at work.
The setting was a house to many, but to others a jail cell, a shop, etc.. The same character might
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be interpreted as brave or cowardly by different subjects. Some subjects would view a character
as acting out of caution while others viewed the same character as acting out of craftiness. The
same moment of action between two characters was described by some subjects as a fight and by
others as love-making.
This variation serves as a reminder that while humankind seems to automatically,
instinctively process input in terms of narrative, the narratives we carry with us, those which
shape our processing of future ones, differ greatly from one another. In the following chapter, I
will demonstrate more fully how narrative genres developed and adapted by a tradition of
women and queer authors are distinct from those of cisgender, heterosexual men.

CHAPTER 3
GENDER, SEXUALITY, AND GENDER IDENTITY IN NARRATIVE
GENRES OF LIFE WRITING
Not long after Charlotte Perkins Gilman published “The Yellow Wallpaper,” she was
approached by a physician who described the piece as “the best description of incipient insanity
he had ever seen, and—begging my pardon—had I been there?” (Gilman “Why I Wrote ‘The
Yellow Wallpaper’”). As anyone familiar with the context of the short story knows, Gilman
certainly had been there. The story is so rooted in her own experience when subjected to the
infamous “rest cure” and its profoundly damaging impact on her psyche as to be arguably
considered autobiography. Yet it is so fanciful, imaginative, and distinct from Gilman’s life
experience as to be necessarily considered fiction. The relevant question, however, is not
whether “The Yellow Wallpaper” is fiction or autobiography. Gilman’s own reflections
demonstrate that it is both: “Being naturally moved to rejoicing by this narrow escape, I wrote
The Yellow Wallpaper, with its embellishments and additions to carry out the ideal (I never had
hallucinations or objections to my mural decorations)” (“Why I Wrote”). Rather, we might ask,
why did Gilman feel impelled to embellish, add to, and adjust the facts of her narrative? More to
the point, if Gilman had written a narrative with greater attention to factual accuracy, if she had
written what would be more traditionally considered “autobiography,” would the story have been
so successful at relating the truth of her experience?
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Writing one’s own life in a meaningful and significant way necessitates making
conscious choices in self-representation. Even in the most strictly autobiographical of writing,
the author necessarily develops of a version of herself or himself that functions best within the
text – a persona. As Robert D. Cherry points out in “Ethos Versus Persona: Self-Representation
in Written Discourse,” personae are not developed simply based on credibility or authority.
Rather, unlike ethos, “persona has come down to us not through a rhetorical tradition, but
through a literary tradition” (389). Even in nonfictional writing, an author’s presence is
essentially a character as in any other piece of narrative literature. It stands to reason that the
same could be said of the plot, style, and structure of autobiographical writing; rather than exact
record, life writing will be tailored to suit the purpose of the piece and resonate with the audience
reading it.
In Gilman’s case, this tailoring resulted in a piece of life writing that bears strong
resemblance to the short fiction of Edgar Allen Poe and other gothic contemporaries. Other
fictional literary models suit those composing more complete and explicit autobiography. In
James N. Hardin’s introduction to Reflection and Action: Essays on the Bildungsroman, he
defines the genre of bildungsroman as focusing on “the intellectual and social development of a
central figure who, after going out into the world and experiencing both defeats and triumphs,
comes to a better understanding of self” (xiii). The bildungsroman is a novel in which a
protagonist must learn and grow as they reconcile their own ideals with the realities of their
culture (xvi). These same descriptors easily apply to a vast number of book-length
autobiographies and memoirs as authors consciously or subconsciously cultivate their own
personae and plot their own lives according to these conventions.
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As Marianne Hirsch points out in “The Novel of Formation as Genre: Between Great
Expectations and Lost Illusions,” such fictional biographical works themselves reflect yet earlier
genres such as the heroic quest (297). This pattern of imitation may in part explain why novels
like those Hirsch describes follow certain uniform and simplistic trajectories. Furthermore, as we
consider the conventions of the novel of formation in greater detail, it becomes clear that not all
lives fit so cleanly into its parameters. For example, Hirsch writes, “In most of these novels, the
place of the hero’s origin remains an ever-present reminder of purity and integrity . . . the heroes’
ideals are necessarily modified in their contact with the sobering forces of reality” (301). What,
then, if an author cannot so identify with or does not so highly value the place of her or his
origins? She also points out that for protagonists, “All aspects of the self are formed so as to
fulfill one preconceived goal” (294); what, then, of lives more discontinuous or multifaceted?
She notes how, commonly, “the travel from country to city creates a temporal compression, a
quickening of crisis. The rhythm of these works is characterized by a series of crises, a number
of disillusioning encounters with society” (305). What if the author’s place of origin is not so
isolated or homogenous but rather characterized by plurality, diversity? A particular relationship
with the surrounding culture is also typical: “Society is the novel’s antagonist and is viewed as a
school of life. The spirit and values of the social order emerge through the fate of one
representative individual” (297). However, one’s background influences one’s relationship with
“society” in a variety of ways; as I will explore shortly, it also influences one’s tendency to view
oneself as “representative” or not.
On closer inspection, these highly standardized narrative patterns of growth, formation,
development, and entry into adult life primarily serve only particular autobiographers and
memoirists. They carry with them assumptions about class, location, family dynamics, and
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certainly gender. As Grace Ann Hovet describes in “Initiation Stories: Narrative Structure and
Planning,” these patterns reflect:
the theories of male psychologists. . . . Development, in their terms, involves the interplay
of psychological and social forces, and positive psychological growth is measured in
terms of the hero’s ability to separate self from the known, attain autonomy, assert rights,
and then to become reintegrated into the social fabric. (19)
Hovet points out that the body of literature narrating growth and personal development is highly
androcentric both in content and style. For example, visual metaphors, with their stress on “quest
and sight,” tend to govern the male developmental story (20) and limit the necessity for
relationships and community with others. Reaching adulthood means developing an imperial
sense of self which is separate, autonomous, and competitive (17). Hovet writes, “The male
psycho-social development model has tended to characterize traditional interpretations of various
types of initiation literature” (17). Thus, the structure of these stories provides an easy model on
which male authors may build a life story.
It is also important to note that as such conventions become prevalent in autobiographical
writing, audiences come to associate those conventions – narrative structures, authorial positions
– with “truth” and, as Phillip Lopate points out in the introduction to The Art of the Personal
Essay: An Anthology from the Classical Era to the Present, life writers are expected to be
devoted to the truth: “The struggle for honesty is central to the ethos of the personal essay”
(xxv). Associating certain narrative conventions with “truth” becomes problematic, however,
when we notice that “truth” is most associated with the perspectives of particular people in
particular positions. For example, Lopate believes that personal essays most commonly represent
a middle-aged voice “because it is the fruit of ripened experience, which naturally brings with it
some worldly disenchantment, or at least realism” (xxxvi). Without wholly disregarding the
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value of such a perspective, we might question why we associate realism with a distant and
disenchanted perspective, indeed why we associate “realism” with any particular perspective at
all.
Many life writers, however, consciously break from established conventions of
nonfiction, realizing that to tell the stories of those whose perspectives have been marginalized
requires new patterns of storytelling. In “Tender Fictions,” Barbara Hammer explains, “I ask my
audience to stretch and embrace new forms with each new work. Form is as important as content
and, indeed, is content itself” (146). If we remain constricted by traditional forms, “the meaning
will only be understood in conventional terms. It will lie within our neat ideas of things we
already know” (146). Such cultural myopia is simply unacceptable, now more than ever.
Hammer asserts that “multiplicity of truth, nonhomogenous and nonlinear storytelling help us
achieve a flexible position for living in this global world of complex personal and national
identities” (150). In other words, we must respect that “truth” may come in forms with which we
are not familiar and from perspectives we have thus far ignored.
Hammer’s discussion of multiplicity of truth hints at concepts further explored by
Carolyn M. Miller in “Genre as Social Action.” Miller explains that a genre is something more
than a set of criteria for classifying a work by textual features (153). Rather, particular genres of
narrative grow out of and subsequently influence the situation of the storytellers and the
audience. As we gain experience with and accept the conventions of a genre of narrative, we
begin to construe our own reality by its parameters, which can be both helpful and limiting:
“What we learn when we learn a genre is not just a pattern of forms or a means of achieving our
own ends. We learn, more importantly, what ends we may have” (165). Thus, if the genres of
narrative available do not adequately represent our true experiences, the problems are quite
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obvious. Our lives appear to be simply inexplicably wrong as they do not resemble the stories
meant to guide us, and to learn what ends or goals we may have means learning what ends we
may not have, which may well be the very ends which would make us happiest.
Accepting that genre conventions develop out of the situation of the storytellers, we begin
to recognize that “autobiography,” “memoir,” and “personal essay” should not be understood as
genres in and of themselves, but as umbrella terms covering a variety of different genres of life
writing which differ enormously based on the identities and backgrounds of the authors.
Accepting that genre conventions also impact the stories that we are able to tell and able to
accept, we begin to recognize the importance of exploring, understanding, and respecting the
genres which grow out of the experiences of marginalized groups.
In Chapter 2, I suggested that while our educational experiences are already influenced
by narrative conventions, students (particularly marginalized students) would benefit from a
conscious infusion of the narrative conventions of marginalized storytellers. In this chapter, I
will explore many of those characteristics, beginning with a discussion of qualities that
distinguish women’s life writing from men’s, moving on to a review of particular genres and
conventions which have grown out of gay and lesbian life writing, and concluding with a
discussion of the various patterns of development featured in transgender life writing. As my
interest lies in recurring patterns among authors of similar backgrounds, I will touch on many
different works rather than close reading a few, and as my concern is with genre conventions, I
will generally focus more on the structure and style of a work than on the details of the narrative.
Any of the works I will review in this chapter certainly deserves a more detailed literary analysis
in its own right, but I believe a broader structural and stylistic approach best serves the purpose
of pinpointing particular characteristics which will be useful in pedagogy.
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The Life Writing of Women

To understand why the literary forms of autobiographies, memoirs, and personal essays
by women authors exhibit markedly different characteristics than those by male authors requires
recognizing two facts at the outset: first that in any gender-stratified society (which is effectively
to say any society that now exists), the material realities of women’s lives differ from men’s, and
second that such stratification necessarily impacts the dynamic between author and public
audience.
In Composing a Life, Mary Catherine Bateson suggests a number of aspects common to
many women’s experience which do not fit cleanly into the parameters of male life writing.
Bateson explains, for example, that women’s lives have generally been more fluid and
discontinuous than men’s lives (13). She also writes:
Women have been regarded as unreliable because they are torn by multiple
commitments; men become capable of true dedication when they are either celibate . . .
with no family to distract them, or have families organized to provide support but not
distraction, the little woman behind the great man. But what if we were to recognize the
capacity for distraction, the divided will, as representing a higher wisdom? (166)
Historically, the relegation of women to the private sphere, their role within the traditional family
dynamic, challenges the independent drive and singular focus expected of protagonists.
Women’s life writing certainly reflects this sense of multidirectional focus, manifesting in a
variety of conventions. As Estelle C. Jelinek describes in The Tradition of Women’s
Autobiography from Antiquity to the Present: “Disjunctive narratives and discontinuous forms
are more adequate for mirroring the fragmentation and multidimensionality of women’s lives”
(188). In Memories of a Catholic Girlhood, Mary McCarthy reflects explicitly on the
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discontinuity of her own life (exacerbated by being orphaned) and how meaningful the family
dynamic is to her ability to narrate a life at all: “One great handicap to this task of recalling has
been the fact of being an orphan. The chain of recollection—the collective memory of a family—
has been broken” (5). Lynda Barry’s One Hundred Demons, for example, collects 100 separate
discontinuous narratives widely varying in style, focus, length, and factuality, united only by the
central goal of making peace with those memories which haunt her. Likewise, Maxine Hong
Kingston’s The Woman Warrior: Memoirs of a Girlhood Among Ghosts includes five narratives,
one of which is her own life story, the others detailing the lives of four other women: two of
them her aunts, one her mother, and one the mythical warrior Fa Mu Lan.
In a sense, the historically very routine quality of women’s lives necessitates a narrative
structure different from the male bildungsroman. In Telling Women’s Lives:
Subject/Narrator/Reader/Text, Judy Long writes, “Where men’s stories are set in the public eye,
women chronicle private scenes. Where men prune their lives down to a terse outline, women’s
accounts remain ‘messy.’ Where men claim a destination, women record process” (56). Indeed,
we see such a tendency toward explicating process rather than destination even as women writers
record events of tremendous impact. Consider Joan Didion’s method of narrating the time
following her husband’s death in The Year of Magical Thinking. She writes:
It was in fact the ordinary nature of everything preceding the event that prevented me
from truly believing it had happened, absorbing it, incorporating it, getting past it. I
recognize now that there was nothing unusual in this: confronted with sudden disaster we
all focus on how unremarkable the circumstances were in which the unthinkable
occurred, the clear blue sky from which the plane fell. (4)
This focus on process is also, perhaps, why a number of women authors tend toward a present or
present progressive tense in their narratives, describing the continuous state of their world and
the people in it, such as Sandra Cisneros does in The House on Mango Street, writing “The boys
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and girls live in separate worlds. The boys in their universe and we in ours” (8) or “Marin, under
the streetlight, dancing by herself, is singing the same song somewhere. I know” (27). Cisneros’
style is one suited to exploring a world that is in many ways frustratingly static, with which she
is very familiar but to which she fears being confined by social expectations.
Rachel Blau DuPlessis also explores how differences in social expectation make the
traditional form of bildungsroman a poor fit for women’s lives. In Writing Beyond the Ending:
Narrative Strategies of Twentieth-Century Women Writers, she explains how a bildungsroman is
essentially a quest story, which is problematic for an author expected to set aside quests in favor
of romantic and familial goals: “This contradiction between love and quest in plots dealing with
women as a narrated group . . . [has] an ending in which one part of that contradiction, usually
quest or Bildung, is set aside or repressed, whether by marriage or by death” (3-4). As surely as
such social pressures impact women’s lives, so do they impact their narratives to the point that
twentieth-century women authors must respond by “inventing narrative strategies, especially
involving sequence, character, and relationship, that neutralize, minimize, or transcend any
oversimplified oedipal drama” (37). Once again, Kingston’s work certainly deals with the
contradictions facing the questing woman; in their own ways, each of her five narratives includes
conflicts arising from family obligations and romantic distractions. In Lakota Woman, Mary
Brave Bird (née Crow Dog) certainly wrestles with this contradiction as she struggles to balance
a quest for racial justice with her role as a family member, particularly when she is torn between
fighting for her community and against its own manifestations of injustice through the actions of
patriarchal men who abuse her and other women, believing it “compensates for what white
society has done to them” (5). She recognizes that the men of her tribe see themselves on an
archaic and destructive kind of quest which doesn’t serve her interests: “The men had nothing to

73

live for, so they got drunk and drove off at ninety miles an hour in a car without lights, without
brakes, and without destination, to die a warrior’s death” (15).
Brave Bird’s very political narrative may seem to stand in defiance of some of Jelinek’s
arguments regarding the qualities of women’s autobiographies, as Jelinek writes, “The emphasis
remains on personal matters—not the professional, philosophical, or historical events that are
more often the subject of men’s autobiographies” (xiii). However, we may say at least that in
Brave Bird’s narrative as well as many others, matters of the “private sphere” find recognition
alongside matters of the “public sphere” in a way that they don’t in men’s narratives. This
parallel juxtaposition of the public and private is certainly the case in Achy Obejas’ We Came All
the Way From Cuba So You Could Dress Like This? Stories, which presents stories of
immigration with special attention to the challenges facing women, and likewise Marjane
Satrapi’s Persepolis: The Story of a Childhood, which describes the Islamic Revolution in Iran in
terms of its impact on her home, community, and family life. We still see a sense of separateness
from the male world and male narratives, of which Jelinek writes: “This sense of alienation from
the male world is very real, but there also exists the positive delineation of a female culture, a
women’s world” (187). Many women’s autobiographies convey a sense of otherness and
“outsider” perspective that comes from living in this world, one which follows different rules
and different patterns of experience requiring different methods of storying the self and narrating
events. In the introduction to Women’s Autobiography: Essays in Criticism, Jelinek points out
that men shape the events of their lives into coherent wholes characterized by linearity, harmony,
and orderliness (16) while women’s texts have a “disconnected, fragmentary . . . pattern of
diffusion and diversity” as “the multidimensionality of women’s socially conditioned roles
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seems to have established a pattern of diffusion and diversity” (17). We certainly see this
10

multidimensionality in Barry’s and Kingston’s work, this division of gendered worlds in
Cisneros’s.
Jelinek goes on to argue that it is not only the sequences of events which are in a sense
fragmentary and multidimensional, but the images of the autobiographers as well: “In contrast to
the self-confident, one-dimensional self-image that men usually project, women often depict a
multidimensional, fragmented self-image” (Tradition xiii). Once again, Kingston’s and Barry’s
texts come to mind; there is no shortage of examples of women autobiographers who use their
work to explore the ways in which they are torn, pulled by multiple commitments and pressured
by conflicting influences. In some cases, this occurs as authors explore personal trauma.
Consider Kathryn Harrison’s The Kiss, a memoir regarding how, as a young adult, Harrison was
pressured her into an incestuous relationship by her father. The Kiss is a story of
compartmentalization told in a language of “separateness” that begins on the first page: “We
meet where no one will recognize us . . . places as stark and beautiful and deadly as those
revealed in satellite photographs of distant planets. Airless, burning, inhuman” (3). At the
midpoint of the memoir, Harrison describes this period of her life as “a time out of real time, one
which will not fit either into the life I lived as a child or the one I create as a woman” (101-02),
and of her adult life, she tells us little but that she has a husband and children, and that regarding
her incest, “we’ve made a place for my father and what happened between me and him. It’s a
locked place, the psychic equivalent of a high cupboard, nearly out of reach” (175).
Fragmentation does not require trauma, though. We can likewise observe Rebecca Walker’s
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More recently, scholars have noted that men’s life writing has become likewise more discontinuous and
nonlinear in recent decades. Jelinek’s text, published in 1980, should serve as an indication that these have long
been qualities of women’s lives and life writing which are becoming increasingly common for men as well.
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multidimensionality in Black, White, & Jewish: Autobiography of a Shifting Self. She establishes
the discontinuous nature of her life early on, writing “I remember coming and going, going and
coming. That, for me, was home” (5). Walker spends her narrative navigating her multiple
intersecting identities and how they have impacted her life and relationships.
For Walker as well as many other women authors, exploring multiple identities means
learning to embrace and love aspects of herself which have been culturally cast as flawed or
inferior. In The Heroine’s Journey, Maureen Murdock describes this learning process as a
central, even guiding principle of women’s version of Joseph Campbell’s model of the heroic
quest. She writes, “Women do have a quest at this time in our culture. It is the quest to fully
embrace their feminine nature, learning how to value themselves as women and to heal the deep
wound of the feminine” (3). Murdock’s somewhat essentialist language aside, it seems useful to
consider that the traditional male version of the heroic quest involves attaining the qualities most
prized by the dominant culture; what, however, if the qualities the author wishes to embrace are
those devalued by her culture, such as femininity? Or, in the case of Alison Bechdel’s Fun
Home: A Family Tragicomic, what if those prized masculine qualities are considered to be
qualities which the protagonist should not have due to her gender? Structural changes occur in
the quest itself: a cyclic pattern emerges to reaffirm and re-explore the protagonist’s motivations
and desires, self-recognition of those motivations and desires becomes a stage in itself, as does
acknowledging them. Bechdel describes her fascination when first glimpsing a butch lesbian
(118) and her father’s scathing question as to whether she would want be like her, to which
Bechdel feels she must answer no.
For other women authors, the qualities they seek to reclaim as positive go beyond gender
or gender expression. In Margo Culley’s introduction to American Women’s Autobiography:
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Fea(s)ts of Memory, she explains that “for white women who need not think of themselves in
racial terms, gender becomes the foundational category for self-organization. For most black
women, as for most black men, the foundational category is race” (8). Undoubtedly, for women
of color, struggles with a culture that marginalizes the author’s racial, ethnic, and/or national
backgrounds take center stage at least as often as struggles with a culture that marginalizes the
author’s gender. Cisneros’s struggles as a Latin-American woman and Brave Bird’s as a Native
American certainly come to mind. These struggles are further foregrounded for authors such as
Elaine Mar, whose memoir Paper Daughter explores her experiences immigrating from China as
a child. Her narrative certainly reflects the “discontinuous” qualities explored by some critics,
but as others note that women’s autobiographies have necessarily incorporated the domestic
sphere, home, Mar’s narrative struggles with the lack of a sense of home: “I longed to locate
home as a place, rooted in soil like childhood safety markers. I wondered if this trait was peculiar
to immigrants” (205). Mar’s narrative is a firm reminder to refrain from entirely homogenizing
“women’s experience,” as other intersecting facets of each author’s identity likewise impact their
narratives.
As John Beverly explains in “The Margin at the Center: On Testimonio (Testimonial
Narrative),” life narratives foregrounding struggles against racial oppression produce yet more
particular structural conventions. Beverly explores whether “social struggles give rise to new
forms of literature” (91), finding that, indeed, writing from marginalized (and indeed oppressed)
positions shapes narrative patterns as “an urgency to communicate, a problem of repression,
poverty, subalternity, imprisonment, struggle for survival, [is] implicated in the act of narration
itself” (94). We can see this urgency of struggle in life writing dating back to Sarah Winnemucca
Hopkins’ Life Among the Paiutes. Telling the story of her life becomes inseparable from an
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argument for the rights and dignity of her tribe: “You call my people bloodseeking. My people
did not seek to kill [the emigrants] . . . my people helped them. They gave them such as they had
to eat” (10). The same could be said of more recent life writers and activists such as Elly Bulkin,
Minnie Bruce Pratt, and Barbara Smith who worked together to produce Yours in Struggle:
Three Feminist Perspectives on Anti-Semitism and Racism. Pratt, for example, combines life
writing and social justice rhetoric when she writes:
I’m trying to learn how to live, to have the speaking-to extend beyond the moment’s
word, to act so as to change the unjust circumstances that keep us from being able to
speak to each other; I’m trying to get a little closer to the longed-for but un-realized
world, where we each are able to live, but not by trying to make someone less than us,
not by someone else’s blood or pain. (13)
For those whose lives revolve around struggle against injustice, whether that injustice stems from
gender oppression, racial oppression, or any other, that struggle necessarily shapes both the form
and content of the narrative.
Moreover, deviations from traditional structures are not simply a consequence of the
author’s background, but politically subversive acts in and of themselves. Long describes how
traditional genre conventions of autobiography are unavoidably masculine: “The characteristic
elements of the male autobiography bear a remarkable correspondence to the male sex role
script, valorizing significance, objectivity, and distance” (17). Sidonie Smith expands on this
point in A Poetics of Women’s Autobiography: Marginality and the Fictions of Selfrepresentation, explaining, “the generic structures of literature and the languages of selfrepresentation and examination constitutive of autobiography as one of them rest on and
reinscribe the ideology of gender” (48). That is to say, gender systems as viewed from privileged
perspectives are encoded into traditional narrative structures. Genre conventions which prioritize
the perspectives of a particular group of people over those of other groups of people inevitably
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reinforce oppressive social systems; to change those conventions is itself a political act, and
some authors are quite explicit about the political nature of their undertakings. Hopkins once
again comes to mind; she utilizes a careful blend of Western autobiographical conventions and
Native American storytelling modes as she argues on behalf of her people. Even more pointedly,
Laura E. Garcia, Sandra M. Gutierrez, Felicitas Nunez, and Yolanda Broyles-Gonzalez
drastically alter traditional life writing with Teatro Chicana: A Collective Memoir and Selected
Plays, which amounts to a memoir of a political theater troupe, combining the narratives of
seventeen women describing their own lives as they relate to the theater, exploring its
transformative meaning in their lives as well as their hopes for its social impact, with scripts of
plays performed at the theater.
As many critics have pointed out, women’s entry into the realm of autobiography and
memoir is itself inescapably political. Judy Long describes the dilemma of women writers,
particularly early autobiographers: “To invest oneself with historical significance, to claim the
attention of the reading public, to follow the model of previous notable lives—all are
positionings more easily attained by male than female subjects” (15). In terms of genre
conventions, this difficulty with attaining such positions forces women to be more innovative, as
“the male subject can simultaneously position himself in history and lay claim to a public
heritage. Linking himself to a reality ‘larger’ than his personal life, the subject magnifies his own
significance” (19), whereas women’s literary heritage has been largely muted or subsumed in the
male tradition. Culley explains this phenomenon in perhaps even more drastic terms, “in defying
the traditional injunction to silence for women, the autobiographical act itself contests WOMAN,
something of which many autobiographers are aware as they await the judgment of their
community of readers” (11). These authorial conflicts between the pressure to be silent and the
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desire to tell one’s story inevitably work their way into the texts due to the author’s awareness of
her own position, and thus “women’s self-writing is animated by the tension between external
control of women and the assertion of female subjectivity” (Long 27). Walker’s narrative is
certainly infused with these tensions. She writes at length about learning to assert her own
subjectivity:
It is so much easier to be an empty screen for their projections, so much easier to believe
all those nice words than to try to reach back there and piece it all together. After all these
years it is second nature to me, this negation of my own mind, my own heart, my own
story . . . . It is jarring to think that most of my life I have been defined by others,
primarily reactive, going along with the prevailing view. (74)
For women, an act involving self-definition and public assertion of identity is bold, political, and
meaningful.
Carolyn G. Heilbrun addresses similar issues in Writing a Woman’s Life. She writes,
“Although feminists early discovered that the private is the public, women’s exercise of power
and control, and the admission and expression of anger necessary to that exercise, has until
recently been declared unacceptable” (17). Heilbrun reminds us that traditionally, for women,
whether putting men or god or family first, “one’s own desires and quests are always secondary”
(21). Women’s writing frequently and explicitly involves learning to centralize one’s own quest,
one’s own needs, desires, and well-being. Barry personifies her own apprehensions about selfexploration as demons who screech at her: “This is pointless! What in the hell are you doing?!
Time waster! Where’s this gonna get you?! What a waste of paper!” (11). Harrison’s memoir
stands as an example of any number of narratives of abuse and trauma prolonged by the
survivor’s conditioned tendency to put the needs of her abuser first.
On both a personal and an institutional level, women, like any number of marginalized
and disempowered groups, have historically been objectified and used by centralized and
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privileged groups, not only in a material sense but also in an intellectual sense through the
appropriation of women’s lives and stories by men. DuPlessis writes, “A change of point of view
reveals the implicit politics of narrative: the choice of the teller or the perspective will alter its
core assumptions and one’s sense of the tale” (109). Authors such as Carolyn Kay Steedman
demonstrate a clear awareness of the political quality of their acts of life writing. In Landscape
for a Good Woman: A Story of Two Lives (namely Steedman’s own life and her mother’s), she
explains her purpose in writing, as she has found that writing about working class people by nonworking-class people “denies its subjects a particular story, a personal history, except when that
story illustrates a general thesis” (10). In her own words, her autobiography is “about the stories
we make for ourselves, and the social specificity of our understanding of those stories” (5). For
marginalized people, the act of telling one’s own story is an act of reclamation.
Consistently, the work of women authors reflects this sense of exploring something
heretofore unexplored. In “Unspeakable Difference: The Politics of Gender in Lesbian and
Heterosexual Women’s Autobiographies,” Julia Watson explains, “In women’s autobiographies,
naming the unspeakable is a coming to voice that can create new subjects, precisely because
women’s marginality may be unnameable within the terms or parameters of the dominant
culture” (139). Searching for appropriate and authentic language, the desire to name what has
never been named, becomes a common theme among women life writers, expressed in a variety
of ways. We see it in Harrison’s frank exploration of her experience of incest. We see it in Mar’s
struggle with language: “It didn’t occur to me that in these hours of writing I was attempting to
travel outside the limits of language, seeking expression for the things that defied words” (212).
We see it as Obejas describes the problems her characters face as “things that can’t be told”
(123).
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What effect, then, does awareness of this political and social atmosphere have on the
genre conventions of women’s autobiographies? First, it may be part of the reason why women
autobiographers and memoirs tend to write in such a way that establishes an explicit partnership
between author and audience, inviting audience participation in a number of ways. As Long
writes, “It is impossible to ignore the partnership of subject and reader when speaking of
women’s autobiography. The subject relies on her reader to validate the experience she struggles
to express. She can achieve her goal only when the reader engages with her” (41). Lauren Slater
forces such engagement in Lying: A Metaphorical Memoir, as she describes her experiences with
a psychological condition alternatively described as epilepsy, depression, bipolar disorder, or
Munchausen’s syndrome, frequently narrating entire episodes she will later reveal did not occur.
She narrates falling into a grave only to shortly thereafter explain, “I didn’t really fall into the
grave. I was just using a metaphor to try to explain my mental state . . . I looked into the grave,
and I thought about falling in” (60). Effectively, she places readers in the same situation as her
doctors, struggling to understand and diagnose her. In a very different way, part of Barry’s goal
seems indeed to be the reader’s active engagement, as she writes that she “hopes you will dig
these demons and then pick up a paintbrush and paint your own!” (13). Barry invites readers to
follow her own narrative model.
Nor is it only the reader with whom the author may partner and engage. In “Authorizing
the Autobiographical,” Shari Benstock describes a major conceptual difference between
women’s autobiographies and men’s. In men’s life writing, “the consciousness behind the
narrative ‘I’ develops over time, encompassing more and more of the external landscape and
becoming increasingly aware of the implications of actions and events” (20); in other words, the
“I” is centralized. Although all life writing is in some sense an exploration of self, Benstock finds
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that “the self that would reside at the center of the text is decentered—and often is absent
altogether—in women’s autobiographical texts” (20). Instead, these texts often manage to share
center stage with other subjects – sometimes family such as in The Woman Warrior or
community members such as in We Came All the Way from Cuba so You Could Dress Like This?
Bechdel’s memoir is at least as much her father’s life story as it is her own; she even comments
on being “upstaged, demoted from protagonist in my own drama to comic relief in my parents’
tragedy” (58).
DuPlessis describes “the distinctive narrative strategy of the multiple individual, [in
which] the female hero fuses with a complex and contradictory group; her power is articulated in
and continued through a community” (142). This narrative strategy contrasts with what Long
describes as a cardinal attribute of men’s autobiographies, “the solitary subject . . . The hero’s
solitariness emphasizes both self-reliance and worthiness” (19). Consider Satrapi’s Persepolis, a
graphic work, which often literally decentralizes the author-protagonist in individual frames. She
also self-depicts as nearly identical amongst groups of girls (3) while at other points depicting
herself multiple times in a single frame (9).
In “Women’s Autobiographical Selves: Theory and Practice,” Susan Stanford Friedman
argues that “the individualistic concept of the autobiographical self . . . raises serious theoretical
problems for critics who recognize that the self, self-creation, and self-consciousness are
profoundly different for women, minorities, and many non-Western peoples” (72). That is to say,
women’s life writing may often go unrecognized as life writing by critics because of the
“emphasis on individualism as the necessary precondition for autobiography” (75). Friedman
explains, “Women project onto history an identity that is not purely individualistic. Nor is it
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purely collective. Instead, this new identity merges the shared with the unique” (76). This would
seem a fair description of life writing projects such as Kingston’s and Obejas’s.
Perhaps fusing their inclination to share the centralized position with their reluctance to
speak on behalf of others as they have been spoken-on-behalf-of throughout history, women
authors also seem more inclined toward collaborative approaches to life writing. Doris Sommer
explores genres of life writing emerging from authors fighting against social injustice in “Not
Just a Personal Story: Women’s Testimonios and the Plural Self.” She points out that “these
intensely lived testimonial narratives are strikingly impersonal. They are written neither for
individual growth nor for glory” (109). Rather, they are written on behalf of and often in
collaboration with the community. The author “represents her group as a participant, rather than
as an ideal and repeatable type” (129). As Beverly describes them, these narratives are
“concerned not so much with the life of a ‘problematic hero’ . . . as with a problematic collective
social situation in which the narrator lives” (95). Unlike class-privileged men’s narratives,
testimonio “involves a sort of erasure of the function, and thus also of the textual presence, of the
‘author,’ which by contrast is so central in all major forms of bourgeois writing” (97). Clear
examples might include Yours in Struggle, the combined life writing of three women against
racism and anti-semitism. The rhetoric of each reflects this decentering of individual self as well.
Pratt explains, “when we begin to understand how false much of our sense of self-importance has
been, we do experience a loss: our self-respect” (42), while in her section, Smith writes, “In
political struggles there wouldn’t be any ‘your’ and ‘my’ issues, if we saw each form of
oppression as integrally linked to the others” (77). Teatro Chicana certainly qualifies as a
collaborative testimonial narrative, being the collective memoir of seventeen women working
together to protest social injustice through theater. In the foreword, Yolanda Broyles-González
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describes herself as a partera or midwife of the collection as opposed to “editor” (x). All of the
women involved are telling a story that is theirs and yet others’ as well.
Broyles-González is not alone in writing consciously about the act of creation, this selfreflexivity is another trait more common to women’s life writing than men’s. In
“Autography/Transformation/Assymetry,” Jeanne Perreault argues that a great deal of women’s
life writing might be better termed “autography” than “autobiography” due to the degree of focus
on the method and meaning of the creative act itself. Perreault finds that women’s life writing
frequently “is not necessarily concerned with the process or unfolding of life events, but rather
makes the writing itself an aspect of the selfhood the writer experiences and brings into being”
(191). Some of the authors already discussed balance carefully between autography and
autobiography, Barry and Steedman in particular. Authors such as Patricia Hampl in I Could Tell
You Stories: Sojourns in the Land of Memory would clearly fall nearer to the “autographic” end
of the spectrum. Hampl’s work shifts smoothly back and forth between meditations on personal
narrative and personal narrative itself. As she considers her role in creating her version of her
history, she echoes Steedman’s concerns about allowing others to speak on our behalf: “if we
refuse to do the work of creating this personal version of the past, someone else will do it for us.
That is the scary political fact” (32). Perreault finds that this tendency toward autography is
connected to women’s greater tendency toward transparent self-creation as opposed to simply
self-exploration. That is, while men’s autobiographies are more likely to treat the “self” as a
stable thing to be explored, women’s autobiographies are more likely to produce the self through
the act of writing:
Most often in feminist texts the ‘self’ is provisional, an exploration of possibility and a
tentative grammar of transformations. Rather than treating ‘self’ as a fixed notion, clearly
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conceptualized and needing only to be ‘expressed,’ the feminist writer of self engages in
a . . . discourse of which she is both product and producer. (193-94)
Women autobiographers engage in such discourse in a variety of ways. In Fun Home, Bechdel
literally draws herself drawing and writing, writes about herself drawing and writing, even draws
pictures of her own diaries. In Lying, Slater’s work, which even in the end leaves ambiguity as to
her mental condition, seems as much an effort at self-diagnosis as it is a narrative of doctors’
efforts to diagnose her. In The Year of Magical Thinking, Didion writes, “This is my attempt to
make sense of the period that followed, weeks and then months that cut loose any fixed idea I
had ever had about death” (7), leaving no doubt that as she writes about her slow emotional
recovery from her husband’s death, the writing itself is part of that recovery.
With such attention to the act of creation, perhaps it is inevitable too that, as many critics
have noted, women’s life writing tends to necessarily take greater liberties with factuality within
the realm of nonfiction. Though we will find an even greater tendency toward the fantastic when
exploring specifically lesbian life writing in the next section, many critics have noted that
women life writers have, by various necessities, developed a different relationship with factuality
than men. Long describes the social pressures which might impact how a woman author might
approach her subject: “Anticipating a hostile critical establishment and an unreceptive literary
tradition, a female subject may adopt a ‘necessary indirection’ in her writing” (37). One might
wonder if such anticipation is part of why Gilman made the choices she did in writing “The
Yellow Wallpaper.” It would certainly explain something of McCarthy’s approach in Memories
of a Catholic Girlhood. McCarthy explains to the reader before even beginning her story in
earnest, “Many a time, in the course of doing these memoirs, I have wished that I were writing
fiction. The temptation to invent has been very strong” (3). As becomes clear, she does invent to
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varying degrees in different episodes, at times for artistic impact, at times due to the faultiness of
memory; however, she diligently follows each chapter with a meditation on what she has
invented, remarking, “There are some semi-fictional touches here . . . This is an example of
‘storytelling’; I arranged actual events so as to make ‘a good story’ out of them. It is hard to
overcome this temptation if you are in the habit of writing fiction” (164). Thus, while McCarthy
does, to some extent, fictionalize, she so carefully informs the reader that she has done so that
her work seems imbued with an unimpeachable authenticity regardless of factuality. As Culley
points out, “American woman autobiographers know . . . that the lines between fact and fiction
blur” (18). In women’s autobiographies and memoirs, these creative negotiations between fact
and fiction are often quite explicit, though not always to the extent of McCarthy’s. Opening One
Hundred Demons, Barry draws herself drawing and ponders, “Is it autobiography if parts of it
are not true? Is it fiction if parts of it are?” (7), inventing the term “autobiofictionalography” for
her work.
Julia Watson describes this process as having a particular significance for women authors
who have more commonly had others’ versions of the past, even versions of their own narratives,
imposed on them, making life writing a matter of creating “personal myths of alternative selfdefinition” (163). Though she writes in a more general sense regarding the task of memoirists, a
great deal of Hampl’s I Could Tell You Stories explores the necessity to imagine and invent in
the course of nonfiction writing, as “no memoirist writes for long without experiencing an
unsettling disbelief about the reliability of memory, a hunch that memory is not, after all, just
memory” (24-25). After telling one story, she follows by admitting, “the truth is, I don’t
remember the woman at all . . . Memory is not a warehouse of finished stories, not a gallery of
framed pictures. I must admit that I invented” (26), describing her life writing as a “created
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version of the past” (32). Slater’s “metaphorical memoir” is certainly an example of such a
“created version” or “personal myth.” Slater wrestles between reality as she attempts to
understand it and the version of it others attempt to feed her, managing to be nearly as forthright
as McCarthy. Slater explains early on that she “learned [from her mother] that truth is bendable,
that what you wish is every bit as real as what you are” (5). For every metaphor or “lie” she tells
the reader, she later offers its counterpoint, perhaps most strikingly after she has fully narrated
having a surgical procedure to address her temporal lobe epilepsy, even providing the text of the
surgeon’s report on the procedure, only to later narrate a visit with a doctor who remarks, “There
is no way this paper was written by a doctor, or anyone even remotely connected to the medical
profession . . . there is no Dr. Neu anywhere in the world who would perform a corpus
callostomy on a patient with TLE. It’s just not done” (175-76). Kingston’s memoir takes yet
another approach to personal mythmaking, in her case often because she does not have access to
facts. In the first section, she admits to inventing many details about “no-name woman” because
“if I want to learn what clothes my aunt wore, whether flashy or ordinary, I would have to begin,
‘Remember Father’s drowned-in-the-well sister?’ I cannot ask that” (6). In one chapter, she will
explain how she heard about events in another, confessing that she did not see them herself. In
many different ways for many different reasons, McCarthy, Barry, Hampl, Slater, and Kingston
all engage in this personal mythmaking coupled with explicit reflection on their doing so.
To briefly summarize and collect the critical thought on these genres, we can begin by
noting that the life writing of women is more attentive than men’s to the partnership between
author and audience. It is also more likely to center on relationships and community, to the point
that the self may be decentered; the woman autobiographer is more likely to represent a group as
a participant alongside others rather than a model which others should follow, or even to take on
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the narrative mode of the “multiple individual.” Women’s autobiographies are more apt to
narrate process than singular event, to take on a cyclical pattern. It is commonly fragmentary and
multidirectional. It is more likely to be explicit about the act of creation, to explore the act of
creation itself, and perhaps as a result, it more commonly blurs the lines between fact and fiction,
experiments with form, and creates new language in an effort to name and understand that which
has been neglected by the traditional literary canon.
The women life writers described here vary enormously in style just as they vary
enormously in background and culture. More importantly, however, the common trends running
through their works stem from those aspects of background which they do share as women. In
the following section, we turn our attention to another diverse group of life writers, in this case
sharing the experience of non-heterosexuality.

Gay and Lesbian Life Writing
The life writing of same-gender-loving people – men and women alike – differs from
traditional forms created by heterosexual men for the same reasons that women’s life writing
differs: these authors’ lives have been shaped by conflicts which do not occur for heterosexual
authors, and their orientation inevitably impacts their relationship to a public (predominantly
heterosexual) audience. At the same time, there are additional complexities for gay and lesbian
life writers which shape their work in a number of ways. Most notably, gay and lesbian life
writing takes particular shapes due to the author’s sense of “otherness” and “hiddenness.”
We began exploring women’s life writing by establishing that women’s lives do not fit
cleanly into the generic molds formed by a male literary tradition, such as the bildungsroman.
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Much the same could be said for the lives of same-gender-loving people, including gay men. In
the final pages of Bechdel’s memoir, which is simultaneously her own coming out story and the
story of her father’s hidden homosexual desires, she ponders whether “spiritual, not
consubstantial, paternity is the important thing,” and she poses the question, “Is it so unusual for
the two things to coincide?” (231). The unspoken answer to this question strikes at one of the
chief differences between traditional coming of age genres and queer coming of age genres: in
the case of heterosexual bildungsromane, no, it is not unusual, but in the case of homosexual life
narratives, yes, it is quite unusual. Concerning sexuality, most straight children are raised by
straight parents; however, most gay children are also raised by straight parents.
Recall that Hardin explains that the bildungsroman is a narrative about “the intellectual
and social development of a central figure who, after going out into the world and experiencing
both defeats and triumphs, comes to a better understanding of self” (xiii). When considering the
variable of sexual orientation in a heteronormative culture, the key phrase becomes: “after going
out into the world.” The central conflict of a bildungsroman occurs when the protagonist
ventures away from the home and confronts social realities which seem alien to her or him (xvi);
adaptation, development, and change are required before the protagonist can become a full part
of society. The (perhaps often unspoken) reason that this conflict requires venturing out to
contend with abrasive social forces is that at home the environment was not confusing or
abrasive. The home, if it exists, is a place of people whose fundamental qualities are shared by
the protagonist, an environment which generally signifies (to use Bechdel’s language) both
consubstantial and spiritual paternity.
In Gaiety Transfigured: Gay Self-Representation in American Literature, David Bergman
explains the psychological significance of a homosexual child’s lack of early identification in
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relation to others “like them;” since no homosexual person is raised as homosexual, “gay men
grow up without the support, recognition, or modeling of others . . . the result is a ‘negative
identity’ . . . an absence of identity” (45). In the introduction to The Original Coming-Out
Stories, editors Julia Penelope and Susan J. Wolfe describe this trend in many of the short works
in the anthology: “Many of our stories mention again and again the frustrations, the doubts, the
[childhood] feeling that ‘I am the only one in the world’” (7). They refer to stories such as
“Coming Out” by Janet Cooper, who explains, “I had no words for what I was. I had no models.
I did not understand my parents’ nasty allusions to most of my friends” (40). The bildungsroman
is a story of how a childhood identity is remolded by society; in a gay or lesbian memoir, the
protagonist must venture out first to find others like them in order to develop an identity before
venturing out again to have it remolded and reworked.
Esther Saxey’s Homoplot: The Coming Out Story and Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual
Identity provides a thorough genre study of this form of gay and lesbian life writing, which
almost invariably begins with a child’s sense of disidentification with their family and
community. She notes that the early stages of a coming out story are “curiously empty of any
older child, teacher, or elder relative who also experiences same-sex desire” (140). Their journey
becomes one that must involve finding others like them: “This coming out trajectory has a
number of accompanying plot arcs; the protagonist moves from feeling ‘different’ to finding
community” (11). This necessary movement should not be taken, however, to reduce the
significance of the home and family life – if anything, it amplifies their significance as the home
environment becomes antagonistic. As Annette Fantasia explains in, “The Paterian
Bildungsroman Reenvisioned: ‘Brain-Building’ in Alison Bechdel’s Fun Home: A Family
Tragicomic:”
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While the Bildungsroman traditionally traces the protagonist’s negotiations with the
external forces—namely, institutional and societal—that influence his or her internal
development, in Fun Home, the material structure of the author’s childhood home, both
symbolically and substantively, represents a primary force in Bechdel’s aesthetic,
intellectual, and psychological development. (84)
One could say the same about any number of coming out stories. In Rubyfruit Jungle, Rita Mae
Brown’s novelized autobiography, Brown symbolizes this disidentification by crafting her
protagonist as a poorly-treated orphan: “I had never thought I had much in common with
anybody. I had no mother, no father, no roots, no biological similarities called sisters and
brothers” (78). “Molly” ventures out and forms relationships with other lesbian women, but must
simultaneously distinguish herself from them, which in this case involves a critique of the
butch/femme dynamic.
The same-gender-loving protagonist almost invariably struggles with a sense of
difference from her or his family, which is the first and perhaps most potent source of her or his
sense of “otherness.” As Bergman writes, “The most significant term and the one from which the
other differences derive is otherness . . . a categorical, perhaps even ontological, otherness since
[a gay man] is made to feel his ‘unlikeness’ to the heterosexual acts and persons who gave him
being” (30). Indeed this concept is so universal in gay and lesbian life writing that it is difficult
to specify the most poignant examples, though Jeanette Winterson’s life novelization Oranges
are Not the Only Fruit certainly stands out, as young Jeanette (adopted much like Brown’s
protagonist) finds herself caught between her own budding lesbianism and her brutally
evangelical mother, who ultimately subjects her to violent exorcisms. Winterson’s highly
symbolic narrative represents the protagonist’s mother in a number of ways that suggest a
difficulty to relate to her or even succinctly understand her: she is the Virgin Mary at one point,
the devil at another, King Arthur in one segment, a sorcerer elsewhere.
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It is perhaps inevitable that this sense of otherness results in not only self-analysis but a
critical examination of straight culture and its reflections in queer culture. Saxey explains, “The
perspective of the protagonist, as both insider and outsider, allows an informed critique of
heteronormative society, and its dating rituals, parenting rules and gender roles” (4). In Audre
Lorde’s Zami: A New Spelling of My Name, she gives critical consideration to how
heteronormative relationship dynamics manifested in the New York lesbian community:
The breakdown of mummies and daddies was an important part . . . For some of us,
however, role-playing reflected all the depreciating attitudes toward women which we
loathed in straight society. It was the rejection of these roles that had drawn us to ‘the
life’ in the first place. (221)
Lorde utilizes this perspective to critique both heterosexual culture and its reflections in gay
culture. Christopher Isherwood employs that perspective toward different ends in Christopher
and His Kind. He narrates his decision to abandon his restrictive, conservative life in England for
the comparatively liberal atmosphere in Berlin around 1930. Incidentally, he there finds a
vantage point from which to critique not only heteronormative family and community dynamics,
but also the homophobia intertwined with multiple political ideologies, even opposing ideologies
such as Soviet communism and Nazi fascism (334).
It may go without saying that the “otherness” same-gender-loving people carry with them
is not some natural occurrence but something thrust upon them by a homophobic culture. As Eve
Sedgwick explains in Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire, “the
homophobia directed against both males and females is not arbitrary or gratuitous, but tightly
knit into the texture of family, gender, age, class, and race relations” (3). Many autobiographies
of gay men and lesbians revolve around confrontations with homophobia. Martin Duberman’s
Cures: A Gay Man’s Odyssey stands out. Duberman narrates his experiences with psychiatrists in
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the 1950s-60s subjecting him to a variety of treatments to “cure” his homosexuality, which he
willingly embraces as he decides, “The only way to be comfortable in this world is to be
straight” (139). To some extent or another, all gay and lesbian life narratives are shaped by
homophobia, as homophobia is more than an incidental or individual experience, but rather a
systemic ideology and practice woven into a variety of social institutions.
As a direct consequence of living in an environment so institutionally hostile, so
“othering,” so designed to deny their very existence, same-gender-loving people’s lives have
been enormously influenced by periods of time spent hidden or “closeted.” Sedgwick explores
this quality of gay life in Epistemology of the Closet. She explains:
For many gay people [the closet] is still the fundamental feature of social life; and there
can be few gay people, however courageous and forthright by habit, however fortunate in
the support of their immediate communities, in whose lives the closet is not still a
shaping presence. (68)
The life narratives of gay men and lesbians undoubtedly support Sedgwick’s argument. Paula
Tree opens “My Coming Out Herstory” describing early crushes on other girls which she knew
to keep secret (138). In “Confessions of a Country Dyke,” Elana/Elaine Mikels writes, “I flash
back to the loneliness of my young adult years as I watch Amy, who has just turned 18, walking
down the windy path arm in arm with her lover” (25), recalling the early understanding that the
heterosexual love she witnessed others sharing was something to be shared openly but the
homosexual love she felt could not be. J.R. Ackerley writes about how he managed to hide his
homosexuality by displaying appropriately masculine qualities in My Father and Myself: “There
were no marks on me as I matured from which my father could have suspected the sort of son he
had sired; I did not lisp, I could throw overhand, and I could whistle” (111-12). As masculinity
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and femininity are so often scrutinized for signs of sexual deviance, many life narratives of
same-gender-loving people dedicate time to discussing these traits as they relate to hiddenness.
For much of the history of gay life writing, same-gender-loving people have long lived
lives of hiddenness and otherness even past the initial point of “coming out,” simultaneously
inhabiting a straight public and professional world, and the world of the gay community, which
is both comforting and potentially constricting in its own right. In Writing Desire: Sixty Years of
Gay Autobiography, Bertram J. Cohler explains, “Being part of this hidden world gave men an
identity counter to that of the larger social world” (12). Navigating between a homophobic
professional world and a stigmatized gay community shapes both identities and the narratives
exploring those identities, particularly as the gay community is not necessarily safe or perfectly
suited to every gay individual. In “Late Victorians,” Richard Rodriguez writes of his experience
in the San Francisco gay community at the height of the AIDS epidemic. He appropriates the
often derogatory language of “natural” vs. “unnatural” to praise the fantastic aesthetic gifts of the
gay men he knew, ascribing to them “a mystical province, that of taste. Taste . . . became the
homosexual’s licentiate to challenge the rule of nature. (The fairy in his blood)” (760).
Rodriguez thus sets up the gay community as a place outside of the mundane (straight) world.
However, he dedicates at least as much time to confirming that real dangers exist in that magical
world, as HIV was “a nonmetaphorical disease, a disease like any other . . . a virus, a hairy
bubble perched upon a needle, a platter of no intention served round: fever, blisters, a death
sentence” (766). Though locating and entering a community of other same-gender-loving people
is a common stage of many gay life narratives, it is rarely the end of the narrative; rather it is at
this point that the protagonist begins to grapple with the dangers threatening that community as
well as form a discrete individual identity separate from that of the group. For example, Lorde
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describes one of her difficulties in the lesbian community in New York: “I wasn’t cute or passive
enough to be ‘femme,’ and I wasn’t mean or tough enough to be ‘butch.’ I was given a wide
berth. Non-conventional people can be dangerous, even in the gay community” (224). If the
traditional bildungsroman involves a negotiation of identity between those traits instilled by a
conventional and accomodating home world and those traits required by a public world, a gay or
lesbian bildungsroman involves such a negotiation between traits which the protagonist shares
with other members of the gay community and those which they do not.
Gay and lesbian life narratives feature such consistent trajectories which are distinct from
heterosexual life narratives that critics agree they comprise their own genre: the coming out
story. This is perhaps the strongest possible example of a narrative genre specific to a particular
group of people, with a precise form directly shaped and impacted by life experiences specific to
that group. As Saxey puts it, “the story grows organically out of the experience of gay, lesbian,
and bisexual lives” (2). Even the protagonists of these stories seem to share more than simply
sexual orientation; there are consistent images of the young homosexual: “the sensitive and
thoughtful young man who swims or surfs and loves an unsuitable schoolmate; the politically
informed woman whose solidarity with other women is eventually understood as sexual” (5).
The coming out story unfolds as a revelation of the mystery surrounding these outsiders. In
Bechdel’s case, she simultaneously narrates her self-discovery as lesbian and uncovers her
father’s hidden desires; examining similar photographs of herself and her father, she writes:
In another picture, he’s sunbathing on the tarpaper roof of his frat house just after he
turned twenty-two. Was the boy who took it his lover? As the girl who took this Polaroid
of me on a fire escape on my twenty-first birthday was mine? (120)
Bechdel takes advantage of her graphic medium by drawing her own hands holding these
photographs, heightening the sense of investigation and revelation.
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This self-investigative trend contributes to a sense of authenticity about the story, as Lies
Xhonneux explains in “The Classic Coming Out Novel: Unacknowledged Challenges to the
Heterosexual Mainstream.” Early coming out stories were particularly prone toward this
revelatory approach as well as a firmly realistic mode of storytelling. Xhonneux describes this as
“the story’s truth value. By and large, coming out stories are offered as a truthful picture of a gay
hero’s or heroine’s life, which is why they are often presented as autobiographies” (95). This
manner of presentation was imperative to early coming out stories, as their aim was to illuminate
a truth which a heteronormative culture had dismissed or actively suppressed. As Penelope and
Wolfe describe the value of the narratives making up their anthology, for same-gender-loving
people, “telling their stories became both a recreation of their pasts and a validation of their
present self-understanding. Many of the stories are narrations of pain, suffering and denial” (9).
Coming out stories are narratives of ending that denial. Or, as Pat Califia narrates her own
coming out in “Layers of the Onion, Spokes of the Wheel,” the process begins with recognizing
“something disturbing we feel we must bring forward—at first into our own consciousness, then
to a community of like-minded people where we hope to find welcome, and finally to outsiders”
(276). In doing so, much as many women authors feel compelled to do, they often explicitly
assure readers of their narrative’s truth. Isherwood opens his memoir with: “The book I am now
going to write will be as frank and factual as I can make it, especially as far as I myself am
concerned” (1). The language immediately suggests the end of a long deception, a final
revelation of the truth.
Coming out stories tread a delicate course between an early confusion as to the subject’s
place in the world and a powerful conviction regarding the subject’s sexual identity. Some critics
argue that this is due to the anticipation of resistance from the mainstream, which also inspired
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trends in the language and content of the coming out story. In “Getting the Story Straight:
Coming Out Narratives and the Possibility of a Cultural Rhetoric,” Jen Bacon reviews some of
the typical language used in coming out stories. She suggests that there are expected, even
required terms to be employed:
You generally do not talk about being confused or tormented by mixed feelings, you talk
about being fed conflicting messages by society and being torn between what you are
supposed to want and what you really desire. You make it sound biological – like the
most natural thing in the world. You trace the feelings back to when you were really
young – even if you never told anyone until you were really old. (251)
Joan Larkin describes similar trends in the introduction to A Woman Like That: Lesbian and
Bisexual Writers Tell Their Coming-out Stories. Larkin describes how the women in her
collection “recall childhood desire, embryonic lesbian hunger, and the innocence and mystery of
those feelings on the brink of collision with the straight world” (xv). She may be referring to
stories such as Jane Delynn’s “The Secret Agent,” in which she describes her childhood
struggles: “At camp that summer, desire further ensnares me, as well as a pain I came to
associate with these feelings. For I, who had always been so popular, suddenly find the world
arrayed against me” (49). When we find such feelings described by numerous authors across
decades, we begin to see how the conventions of coming out stories became an instructive model
for how gays and lesbians were to describe their experiences.
Because a sense of difference from family and community characterizes the lives and life
narratives of same-gender-loving people, they seek out such instructive models which, as Saxey
puts it, “show readers what characterizes a gay man or lesbian, what constitutes a ‘gay life’” (3),
or as Xhonneaux describes, “queer lifestyles on which readers can model their own experiences”
(96). Bechdel explicitly narrates and draws her searches through literature and student groups in
her college years (210). More interestingly, it becomes clear that her desire to uncover her
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father’s homosexuality is, in part, a search for a role model. In the nearest Bechdel and her father
come to discussing their respective orientations, he confesses, “When I was little, I really wanted
to be a girl. I’d dress up in girls’ clothes,” to which she replies excitedly, “I wanted to be a boy! I
dressed in boy’s clothes! Remember?” (221). She will reflect on this as her “eagerness to claim
him as ‘gay’ in the way I am ‘gay,’ as opposed to bisexual or some other category” (230). While
Bechdel’s circumstances (coming out as a lesbian while simultaneously learning of her father’s
hidden same-gender love) may seem statistically unique, she is not the only author to search for a
reflection of their sexual orientation in their parents. Ackerley learns after his father’s death that
his father secretly had an entire second family; parts of his memoir are devoted to exploring his
father’s sexual deviance. Though he admits, “Unhappily my knowledge of that life and of the
years that followed is meagre” (24), he suspects, with little evidence, that his father’s dalliances
included affairs with other men during his service as a guardsman. He narrates an encounter
between his father and a close friend during that time which he believes may have turned sexual,
but ultimately laments, “Would that I had been able to peep and eavesdrop through that window
and discover their secrets, if any. But I was not yet born” (29). Ackerley, Bechdel, and numerous
other authors narrate their searches for models through which to understand their own identities
as same-gender-loving people.
This very dearth of readily available role models may be in part what endows the genre of
coming out story with such a special social power and significance. As many critics have argued,
the genre does more than simply reflect an evolving culture; it also influences how that culture
evolves. Xhonneux explains, “it provides people who are discovering their sexualities with a
vocabulary to talk about their emerging feelings . . . and it depicts queer lifestyles on which
readers can model their own experiences” (96). Coming out stories initially reflected the lives of

99

gays and lesbians, but in subsequent generations, the lives of gays and lesbians reflected existing
coming out stories. Thus, these narratives were “creating that which they appear to simply
report” (96). As Saxey discusses, this phenomenon is more than a matter of life imitating art
imitating life, but rather there are political demands impacting the way gays and lesbians
construct their lives in narrative. For instance: “the focus on a happy ending for the protagonist
risks drawing attention away from continuing cultural homophobia” (6). Likewise, the language
Bacon described – biology, “natural,” tracing back to youth – has such obvious political
implications that it remains a contested point in debates over gay civil rights and is strictly
policed among gays and lesbians.
For example, consider the uproar and media backlash which occurred after actress
Cynthia Nixon came out as a lesbian. Nixon described herself as having once been straight and
having chosen to be gay. Many in the queer community were enraged at the suggestion that
being gay was a choice rather than an inborn condition; others insisted that Nixon must in fact be
bisexual. The danger, of course, in simply acknowledging and respecting Nixon’s description of
her own sexuality is that it so resembles homophobic arguments that gay people can (and thus
should) decide to be heterosexual. Stories like Nixon’s are thus often met with disbelief and
indignation from within the queer community.
The coming out story as a genre has come to describe one particular process by which a
homosexual might come out, a version of the story that is recognizable to straight audiences and
that is politically useful. As Sedgwick points out, “The ability of anyone in our culture to support
and honour gay kids may depend on an ability to name them as such” (Epistemology of the
Closet 42). Without having some relatively stable (and relatively positive) image to conjure up of
same-gender-loving people, straight audiences find it difficult to know who or what to support.
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Unfortunately, as Saxey argues, “Once this process has become stabilized, and the subject . . .
has been constructed, its existence becomes ‘common sense’, and any alternative positions hard
to express or even imagine” (6). This may prompt certain criticisms regarding the position of
coming out stories and their capacity to authentically reflect the lives of diverse gays and
lesbians now. The central question becomes: “Are coming out stories deviant and transgressive,
or normative and confining?” (5). In fact, the coming out story may be normative in more ways
than one. In “Regulated Narratives in Anti-Homophobia Education: Complications in Coming
Out Stories,” Gulzar Raisa Charania explains how she feels her own story has at times been
reworked and even distorted for the sake of anti-homophobia education. She has felt compelled
to provide “a story of sameness, the story that we are just like you, or at least almost like you,
and in fact it is this near sameness that makes us as LGB people recognizable” (34). The
normalized coming out story does more than confer a uniform image upon lesbians and gays;
that image is one which must in fact closely resemble heterosexuals.
All of this discussion of social regulation is not to say, however, that all gay and lesbian
life writing falls into this particular genre, only that the genre has been defined by the
experiences of gay men, lesbians, and other same-gender-loving people. Many such authors,
however, are far more drawn to forms of writing which are themselves more deviant,
nontraditional, transgressive, queer. For example, in “Queering the Essay,” David Lazar argues
that the essay is an inherently queer genre
in the way that queer theory defines queer as a continuing instability in gender relations
that undermines the traditional binary of gender, replacing it with indeterminate,
transgressive desires. The desire of the essay is to transgress genre. (20)
Certainly, many same-gender-loving authors (including Cooper, Mikels, Tree, Califia, and
Delynn) have utilized the malleable form of the essay. Richard Rodriguez stands out as a
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particularly skillful example. He explores gay experience as simultaneously magical and
mundane, beautiful and tragic, real and unreal, by twisting the image of the Victorian house: “No
other architecture in the American imagination is more evocative of family than the Victorian
house,” but “if Victorian houses assert a sturdy optimism by day, they are also associated in our
imaginations with the Gothic . . . the descending architecture of nightmare” (759). “Late
Victorians” as a literary piece shifts just as easily between a kind of objective cultural study and
a deeply subjective and personal narrative.
Some same-gender-loving authors take a markedly different approach than that described
in the standardized coming out story. Recall, as explored in the previous section, that women’s
life writing in general is more likely than men’s to be experimental in terms of form and take
greater liberties with factuality in life writing. These qualities manifest powerfully in lesbian
narratives, so much so that many critics have seen fit to distinguish a genre of “lesbian narrative”
from stories which simply feature lesbian protagonists or are written by lesbian women. In
“Sylvia Townsend Warner and the Counterplot of Lesbian Fiction,” Terry Castle discusses
lesbian narratives in terms of their form, their place within literature, and the effect of their focus
on lesbian romance. To begin with form, she writes:
The archetypal lesbian fiction decanonizes, so to speak, the canonical structure of desire
itself. In so far as it documents a world in which men are ‘between women’ rather than
vice versa, it is an insult to the conventional geometries of fictional eros. It dismantles the
real, as it were, in a search for the not-yet-real, something unpredicted and unpredictable .
. . As a consequence it often looks odd, fantastical, implausible, ‘not there’ - utopian in
aspiration if not design. It is, in a word, imaginative. (231)
She emphasizes the fantastically unorthodox nature of lesbian texts both in terms of the causes
and effect of such unconventionality of form. Because well-established literary texts are part of a
patriarchal tradition upholding hegemonic values, a lesbian narrative (as Castle would describe
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one) will be almost necessarily non-canonical in that it will appear to be a parody of such
canonical works (230). Hence, the lesbian narrative can have a powerfully countercultural effect.
To centralize lesbian romance is a threat to “this supposedly intractable patriarchal structure.
Female bonding . . . destabilizes the ‘canonical’ triangular arrangement of male desire, is an
affront to it, and ultimately – in the radical form of lesbian bonding – displaces it entirely” (217).
A lesbian narrative is a counterplot to traditional, patriarchal literature. There are a variety of
ways in which lesbian women have reworked the traditions of life writing, changing definitions
to suit their purposes. Consider The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas, written by Gertrude Stein.
The work closes with Stein referring to herself in the third person, as she writes the entire book
in the voice of her partner:
About six weeks ago Gertrude Stein said, it does not look to me as if you were ever going
to write that autobiography. You know what I am going to do. I am going to write it for
you. I am going to write it as simply as Defoe did the autobiography of Robinson Crusoe.
And she has and this is it. (310)
This may seem a farcical exercise, or perhaps what Castle might term a parody of the traditional
genre of autobiography, but by referencing Defoe, a male author whose most famous work
utilized an autobiographical voice in a fictional text (arguably creating the genre of realistic
fiction), Stein makes clear that she is redefining this genre precisely to claim a literary power
previously governed by a male literary tradition.
In Heterosexual Plots and Lesbian Narratives, Marilyn Farwell amplifies Castle’s
arguments. She also establishes why crafting such a counterplot is a challenging endeavor.
Farwell writes, “A narrative is a system of power relationships not easily challenged. It is a story
that has as part of its system an alignment of gender into opposite and hierarchical categories”
(28). Here, Farwell echoes Teresa de Lauretis, who explains in Alice Doesn’t: Feminism,
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Semiotics, Cinema that traditionally, the narrative protagonist “must be male, regardless of the
gender of the text-image, because the obstacle, whatever its personification, is morphologically
female” (118). Similarly, Farwell contends that the very structure of traditional narrative as we
know it (and of romantic narratives in particular) is infused with heternormativity: “The
interdependence of heterosexuality and the narrative structure is a burden that limits the
development of female agency” (39). To exercise “female agency,” then, is to adapt and rework
traditional structures to better reflect the reality of the author’s experience. Consider Bechdel,
whose narrative jumps backward and forward in time in a cyclical pattern. This pattern is
perhaps the only way of narrating both her sense of her father’s distance while he was alive and
also her sense of having found him after his death through this investigation of his sexuality. Of
that distance, she writes, “It’s true that he didn’t kill himself until I was nearly twenty. But his
absence resonated retroactively, echoing back through all the time I knew him” (23). Yet, the
knowledge she gains in investigating his sexuality results in her closing with an image of herself
as a child jumping into his arms and the explanation that “in the tricky reverse narration that
impels our entwined stories, he was there to catch me when I leapt” (232).
Nonlinearity such as Bechdel employs is one technique Farwell mentions specifically.
She writes that the essential question when considering lesbian narrative is “whether the text
image—e.g., a female or lesbian character—can challenge that ideologically inflected system or
whether only structural changes such as nonlinearity can effect transgression” (29). Much like
Castle, she sees in lesbian narrative the capacity to disrupt the patriarchal narrative system
through structural changes. Such changes can alter a text so drastically that it becomes difficult
to classify under traditional genre definitions, such as Winterson’s novelization of her life.
Oranges are Not the Only Fruit is indeed largely Winterson’s life story and yet is replete with
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scenes and episodes resembling classical fantasy, full of adventure and sorcery, parallel
narratives acting as allegory for the “real” story, thematically weighted objects and imagery
threading between worlds. This structure necessarily means approaching the core thematic
narrative from multiple and diverse perspectives as she recasts herself as multiple characters –
Jeanette the young girl terrorized by an evangelical mother, Winnet Stonejar the adventurer
tricked into being a wizard’s apprentice (144).
Winterson’s work may be considered a very explicit example of what Bonnie
Zimmerman calls “mythmaking” in The Safe Sea of Women: Lesbian Fiction, 1969-1989.
Zimmerman describes “lesbian fiction as the expression of a collective ‘myth of origins’ with
four primary divisions: . . . the lesbian self, the lesbian couple, the lesbian community, and
community and difference” (xv). Authors such as Audre Lorde explicitly refer to their work in
this way. In a conversation with Joan Wylie Hall, Lorde describes Zami as “a biomythography,
which is really fiction. It has the elements of biography and history and myth. In other words, it’s
fiction built from many sources. This is one way of expanding our vision” (Conversations with
Audre Lorde 99). Naturally, just as in any cultural mythology, the lines between fact and fiction
necessarily blur, and as Zimmerman clarifies, “to say that lesbian writers are constructing stories
and myths is hardly to criticize them. The task of the writer is precisely that: storytelling” (26).
Winterson and her adventurous alter ego are likely the kind of women Zimmerman describes as
“the lesbian hero, in all her various shapes, [who] journeys through patriarchy to its point of exit,
the border of an unknown territory, a ‘wild zone’ of the imagination” (75).
The life writing of same-gender-loving people is shaped by otherness and hiddenness,
which manifest early with the protagonists’ disidentification with home and family, the need to
find those with whom they can identify before moving forward. Otherness continues to shape the

105

narrative as the subject navigates between the “straight world” and the “gay world.” These
narratives involve a search for historical and social roots, precedents to validate the subject’s
existence and identity. It often functions as a revelation, the solving of a mystery of the subject’s
identity, and in such cases tends toward a tone of strict realism. However, particularly in the
realm of lesbian literature, it is as likely to experiment wildly, to merge fantasy and reality in
narrative structures radically different from traditional literary genres, much less traditional
autobiography. Such texts seek to explore subjects from multiple perspectives and through
multiple lenses.
The works described in this section vary from the rigidly structured to the radically
experimental, but in either case, the literary conventions which manifest stem from the
background(s) of the author. As gay and lesbian identity took shape in the twentieth century, so
did specific genres of life writing – the coming out story, the lesbian narrative – to describe the
experiences of those sharing these identities. In the following section, we will examine similar
phenomena among transgender people.

Transgender Life Writing

Despite the tendency to cluster transgender identities with same-gender-loving identities,
literary critics recognize that the life writing of transgender people has produced genres
markedly distinct from the coming out stories and lesbian narratives described in the previous
section. To be sure, there are certain surface level similarities: the childhood knowledge of one’s
difference from those around them, the inability to fit into a prescribed role, and the insistence
that one’s identity is inborn (whether that identity is homosexual or transgender). However, there
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is an undeniable particularity to transgender experience which far surpasses the degree of
difference between the experiences of gay men and those of lesbians or for that matter between
the experiences of lesbians and heterosexual women. This difference is readily apparent through
examination of the life narratives of transgender persons which focus on the development of
these identities. More than any other factors, transgender life writing has been shaped by
negotiations with the medical and psychiatric community, by navigation of the process of gender
transition, and the imperative to “pass” as cisgender.
Gender transition is such a defining experience in the lives of transgender people that one
would be hard pressed to find a transgender autobiography or memoir which does not
prominently feature narrative of the process. To describe the most common structure of the
gender transition narrative, we may begin by establishing the expected stages of gender transition
itself. A piece of life writing in this genre follows a subject who recognizes a dissonance
between their internal sense of gender identity and the gender role into which they are assigned
and socialized; this dissonance prompts a shift in social identity which will involve some
combination of changes in dress/presentation, legal status, name, pronouns, and physical
characteristics (medical intervention). In the twenty-first century, none of these specific changes
is requisite. For example, although many gender transition narratives do include physical
transformation, one might change one’s social gender role without changing one’s body. We
now also recognize that although a gender transition narrative will always involve some
movement out of a particular gender role into which one was socialized, it does not necessarily
include a movement into any particular gender role. That is, although many gender transition
narratives are a definite shift from female to male or from male to female, one might shift into an
identity that is dual-gendered, androgynous, or otherwise less easily categorized. However,
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understanding the transition narrative (and transgender history) means recognizing that the
discourse on transgender identities has not always been so inclusive or adaptable. Rather, the
lives transgender people have led (and the narratives defined by and defining those lives) have
been policed just as coming out stories have been policed. Unlike coming out stories, which have
largely been policed from within the gay community, transition narratives have been more
heavily and tangibly policed by those who are not themselves transgender – most notably by the
medical and psychiatric community.
That many transgender people need medical treatment for a condition not readily
identifiable by physical symptoms empowered the medical establishment to demand a particular
life story, a narrative which effectively becomes the symptom. In Second Skins: The Body
Narratives of Transsexuality, Jay Prosser explains, “The story the transsexual tells the clinician
must mirror or echo the diagnosis, its details matching or carrying those of this master narrative”
(104). Applying Esther Saxey and Lies Xhonneux’s arguments regarding the coming out story to
the transsexual narrative – that the stories create what they purport to describe – it is little
wonder that for much of its history, the transition narrative has featured a passive subject lacking
in personal agency; the subject’s life story has literally been overwritten by another author.
Prosser writes, “Constructionist theories of transsexuality overwhelmingly fail to examine how
transsexuals are constructing subjects” (8) as opposed to constructed objects. Much of Prosser’s
study revolves around exploring how this concept of the passive, constructed transsexual grew
directly out of the narratives of gender transition. Consider the very first semi-autobiographical
account of a gender transition, Man into Woman: An Authentic Record of a Change of Sex
(1933), the story of the transition of Lili Elbe (née Einar Wegener [“Andreas Sparre” in the
text]). I refer to the text as “semi-autobiographical” in that while the text is presented as the
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writings of Lili Elbe herself, the book is credited only to her doctor, Ernst Ludwig Harthern
Jacobson (under the pseudonym Niels Hoyer) as editor. Jacobson published the account two
years after Elbe’s death. Elbe is first presented to the audience as a morose individual in need of
a miracle (14). The miracle Elbe seeks is one to be provided by a team of doctors, before whom
Elbe is described as “helpless” (22) and who explicitly decide on timetables for treatment, even
occasionally over Elbe’s objections (24). The doctors succeed, however briefly, in transforming
Elbe in not only a physical but even a psychological sense. When Elbe has a powerful emotional
reaction to her surgeon, craving his approval as a woman, a letter ostensibly written by Elbe’s
wife describes:
What the Professor is now doing with Lili is nothing less than an emotional moulding,
which is preceding the physical moulding into a woman. Hitherto Lili has been like clay
which others had prepared and to which the Professor has given form and life by a
transient touch. Up till now, he thought, Lilli’s femininity has been only superficial, not
yet completely wholly genuine. By a single glance the Professor yesterday awoke her
heart to life, to a life with all the instincts of a woman. (130)
Thus, the text would grant doctors control not simply over Elbe’s body but her personality as
well. Elbe is consistently described as a helpless, timid creature with no responsibility and little
control of her own transformation (134). She does not recreate herself; she is “moulded” by the
doctors. Just as Elbe’s medical transition is understood to be the among the first medical sex
changes, this account of that transition represents something of a foundation for the eventual
genre of the gender transition narrative, and (perhaps unsurprisingly considering the “editor”) it
establishes the doctor as the primary acting agent and the transsexual as a passive object under
construction.
We cannot overlook the historical situation leading to the standardization of this narrative
of the passive, constructed transsexual. In Sandy Stone’s well-known essay, “The Empire Strikes
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Back: A Post-transsexual Manifesto” (first published in response to Janice Raymond’s equally
well-known transphobic attack, The Transsexual Empire), Stone cautions against assuming that
no other transsexual narrative existed. Rather, other narratives were actively rejected:
“[Clinicians] consider autobiographical accounts thoroughly unreliable” (224). Of all possible
sources of information about the transsexual experience, doctors considered the stories told
organically and independently by transsexual people to be the least trustworthy. Transsexual life
narratives outside of medical discourse remained relatively obscure and unknown, either because
they were labeled gay or lesbian narratives instead (consider Radclyffe Hall’s The Well of
Loneliness, for example) or unpublished and lost entirely, the only testament to their existence
being the medical literature guiding psychiatric professionals to reject them. Prosser explains that
“professional writings frequently contain strategies about how to detect the inauthentic
transsexual via the inauthentic account, how to get the ‘true story’” (110). Unsurprisingly, as the
image crafted by the medical establishment became centralized, the atmosphere between
transgender people and medical providers developed into one of increasing distrust. The quest
for treatment became a game with stakes too high for transsexuals to refuse to play. In reference
to Harry Benjamin’s widely used descriptions of transsexuals, Stone reminds us:
The reason the candidates’ behavioral profiles matched Benjamin's so well was that the
candidates, too, had read Benjamin's book, which was passed from hand to hand within
the transsexual community, and they were only too happy to provide the behavior that led
to acceptance for surgery. (228)
A contrast to Jen Bacon’s description of the coming out process demonstrates
transsexuals’ particular vulnerability toward this kind of external control. Bacon writes: “At a
basic level, the act of coming out is not rhetorical if we think of rhetoric in the classical sense of
persuasion. I’ve never needed to persuade anyone that I am queer – if I tell them, they believe
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me” (251). On an individual level, some same-gender-loving people may counter that they have
in fact been doubted or challenged by family or community members who did not accept or
acknowledge their self-identification as gay, lesbian, or bisexual. However, to Bacon’s point,
such doubts and challenges generally take the form of denial rooted in homophobia rather than a
refusal to believe, “at a basic level,” that homosexuality exists. Indeed, this is so “basic” that
Bacon does not dwell on the point long, but this simple privilege she glosses over is one which
transgender people do not have. Unlike homosexuals, transgender people cannot always expect
to be immediately believed regarding their gender identities because they cannot always expect
their audience to accept as valid the gender identities of transgender people in general; in fact,
transgender people have learned to anticipate doubt and skepticism, to expect suspicions of
fetishism, clothing-obsession, or an inability to cope with homosexuality rather than trust
regarding their self-identification. This pervasive distrust may be why many transgender
memoirs open on a post-transition subject, revealing that a transition has occurred before
jumping back. Having learned by experience the difficulty in changing the perception of friends
and family who knew them first as their assigned gender, the author feels it necessary to ensure
that the reader’s first impression of the subject is the “correct” one. We see this in a variety of
texts such as Donna Rose’s Wrapped in Blue: A Journey of Discovery, which opens on Rose
preparing for sex reassignment surgery (9). The very first words of Max Wolf Valerio’s The
Testosterone Files: My Hormonal and Social Transformation from Female to Male read: “I
watch myself in the mirror, shirt off, pants slung down past my hip bones. The scars are fading
and the contour of my chest looks tight” (1).
The anticipation of doubt may also be why many transsexual authors are so careful to
explicitly define the difference between sexual orientation and gender identity in their work,
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though notably, the autobiographical accounts of transgender women and transgender men tend
to follow different steps in reaching this understanding. Trans women more commonly narrate a
clear early understanding that their condition is not a matter of sexual orientation, often
containing episodes which clarify that understanding. In the extreme case of Christine
Jorgensen’s A Personal Autobiography, a pre-transition scene clarifies that while she is attracted
to men, she is repulsed to the point of vomiting at the idea of having sex with a man while still
male-bodied (75). Contrarily, many trans men narrate a slower process of realization that they are
not simply butch lesbians but in fact men. As Mark Rees recalls his girlhood in Dear Sir or
Madam: The Autobiography of a Female-to-Male Transsexual, “I was happily ignorant of any
problem of gender identity and still assumed that all girls wanted to be boys” (10). One may
theorize that the same misogynistic culture speeds trans women’s self-conceptualization and
slows that of trans men. Timetables aside, however, female-to-male narratives and male-tofemale narratives alike come to the common understanding that the state of being transgender is
not the same as that of homosexuality, and once that understanding is reached, the narrative of
gender transition can proceed.
Critics have detailed a number of recurring characteristics for both the pre-transition and
post-transition stages of the narrative imposed on transgender people by clinicians. Stone
discusses early medical texts which concluded that transgender people, generally speaking, were
depressed, dependent, withdrawn, isolated, and socially maladjusted (228). Likewise, in an effort
to distinguish a “true transsexual” from a transvestite, psychiatrists relied on the idea that
“physical men who lived as women and who identified themselves as transsexuals, as opposed to
male transvestites for whom erotic penile sensation was permissible, could not experience penile
pleasure.” A male-to-female transsexual was expected to harbor such profound disgust for her
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own (male) genitals as to make real sexual pleasure unlikely. The researchers confessed that
most of their subjects had a variety of other physical and mental health problems in addition to
gender-based difficulties, but nevertheless, these characteristics became part of clinicians’
diagnostic procedure. One might immediately recall the sexual difficulties Jorgensen described.
Likewise, in Conundrum, Jan Morris relates her self-conception prior to transition: “I found the
figure I cut in the world, however innocuous it seemed to others, abhorrent to myself” (78) and
“by my mid-thirties my self-repugnance was more specific, and more bitter, and I began to detest
the body that had served me so loyally” (89).
Following a stage that might be described as a kind of second adolescence, clinicians also
had expectations regarding the mannerisms and behavior of a transgender person post-treatment.
As Julia Serano explains in Whipping Girl: A Transsexual Woman on Sexism and the
Scapegoating of Femininity, during transition, psychologists strictly enforced traditional gender
roles: “Not only did the trans person have to physically ‘pass’ as their identified sex, they needed
to exhibit the ‘appropriate’ sexual orientation (heterosexual) and gender expression (masculinity
for men, femininity for trans woman)” (122). Transgender women were expected to look and act
to the greatest extent possible as cisgendered women were expected to look and act. The
transgender subject, then, was a joyless, sexless, self-loathing misfit prior to treatment who
would be an exceptionally feminine heterosexual woman or masculine heterosexual man after
treatment. Morris certainly follows this pattern. Her narrative does not quite so explicitly credit
her doctors with the kind of psychological “moulding” that Elbe’s narrative did, but she
nevertheless describes the changes in her social and psychological state as having derived
directly from her surgery: “My body then was made to push and initiate, it is made now to yield
and accept, and the outside change has had its inner consequences” (153). The changes to which
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Morris refers are a myriad of thoughts and behaviors considered more feminine: feeling small,
caring about clothes, makeup, a coy reaction to men’s attentions, gossiping (157-58).
Conversely, Mario Martino’s Emergence: A Transsexual Autobiography, similarly credits
medical treatment (269) for his pronounced masculinity: “I’m more gutsy now . . . I am brutally
frank. A completely masculine trait . . . I’m more realistic today . . . I don’t walk slowly into
things, I plunge” (270). While Stone’s argument that transgender people would consciously
choose to provide doctors with the story and behavior which would yield treatment is quite
convincing, clearly many did not simply deliver a certain narrative to their doctors, rather they
internalized that narrative to the point that their memoirs, their own descriptions of their
transitions, bore an uncanny resemblance to the medical master narrative (which itself bears a
curious resemblance to Lili Elbe’s narrative).
Over the last few decades, however, a number of notable changes have occurred in
transgender life writing. In “Connecting Body and Mind: How Transgender People Changed
Their Self-Image,” Mariette Pathy Allen chronicles the shifting self-concept and selfrepresentation of transgender people: “the guilt and shame experienced in the early years was
morphing into anger, defiance, and new self-confidence” (278). Part of this defiance and selfconfidence certainly involved a break from the heteronormative master narrative that demanded
conformity and invisibility. Allen writes:
Fewer people feel the need to be part of ‘the American Dream,’ in which everyone fits in.
Now there are plenty of people who refuse to fit in, or to ‘disappear into the woodwork,’
as most post-operative transsexuals did in the past . . . They might not care about
‘passing’ as a man or a woman, or about the anatomical configuration or gender identity
of their partners. (279-80)
Very late twentieth-century and much of twenty-first century transgender life writing
demonstrates drastic shifts toward personal agency and individual ownership of the transition
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process, which alters every stage of it. Compare Jennifer Finney Boylan’s depiction of her pretransition self in She’s Not There: A Life in Two Genders to the depressed, self-loathing
representations of Jorgensen and Morris. Pre-transition, Boylan is troubled and distressed, but
also joyful, successful, well-liked, in a loving marriage, and the father of two children. Boylan
even points out the contrast to expectations through the voice of her therapist:
He seemed startled by how well-adjusted I was. There didn’t seem to be any explanation
for it . . . “You operate at a strangely high level of functionality, actually, considering
what you’ve been dealing with.” (121-22)
In recent years, the pre-transition transgender person is characterized less as a desperate soul in
need of rescue and more often as simply a person who recognizes the need to evolve into a more
complete, congruent person.
The shifts in how the post-transition subject appears are far more drastic. Rather than
embrace and glory in stereotypes of masculinity and femininity, transgender life writers in recent
years have more commonly taken the opportunity provided them by their unique perspectives to
critique those stereotypes. While many authors address the question of passing as cisgender and
the invisibility that comes with it, fewer seem to hold it up as a goal of transition; instead, it
becomes, if anything, a small obstacle on the route to openness and honesty regarding their
whole selves. Jamison Green provides a powerful example in Becoming a Visible Man. When
Green joins an all-male percussion troupe with a supportive group of cisgender men, he initially
hides his transgender identity, and he makes quite clear that he passes as cisgender. However, he
quickly comes to sense a distance between himself and the men he befriends as they bare their
souls and he keeps his secret. Although his new male body allows him entrance into this space,
“I realized it was that very body that was placing new constraints on me” (35). These constraints
are finally lifted when Green is asked to help lead a newly developing men’s group, and he feels
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it would be wrong to take on a leadership role without disclosing his identity. In the end, even
more significant than his initial acceptance by the group, Green finds the group embraces him
after his revelation. He describes how he opens his coming out:
I stood up before them and told them from my heart that once upon a time there was a
little boy named James. I told them what his life was like as a boy who was generally
happy and healthy and loved, but who had problems now and then because his body was
different from other boys’ bodies, because he wasn’t allowed to do things other boys or
men were expected to do. James had problems now and then when people told him he
had to wear a dress because he had a female body. (42)
The rhetorical strategy Green employs here is fascinating. Encapsulated in a few sentences,
Green acknowledges the medical master narrative (which recommended the creation of a false,
cisgendered history) then obliterates it by coming out as a man who once lived in a female body.
Boylan also seems to implicitly address this issue. In the chapters directly following
transition, Boylan seems wrapped up in femininity as discussions of dresses and finger-nail
polish present precisely the sort of post-transition woman clinicians intended to construct. Like
Green, though, Boylan eventually recognizes the insecurity underlying this hyper-feminine
presentation. She recalls, “There were times when it was as if I were trying to prove I was female
by oppressing myself” (156). In fact, this constructed femininity becomes the greatest obstacle in
her efforts to maintain a friendship begun prior to transition. Her friend writes to her: “Here, you
insist, is the real me, the me I’ve kept a secret all these years. And yet the real you . . . seems
mannered, studied, implausible” (183). Interestingly, her friend even frames this in narrative
terms, comparing Boylan herself to an implausible (even if true) story composed by a creative
writing student. Although Boylan does not make this explicit, it seems that this “story” her friend
finds so unreal is in fact the medical master narrative. Boylan’s success depends on escaping the
bounds of that narrative, and she does so in most respects. She returns to a discussion of
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masculinity and femininity late in the text and remarks on the increased level of scrutiny
transgender people face in this regard:
There are aspects of me that are feminine now . . . [and] I still retain a number of
masculine affects that I am not ashamed of . . . Had I been born female, no one would
remark upon these things—but since I was not, any masculine affect is considered a
vestigial link to a previous life; conversely, any feminine affect that seems excessive can
be hauled out as evidence that I . . . have arrived at middle age just in time to be fourteen
years old. (246)
Boylan’s most significant development post-transition occurs when she stops considering
whether she is masculine or feminine and stops attempting to prove her own identity.
Recent transgender life writing rewrites dominant narratives and critiques dominant
paradigms of sex and gender in a variety of ways. In A Queer and Pleasant Danger: The True
Story of a Nice Jewish Boy Who Joins the Church of Scientology and Leaves Twelve Years Later
to Become the Lovely Lady She is Today, Kate Bornstein describes her evolution beyond the
traditional femininity demanded of trans women: “I learned just how deeply I’d bought into the
heterosexist mainstream transsexual narrative of the day: I wanted to look like and take on the
woman’s role in the misogynist American dream” (169). In “transcension,” Katie Diamond and
Johnny Blazes’s graphic essay, they address the notion that a trans person, like a cis person, must
have a fixed sense of gender identity from an early age. They critique the expectation that trans
people must proclaim “I have always been this way” (176), instead declaring, “I have always
been becoming what I am right now” (177). In “The Manly Art of Pregnancy,” j wallace
redefines the process of child bearing as a masculine one by narrating his own pregnancy:
I developed the art of seeming chivalrous while not lifting over forty pounds. I came to
understand that sometimes, being manly is about knowing what tool to use . . . Crawling
under one’s car to strike at the tire with a hammer is not manly; protecting one’s family
and using a cell phone is. (191)

117

Green considers his transition from a lesbian feminist to a male feminist, writing “I became
acutely aware of women’s fear of men in general, something that I had never understood until it
was directed at me as a man” (35-36). He wrestles with what he describes as the “lesbian
feminist doctrine of male evil—that all men are bad” (23) as he attempts to find himself as a
man, ultimately making his goal to find a way of being a man that bears little resemblance to the
hyper-masculine and chauvinistic image of manhood fostered by a patriarchal culture.
For transgender people who do not identify as men or women, but rather as genderqueer,
bigender, androgynous, gender fluid, or otherwise nonbinary, it often seems as if an additional
stage of the transition narrative comes when a person moves beyond their initial target gender.
Bornstein, for example, who initially transitioned from male to female, writes, “It had been such
a relief for me when I could stop pretending to be a man. Well, it was a similar relief not to have
to pretend I was a woman” (199). In What Becomes You, Aaron Raz Link identifies as “not really
a woman . . . But I’m not really a man, either . . . I’m some other kind of thing, I’m something in
between” (57); he is aggressively “out” as a trans person, narrating his presentation at a pride
parade: “I strip down and paint my body black. I paint my scars in red, because I’m not sure how
much they show from a distance now . . . If you got it, flaunt it” (184). Nick Krieger begins a
transition from female to male but moves on to self-describe as “the best of both genders, a
compromise . . . hold[ing] elements of man and woman at the same time” (54); Krieger writes,
“For Jess and me, gender wasn’t static. I could be ‘she’ at work and ‘uncle’ to the cat and Jess
could be a politically identified woman whom I referred to as ‘he’” (96).
Considering that such evolution has taken place, that the form of the transition narrative
has so changed in the twenty-first century, one might question the need for such lengthy
exploration of the more traditional and regulated structure characterizing early transition
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narratives, but understanding the history of the genre remains necessary to understand why
transgender people write their lives as they do today. As certain critics have pointed out, some
transgender people have felt so restricted by the historically regulated form that they chose to all
but abandon narrative in favor of “manifesto.” In “Serious Play: Drag, Transgender, and the
Relationship Between Performance and Identity in the Life Writing of Rupaul and Kate
Bornstein,” Elizabeth Schewe writes, “Bornstein approaches life writing from a more explicitly
critical perspective because she places herself within a genealogy of transsexuals whose
autobiographies have been appropriated to promote a pathologizing view of trans people” (671).
Schewe argues that Bornstein writes in a style designed to “neutralize the threat of cooptation”
(681); Bornstein “elicit[s] the reader’s desire to hear her life story and then offer[s] her theory of
gender in its place” (682). Though Bornstein would eventually write an autobiography (as
described above), Schewe refers to Bornstein’s earlier and more famous work, Gender Outlaw:
On Men, Women, and the Rest of Us, in which Bornstein weaves discontinuous episodes of
narrative among gender theory and cultural critique. Likewise, Serano writes, “When I first told
people that I was working on a book based on my experiences and perspectives as a transsexual
woman, many of them immediately assumed that I was writing an autobiography” (1). What she
produces instead is a well-researched piece of academic writing on trans-feminism which is
nevertheless infused with personal narrative in many places. Even Green’s work, while leaning
more heavily toward narrative, may be described as equal parts memoir and manifesto, though
his structure reverses that which Serano employs. Serano points out from the beginning that her
text is not autobiography but rather researched meditations on gender and culture, but as the text
proceeds, short narratives of her own experience as a trans woman appear with increasing
frequency. Green, on the other hand, begins with narrative and primarily follows the pattern of
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other gender transition narratives through the first half of the text before proceeding into an
extended social commentary occasionally peppered with personal anecdotes in the second half.
More importantly, most transgender life writers have not eschewed narrative forms and,
perhaps more than any other cultural group, they engage previous generations of transgender life
writers in explicit terms, comparing and contrasting their journeys and their choices in
representation. Martino describes reading Christine Jorgensen’s autobiography and how it
motivates him to pursue transition: “Then I was not too different! And there were tens of
thousands all over the world! . . . 1967: The year of the Christine Jorgensen book would be my
year too!” (163). Morris describes how she wondered about other transgender women she had
heard of until she “groped towards their presence in the memoirs and the history footnotes . . . on
a winter evening I espied, reduced to a half-price and displayed with a proper obscurity on a high
back shelf, a book called Man Into Woman” (45). Morris compares her own situation to Lili Elbe
a few decades earlier, and a few decades hence, Boylan in turn compares her own life to Morris,
who she felt “showed that a transsexual can be mature, wise, dignified, and literary” (245). One
would be hard pressed to find any other community whose authors so consistently and explicitly
reference the life writing of past generations.
Moreover, while I described Boylan and Green as responding to the medical master
narrative in subtext, other authors do so much more explicitly. In Branded T, Rosalyne
Blumenstein seeks to reclaim agency taken from trans people by clinicians, using the language of
credit: “I had already achieved what some surgeon was going to get credit for. I had already
challenged the idea of how the world was going to perceive or identify me. But within our
culture the credit is given to the miracle workers a.k.a. ‘the surgeons’” (115). It is easy to
imagine Blumenstein’s words as a pointed response to the self-aggrandizing writing of Elbe’s
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physician. She states emphatically that she is the driving force of her transition, not the medical
establishment. Krieger goes so far as to acknowledge and artfully rewrite the medical narrative.
To receive medical treatment, Krieger goes to a therapist to acquire a letter of recommendation,
in which the therapist writes (as she must) that Krieger meets the criteria for gender identity
disorder and will transition to male. Frustrated, Krieger drafts, and includes in his memoir, the
letter he would have preferred, which finishes, “In conclusion, born female, Nina resembled a
girl, then woman, then boy, and is on her way to becoming, well, I have no idea. But whatever
the ending, it will be happy. Such is the case when a client writes her own story” (190). One can
only hope the medical community may notice.
Transgender life writing can only be fully understood by exploring both the medical and
psychiatric roots of transition narrative and the more recent responses to that narrative; however,
it may be well characterized by a central conflict in which a protagonist conceives of a version of
self that is distinct from their current self. Helping to illustrate that conflict, such narratives
commonly begin at the end, on a post-transition subject, before flashing back. Protagonists
frequently move through stages of resisting the need to transform before narrating the
transformation itself. Modern narratives often include further stages involving movement beyond
the initial self-conception in one way or another, sometimes simply by taking greater individual
ownership of that gender identity, sometimes by evolving beyond gender. While early
transgender life writing was highly rhetorical in anticipating an audience’s doubts as to the
author’s gender identity, modern transgender life writing is highly explorative and critical in its
treatment of gender. It is also very apt to engage directly and explicitly with the authors and
narratives of previous generations as well as with the externally imposed narratives of the
medical and psychiatric community.
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Life writing has a special significance for transgender people – whether in the evolving
genre of transition narrative or in the more amorphous narrative manifesto – as the lives of
transgender people have demanded that they be careful and skilled narrators. Though the authors
discussed in this section are quite diverse, they are united by the drive to narrate oneself into
existence, to effect a transformation through narrative.

Summary and Conclusions

Within the realm of autobiography, memoir, and narrative essay, a broad assortment of
identifiable genres have both grown out of and helped give shape to the experiences of particular
cultural groups. Literary critics and life writers alike have named many genres discussed in this
chapter: collective memoir, testimonio, autofictionalbiography, autography, biomythography,
metaphorical memoir, coming out story, autogynography, lesbian narrative, transition narrative,
narrative manifesto.
These genres (and the life experiences from which they emerged) differ tremendously,
but one might notice certain recurring elements. For a variety of reasons, many defy traditional
categorization to the extent that their status as non-fiction may be questioned. All of these, to
different degrees and in different ways, share the perspective of the outsider. While this chapter
had a largely literary focus, the following chapter will focus more on the psychology of these
outsiders – of women, of same-gender-loving people, and of transgender people – as different
life experiences lead not only to different patterns of life writing, but different patterns of
thought.

CHAPTER 4: EPISTEMOLOGY AND PROBLEM SOLVING
PATTERNS ACROSS GENDERS AND SEXUALITIES

As I begin this chapter on the potentially volatile subject of gendered differences in
cognition, I pause to consider the case of Deborah Tannen. Author of works such as You Just
Don’t Understand: Women and Men in Conversation, Tannen’s research operates at the
intersection of gender studies and sociolinguistics. Tannen uses observation and interview data to
support her underlying thesis that women and men communicate in different ways which also
suggest different patterns of thought. More specifically, she argues that most men engage the
world “as an individual in a hierarchical social order in which he was either one-up or one-down.
In this world, conversations are negotiations in which people try to achieve and maintain the
upper hand. . . . Life, then, is a contest” (24-25), whereas most women engage “as an individual
in a network of connections. . . . Conversations are negotiations for closeness in which people try
to seek and give confirmation and support, and to reach consensus. . . . Life, then, is a
community” (25). In some ways, the research and arguments in this chapter are not unlike those
presented by Tannen, which causes me to consider certain controversies surrounding Tannen’s
work.
Academic opposition to You Just Don’t Understand came in two main forms. First,
researchers such as Rosalind C. Barnett and Caryl Rivers in “Men Are From Earth, and So Are
Women. It’s Faulty Research That Sets Them Apart” criticize Tannen’s work as essentialist,
comparing it to contemporary popular works like John Gray’s Men are From Mars, Women are
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From Venus (B12). In fairness, despite rooting gender communication differences in childhood
socialization, Tannen’s language tends to invite such comparisons, such as when she explains,
“though all humans need both intimacy and independence, women tend to focus on the first and
men on the second. It is as if their lifeblood ran in different directions” (26). While grounded in
academic research, Tannen’s prose often neglects the social causes of communication
differences, opting for a more essentialist framework with which a popular audience would be
more comfortable or familiar. Second, linguists like Alice Freed in “We Understand Perfectly: A
Critique of Tannen’s View of Cross-sex Communication” take issue with Tannen’s neglect to
critique the privileging of men’s communication styles. Freed writes, “we learn daily of the
reality of patriarchal rule in our culture. . . . It in this context that any discussion of interaction
between women and men in the United States must be situated” (144). Freed even suggests that
Tannen becomes complicit in prioritizing men’s communication style when she “emphasizes the
importance of women’s adjusting to men's need for status and independence over men's need to
understand women’s desire for connection” (145).
I believe, however, that it would be an unfortunate mistake to overlook significant
findings due to a researcher’s failure to contextualize them fully. For example, though Tannen
does not critique the privileging of men’s communication styles, she does prompt us to “imagine
how often women who think they are displaying a positive quality—connection—are misjudged
by men who perceive them as revealing a lack of independence, which the men regard as
synonymous with incompetence and insecurity” (39). If this observation could be more
thoroughly explored as a matter of ongoing socialization alongside an exploration of how our
culture privileges men and oppresses women by favoring one style over the other, the same
authors quoted above might applaud Tannen’s work.
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I take the time to consider Tannen’s opposition here in the hopes that I will avoid leaving
myself open to similar critique. Previously, I argued that effective narrative pedagogy should
reflect the narrative styles of students, and that a critical feminist narrative pedagogy would
recognize that women’s life narratives differ structurally and stylistically from men’s and that
queer life narratives differ structurally and stylistically from heterosexual and cisgender life
narratives. However, to adequately explain why such recognition is so significant requires
demonstrating that women and men, queer people and heterosexual and cisgender people, narrate
differently because they think differently, learn differently, and solve problems by different
means. As I do so, I do not wish to fall into the trap of assuming or implying that these
differences are biologically, or in any other sense, essential. Thus, before proceeding into an
exploration of these differences, this chapter necessitates some expansion and further detailing of
the theoretical frameworks I established in the first chapter.
I initially identified my approach as a feminist one, but at this point it becomes germane
to recognize that for nearly as long as feminism has existed, there have been multiple, often
conflicting, feminisms. Two feminist camps relevant to this discussion of gender differences
include “equality feminism” and “difference feminism.” In Finding a New Feminism: Rethinking
the Woman Question for a Liberal Democracy, Pamela Grande Jensen defines these: “Equality,
or liberal, feminism seeks the completion of liberalism by the eradication of all barriers to a
gender-neutral polity”; in contrast, difference feminists would argue that gender neutrality has
“baneful effects on women as women, whether by impelling them to imitate men, by depriving
society of their distinctive contributions, or by letting them participate in society only on terms
that favor men” (2-3). For the purposes of this chapter, there is little to say on the subject of
gender neutrality as an ideal; what matters in considering pedagogy and curriculum design today
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is that gender neutrality is not currently the reality for students, and as I argued in chapter one,
practices and ideas described as gender neutral are in fact typically androcentric. My argument
that women and men – and furthermore queer people and heterosexual cisgender people – have
distinct reasoning styles clearly seems to align with a “difference feminist” approach; however,
such an approach undoubtedly risks reinforcing stereotypes of sex and gender and characterizing
these differences as essential.
The risk in essentializing such differences would be to slip backward several decades in
psychological research. To peruse texts published on gender and psychology in the 1950s and
1960s is to find a variety of wildly speculative arguments designed to confirm that stereotypes
about masculinity and femininity were somehow rooted in genes and hormones, and to proceed
into the 1970s is to finally find solid research deconstructing those arguments, such as Julia A.
Sherman’s Sex-related Cognitive Differences: An Essay on Theory and Evidence. As Sherman
points out, earlier suggestions that women were inherently deficient in certain kinds of
intelligence were largely an attempt to find justification for pre-existing stereotypes: “The cogent
question appears to be not ‘Are women as intelligent as men?’ but ‘Do we want women to be as
intelligent as men?’” (172). Her essay methodically debunks theories that greater cognitive
variation exists among males than females for evolutionary purposes (87), those attempting to
explain cognitive differences based on hormonal and metabolic factors (107), and those related
to brain laterality (134), concluding instead that “there is a good deal of evidence to support the
theory that sex role directly and indirectly affects sex-related cognitive differences” (171). By
“sex role,” Sherman refers to the attitudes and behaviors which we are socialized to enact based
on gender.
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Sherman’s argument thus helps set the stage for the rise of social-constructionist theories
in the 1980s and 1990s, most succinctly argued in classic works such as Judith Lorber’s “The
Social Construction of Gender.” In contrast to essentialist theories of gender difference, social
constructionism posits that “gender, like culture, is a human production that depends on
everyone constantly ‘doing gender’” (96). Gender performance involves a wide variety of
actions: dress, body language, speech patterns, activities, vocations, etc. As Lorber points out,
“Gender signs and signals are so ubiquitous that we usually fail to note them” (96). The key here
is that such signs and signals, such ways of doing gender, are not natural or biologically
predetermined, but rather taught and learned as part of a self-perpetuating sociocultural system:
As a social institution, gender is a process of creating distinguishable social statuses for
the assignment of rights and responsibilities. . . . As a process, gender creates the social
differences that define ‘woman’ and ‘man.’ In social interaction throughout their lives,
individuals learn what is expected, see what is expected, act and react in expected ways,
and thus simultaneously construct and maintain the gender order. (98)
The system is so pervasive as to be invisible and appear natural and inevitable; however, in fact,
each of us learns this system, to some extent consciously and perhaps to a greater extent
subconsciously.
In Being Boys, Being Girls: Learning Masculinities and Femininities, Carrie Paechter
further explores gendered behaviors as group processes which we learn in relation to those
around us: “Our various masculinities and femininities are constructed as ways of being within
particular communities of masculinity and femininity practice, and are likely to change as we
move between these communities” (14). Paechter does specify certain communities which have
profound impact on our conceptions of gender: “in most contemporary societies, there are three
key sites in which the communal construction and learning of masculinities and femininities take
place: the family; the peer group; and the school” (2). Undoubtedly, the assumption that gender
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roles are natural and instinctive grows from the fact that we learn those roles very early. Paechter
points out that at less than two years old, “children start to construct their own identities,
including their identities as masculine or feminine. By 2-2 ½, children are able to label
themselves as male or female” (51). Just as we do not often recall learning our first language as
an active process, so we do not recall learning to associate attitudes and behaviors with particular
genders.
To be sure, the process of teaching gender can be as subconscious and unintentional as
that of learning gender. In “Learning Masculinity and Femininity: Gender Socialization from
Parents and Peers Across the Life Span,” Shelly Marmion and Paula Lundberg-Love point out
that such training begins very early:
Parents have been shown to exhibit gender stereotyping behavior as early as twenty-four
hours after a child’s birth. They described their boys as strong, big, active, and alert,
while they described their girls as small, soft, fine-featured, and inattentive even though
the baby girls were matched to the boys on size, weight, and activity level. (2)
Parents are more likely to reward and celebrate gender appropriate behavior, and children rapidly
learn which behaviors result in positive attention; for example, “toy preferences appear to be
shaped by parents’ reactions to children’s play with different types of toys” (3). By age 2-3,
children begin favoring association with same-gender peers, thus inducting them into a new
community which will reward and police their gendered behaviors (11). Through continued
socialization from parents, peers, teachers, and any available media, children internalize
stereotypical gender differences.
Returning to a more explicitly feminist angle, to make no mistake, those differences are
ranked in our culture’s value systems; they are hierarchical. For example, in “Gender and Verbal
and Nonverbal Communication,” Marianne LaFrance and Jennifer L. Harris discuss the different
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communication styles into which boys and girls are socialized, which men and women exhibit,
and the values associated with them: “Stereotypes in Anglo-American culture hold rather simply
that men are direct and women are indirect in how they communicate. Socialization surely
accounts for some of why this might be the case” (149). Likewise, socialization surely accounts
for the fact that in a variety of contexts, “the direct and assertive mode has tended to be evaluated
more positively than the more indirect (and presumably feminine) mode” (135). As different
behaviors come to be considered gendered, our culture places greater value on those signifying
masculinity and less value on those signifying femininity, thus, “a direct style of communication
is associated with attributions of agency and ability” (136). Lorber likewise points out that “in a
gender-stratified society, what men do is usually valued more highly than what women do
because men do it, even when their activities are very similar or the same” (99). While in theory,
a society may consider genders different but equally valuable and powerful, this has not
traditionally been the case in Western culture. As Lorber explains, “gender ranks men above
women of the same race and class. Women and men could be different but equal. In practice, the
process of creating difference depends to a great extent on differential evaluation” (98).
In summation, then, I approach this topic with a framework incorporating social
constructionism with certain principles of difference feminism. I believe that we should be
capable of recognizing that at this historical moment, gendered differences in reasoning do exist
without accepting the suggestion that such differences must exist. As this chapter will explore,
there are indeed patterns of thought, learning, and problem solving which are more common
among men and those more common among women, and the former are those currently
centralized in education. Furthermore, I would reject any solution which centralizes and
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considers neutral that which is currently characterized as masculine and expects women to be
responsible for shifting their own thoughts and behaviors in that direction.
Similarly, this chapter will also explore those patterns of thought, learning, and problem
solving which are more common to same-gender-loving people and transgender people, although
in this area there are considerable gaps in research. Psychological research on gender has
thoroughly, if not exhaustively, explored gendered differences in reasoning. Psychological
research on same-gender-loving people has more commonly concerned itself with the causes of
same-gender-love or the effects of the social stigma surrounding it, and psychological research
on transgender people has somewhat myopically focused on diagnosis and management of the
transition process. In this chapter, I will strive to draw out what insights existing research may
suggest about the reasoning of queer people as well as noting where such research is lacking.
Before I proceed, I will caution that a great deal of this discussion of the psychology of
women and queer people may sound familiar, even repetitive, in light of the exploration of
women’s life narratives and queer life narratives. This repetition is unavoidable and is indeed the
key to the significance of this field of narrative study, in that how we think and how we narrate
are inseparable. The different narrative conventions detailed in the previous chapter reflect
different patterns of thought, which as educators we owe it to our students to take the time to
understand.

Women’s Ways of Learning

According to an interview with Mary Field Belenky (co-author of the landmark text,
Women’s Ways of Knowing: The Development of Self, Voice, and Mind), when Belenky was a
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graduate student in developmental psychology in the 1950s, her professors explicitly instructed
her to use only male subjects for research; women, they warned her, would “mess up” the data
(Ashton-Jones and Thomas 275). This opinion would seem to imply that the professors’
considered over fifty percent of the population to be irrelevant outliers, non-representative in the
study of how humans learn and think.
Or rather, as Carol Gilligan points out in In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and
Women’s Development, women were not simply considered irrelevant, but deficient. Gilligan
writes, “The disparity between women’s experience and the representation of human
development, noted throughout the psychological literature, has generally been seen to signify a
problem in women’s development” (1-2). She describes how prevailing psychosocial
development models follow a male pattern (12-13), and “when women do not conform to the
standards of psychological expectation, the conclusion has generally been that something is
wrong with the women” (14), which, in the study of human development, creates a “discrepancy
between womanhood and adulthood” (17). Gilligan also points out the double-bind facing
women due to their socialization into femininity; because the predominant developmental
models she describes center greatly on independence and separation, “the very traits that have
traditionally defined the ‘goodness’ of women, their care for and sensitivity to the needs of
others, are those that mark them as deficient in moral development” (18). To be a properly
feminine woman is to be an insufficiently developed human by conventional standards.
Whether women were considered irrelevant or deficient, the net result is that for much of
the history of the study of human learning and human thought, the primary subject has been
men’s learning and men’s thought. This is not merely the case in the field of psychology.
Philosophers, too, have recognized that fundamental underlying principles of their discipline
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have markedly masculinist tendencies. In “Positionality and Thought: On the Gendered
Foundations of Thought, Culture, and Development,” Rachel Joffe Falmagne critiques the
presumptive system of reasoning which underlies every major branch of philosophy, logic,
which she argues has been “regarded by some as the foundation of all knowledge” (199). Logic
would seem, perhaps even by definition, to be an objective and unbiased form of reasoning;
however, Falmagne points out that:
As a discourse of knowledge (that is, a discourse that defines legitimate ways of knowing
and agents of knowledge), it is inherently an exercise in power, and it has developed
through an explicit exaltation of symbolic masculinity in a social world whose economic,
social, and cultural power relations are fundamentally gendered and unequal. (198-99)
Logic thus exists specifically to delineate appropriate and inappropriate means of reasoning,
methods of revealing truth. It also carries assumptions about the nature of truth: “The most
problematic aspect of logic is that it is a system explicitly aimed toward providing complete
closure, capturing unshakable truths” (202). Truth, according to formal logic, will be that which
is certain and unchanging, knowledge uninfluenced by the position of the knower.
As we already discussed in the first chapter with reference to the work of feminist
standpoint theorists, all knowledge is situated. Furthermore, those who tend to lay claim to an
objective knowledge, a truth beyond context, tend to be those in the most privileged positions. In
“Gendered Ways of Knowing and the ‘Epistemological Crisis’ of the West,” Sandra Harding
reminds us that all epistemologies grow and develop from culturally positioned knowledge
systems, and those claiming to seek objective knowledge are no exception. Harding argues:
We can treat genders as distinctive cultures – as ‘gender cultures.’ Of course women and
men occupy the same cultures in many familiar uses of this term; ethnic or religious or
class structures contain both genders. However, there are also more or less single-gender
cultures within these other cultures. This is true in the sense that only women or men, or
primarily women or men, are to be found in them. (442)
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Traditionally, of course, most academic fields have been single-gender cultures, places occupied
primarily by men, resulting in epistemologies which could be appropriately described as
masculine.
Sara Ruddick further explores the unacknowledged masculinity of philosophical
reasoning in Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace, as she describes the alienation she
felt as a woman philosopher, caused by “the sexual politics in which Reason was enmeshed” (4).
As Ruddick writes, “To cast one’s lot with reason meant staying with the men, on the right side
of power. Philosophers have often suggested that people of superior rationality are justified in
excluding and dominating others” (6). She describes how she began her career by doing
precisely that; however, she eventually came to realize that “Reason, at least as Western
philosophers had imagined Him, was infected by – and contributed to – the pervasive disrespect
for women’s minds and lives” (4-5). In “Reason’s ‘Femininity’: A Case for Connected
Knowing,” Ruddick explains that “reason” “tends to be opposed to all that is bodily, including
sexual difference, including, therefore the female, always the different sex. Persons are
reasonable, women are persons, but ‘womanliness’ remains one of reason’s antagonists” (249).
A culture which defines correct and incorrect modes of thought necessarily establishes power
dynamics favoring those who are best at thinking as determined by those definitions. The result
is naturally cyclical; to be skilled at reasoning means to reason like those who decide what
constitutes good reasoning. The only way to break that cycle is to centralize previously
marginalized modes of reasoning, other means of uncovering truth, and indeed other conceptions
of truth.
While many of the philosophers and psychologists doing the work of exploring those
modes of thinking may commonly refer to them as women’s modes of thinking or feminine
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modes of thinking, most are quick to remind readers that they are definitely not exclusive to
women. Gilligan, for example, writes, “The different voice I describe is characterized not by
gender but theme. Its association with women is an empirical observation, and it is primarily
through women’s voices that I trace its development. But this association is not absolute” (2).
The patterns of thought and communication which Gilligan explores through women’s voices are
certainly patterns which men can follow; however, they are patterns into which women have
been actively socialized. Even Ruddick, who describes her subject specifically as “maternal
thinking,” notes that she has “a somewhat eccentric way of identifying ‘mothers’” (Maternal
Thinking 40). Specifically, a mother is one “who takes on responsibility for children’s lives and
for whom providing child care is a significant part of her or his working life. . . . Although most
mothers have been and are women, mothering is potentially work for men and women” (40).
Thus, maternal thinking is a pattern of thought more common to women because it arises out of a
way of living which is more common to women.
In synthesizing a wide breadth of research, certain key characteristics of women’s
thinking or feminine thinking appear again and again. First and most prominently, the processes
of learning, reasoning, and knowing are social, interpersonal processes as opposed to solitary,
independent ones. Belenky, Blythe McVicker Clinchy, Nancy Rule Goldberger, and Jill Mattuck
Tarule’s Women’s Ways of Knowing promises to discuss “five different perspectives from which
women view reality and draw conclusions about truth, knowledge, and authority” (3). In fact,
these perspectives could be viewed as stages of epistemological development, beginning with
“Silence” in which women see themselves as “deaf and dumb” (34), progressing through stages
in a movement from being purely receptive to inhibitively subjective to ultimately being
“connected,” a stage in which knowledge is actively produced and shared in collaboration with
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others: “Connected knowers develop procedures for gaining access to other people’s knowledge”
(113). At every stage, “other people’s knowledge” is significant, as “received knowers” tend to
trust group consensus (41), for example. The process toward being a “connected knower” has
much to do with the capacity to take an active role in the community of knowers: “Quest for self
and voice plays a central role in transformations in women’s ways of knowing” (133). The
authors find this sense of relational learning expressed in women’s descriptions of their own
processes, which differ from men’s:
The tendency for women to ground their epistemological premises in metaphors
suggesting speaking and listening is at odds with the visual metaphors (such as equating
knowledge with illumination, knowing with seeing, and truth with light) that scientists
and philosophers most often use to express their sense of mind. (18)
Women’s Ways of Knowing was among the first to remark on these gendered epistemologies, but
it was hardly the last.
In Between Voice and Silence: Women and Girls, Race and Relationship, Jill McLean
Taylor, Gilligan, and Amy M. Sullivan point out the need for an intersectional lens to understand
epistemologies beyond gender. Regarding their experience as adult middle-class women
interviewing impoverished teenage girls, “we quickly discovered that we had to learn new ways
of listening, become attuned to different voices, different cultures, and different languages even
when English remained the spoken tongue” (2). As they listen to those voices, however, they
find similar results to those exposed in Women’s Ways of Knowing, particularly in terms of the
interpersonal nature of learning. They note that if educators are not attentive to how girls learn,
they can often make mistakes in observation, as when girls are frustrated or distracted, they are
sometimes “driven into a psychological isolation they and others readily confused with
independence” (3). In Meeting at the Crossroads: Women’s Psychology and Girls’ Development,
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Gilligan and Lyn Mikel Brown write, “we found that an inner sense of connection with others is
a central organizing feature of women’s development and that psychological crises in women’s
lives stem from disconnection” (3). What may look like a healthy and positive sign of
independence if judged by androcentric standards may in fact be a sign of distress, and perhaps
vice versa.
Tarule points out that this disjunction between traditional understandings of the academic
learning process and how women learn continues into higher education in “Voices in Dialogue:
Collaborative Ways of Knowing.” Interviewing adult women about their ways of learning, she
found they would explicitly report “that the roots of their thinking are nourished by conversation
and that dialogue is how they apprehend new understanding and reinterpret their thinking and
their ideas” (285). She comes to understand that women describing their conversational styles are
describing “approaches to analysis, but approaches that position them differently for the
academy: for engaging in debate, for adopting a voiced position in the ‘master narratives’ and for
feeling thus enabled and empowered to enter various realms of discourse” (285).
Ruddick describes how she came to appreciate these different forms of reasoning and
knowledge production when she became a mother and entered into a community of other young
mothers who collaborated in learning how to raise children; she came to wonder, “Could this
‘chattering’ [about motherhood], so unlike the philosophy in which I was trained, be ‘thinking’? .
. . Could what we thought and the way we thought be put into use?” (11). Later coming to
borrow the language of “connected knowing,” she describes it as involving:
Knowers’ relationships with each other. Knowers present their evidence and construct
understandings through contextual and open-minded narratives in which analytic
distinction, deductive argument, and replicable experiment may figure but do not
predominate. Knowers take disagreement as an occasion for collaborative deliberation
and communication rather than for debate. (“Reason’s ‘Femininity’” 262)
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Ruddick continues also to remind readers of the socially constructed nature of masculine and
feminine styles of reasoning, as “reason arises in relationships, develops in practices, and speaks
or is silenced within epistemic communities. Reason’s ‘femininity’ or ‘masculinity’ arises
alongside reason itself, a creation of the same relationships, practices, and gendered discourse”
(266).
The constructed nature of reasoning style may itself be a concept more easily grasped for
women, as this collaborative, interpersonal style of learning connects directly to another key
characteristic noted by many researchers. Belenky et al. explain that their subjects tend to relate
to authoritative experts differently than men as they more quickly recognize that multiple valid
sources of knowledge exist, of which they may themselves be one. Connected knowers
understand that “all knowledge is constructed, and the knower is an intimate part of the known”
(137). Where androcentric developmental models emphasize a mature subject’s ability to
independently and impersonally judge a knowledge source as valid or invalid, the model
uncovered in Women’s Ways of Knowing highlights empathy as a trait subjects strive for: “Since
knowledge comes from experience, the only way they can hope to understand another person’s
ideas is to try to share the experience that has led the person to form the idea” (113). Connected
knowers seek personal connection with peers and experts in order to grasp and evaluate ideas.
The authors point out that once again, by typical models, this tendency to seek connection and
support may come across as a deficiency: “It is easy to condemn women’s refusal to make
judgments as evidence of passivity or absence of agency, and indeed, in a sense, it is” (117), but
more importantly, it demonstrates a multidimensionality missing from traditional models.
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This different relationship with authority and peer groups can be a stumbling block in
educational institutions structured as they are. Elizabeth Debold, Deborah Tolman, and Lyn
Mikel Brown discuss these issues in “Embodying Knowledge, Knowing Desire: Authority and
Split Subjectivities in Girls’ Epistemological Development.” They find that sadly, “girls divide
from aspects of themselves and from other women and girls as they come to know the
patriarchal, heterosexual dynamic of social power relations” (88) in schools. Where knowledge is
presented as emerging from a single source (the teacher, for example, or a textbook), and is
described as independent of any particular perspective, girls experience a “public-private split”
(90) as espoused truths conflict with the knowledge gleaned from personal experience, which can
result in either disqualification of the authority or disqualification of themselves, neither of
which is ideal. Debold et al. find that “girls coming of age and coming to know the dominant
culture typically find themselves torn and, ultimately, split from their own power to authorize
their experience as real and as knowledge” (86). The presentation of supposedly objective
knowledge damages such girls’ sense of their own knowledge and agency. Furthermore, if a
student’s primary means of learning and grasping new information involves interpersonal
connection and empathy, the very suggestion that a knowledge source is impersonal and
objective is itself prohibitive to learning.
The idea of impersonal objective truth becomes even more problematic when presented
as permanent and fixed, as another characteristic of women’s thinking noted by researchers is a
greater degree of adaptability, a readiness to accept that what is true may shift with time and
context. Ruddick describes this as a metaphysical attitude that welcomes change (Maternal
Thinking 89) because “the capacity to change with and through a child’s changes requires an
attitude that is, in traditional terms, a philosophical position” (91). That position encourages not
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only an understanding of context but also a consistent self-reflexivity as contexts change. As
Belenky et al. point out, when a learner is conscious of that position, they expect the same from
those designated experts:
When women accept the responsibility for evaluating and continually reevaluating their
assumptions about knowledge, the attention and respect that they might once have
awarded to the expert is transformed. They appreciate expertise but back away from
designating anyone an ‘expert’ without qualifying themselves. An evaluation of experts is
not only possible but is an important responsibility that they assume. . . . True experts
must reveal an appreciation for complexity and a sense of humility about their
knowledge. (139)
The women described above continuously reevaluate their own knowledge and strive to
appreciate the complexity of where that knowledge comes from by listening to the voices of
others in collaborative knowledge building. To them, anyone claiming expertise should
demonstrate the same habits and qualities: self-reflexivity, contextual awareness, empathy.
Including “empathy,” a word concerned specifically with feeling, no doubt runs quite
contrary to certain traditional paradigms of knowledge and reasoning. Ruddick explains, “As
Western philosophers had idealized it, Reason was meant to be detached and impersonal, at best
irrelevant to particular affections and loyalties” (8). As multiple researchers have uncovered,
however, women are less inclined to separate knowledge from emotion, reasoning from feeling.
For example, “the world that mothers and children see and name, separately and together, is
constructed by feeling. Objects, events, people, and feelings themselves are selected and given
meaning in terms of emotional stories” (69). Commenting on the model presented in Women’s
Ways of Knowing, Ruddick finds that in connected knowing, “Knowing is not separated from
feeling; emotion is not only a spur but often a test of knowledge” (“Reason’s ‘Femininity’” 261).
She holds this up in contrast to “impersonal, procedural knowing, which continuously separates
knower from known and the mind’s knowing from its emotional, bodily, and social life” (262).
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Similarly, Debold et al. find that for girls and women, “knowing comes out of a felt
experience that is both mind and body, feeling and thinking” (105). While this is true even for
those reaching the most mature stages of development, Belenky et al. point out that this link
between feeling and thinking manifests at every stage and must be appropriately managed. At the
stage of subjective knowing, for example, knowers view their knowledge as “an intuitive
reaction—something experienced, not thought out, something felt rather than actively pursued or
constructed. These women do not see themselves as part of the process, as constructors of truth,
but as conduits through which truth emerges” (69). In the following stage, knowers often become
such critical thinkers (including of their own ideas) that they are highly suspicious of anything
that “feels right” (104). The highest stage in the development model of Women’s Ways of
Knowing uses inherently emotional language: passionate knowing, in which knowers:
seek to stretch the outer boundaries of their consciousness—by making the unconscious
conscious, by consulting and listening to the self, by voicing the unsaid, by listening to
others and staying alert to all the currents and undercurrents of life about them, by
imagining themselves inside the new poem or person or idea that they want to come to
know and understand. (141)
The features of these stages would obviously be important for an educator to recognize when
guiding students through them.
Equally important, to fully capitalize on the abilities of those moving through these stages
requires understanding that these different methods of learning and knowing also prompt
different methods of solving real world problems. Gilligan describes these different methods as
complementary moral orientations or perspectives or ethics; she details the distinctions between
an ethic of justice or fairness (more commonly focused on by men and boys) and an ethic of care
(more commonly focused on by women and girls): “This conception of morality as concerned
with the activity of care centers moral development around the understanding of responsibility
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and relationships,” while “the conception of morality as fairness ties moral development to the
understanding of rights and rules” (19). For example, she comments on results of a classic test of
moral reasoning previously interpreted to suggest that boys developed superior moral reasoning.
In the test, children were presented with a moral dilemma: a man cannot afford a drug to save his
dying wife; should he steal the drug? Boys more commonly search for a rule upon which to base
a logical decision – for example, “stealing is wrong” or “life is more important than property.”
Girls more commonly sought alternative solutions through which everyone could get what they
needed such as borrowing the money or offering to work for the pharmacist. Two representative
children, Jake and Amy, “see two very different moral problems—Jake a conflict between life
and property that can be resolved by logical deduction, Amy a fracture of human relationship
that must be mended with its own thread” (31). If the test is judged based on the subjects’ ability
to reason based on rules, Amy’s response might seem evasive, and she might be judged
incapable of higher moral reasoning. Gilligan argues, however, that her response simply
represents a different kind of problem solving:
Women’s construction of the moral problem as a problem of care and responsibility in
relationships rather than one of rights and rules ties the development of their moral
thinking to changes in their understanding of responsibility and relationships . . . thus the
logic underlying an ethic of care is a psychological logic of relationships, which contrasts
with the formal logic of fairness that informs the justice approach. (73)
A supportive educational experience for those employing this perspective would encourage the
use of more than one method of problem solving and even explicitly discuss the comparative
merits of strategies centered on relationships and strategies centered on rules.
In “Adolescents’ Solutions to Dilemmas in Fables: Two Moral Orientations—Two
Problem Solving Strategies,” D. Kay Johnston describes an expanded set of moral reasoning
tests given to 60 children to determine which children were more apt to use a logic of rights
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(correlating to Gilligan’s “justice” perspective) and which were more apt to use a logic of
response (correlating to Gilligan’s “care” perspective) (52); the results fall along predictably
gendered lines. When asked to describe their own reasoning, girls utilizing the logic of response
“described this logic as ‘seeing everybody’s side’ of the problem” (67), highlighting the role of
empathy in their reasoning process. In “When is a Moral Problem Not a Moral Problem?
Morality, Identity, and Female Adolescence,” Brown describes a study more directly focused on
adolescent girls, in which subjects were asked to narrate moral dilemmas they had faced and
describe how they solved them. Brown found that “each story highlights responsiveness; each
emphasizes knowledge of the other(s), of their particular situations, of their particular needs”
(93). One subject, for example, describes struggling when a peer failed to complete part of a
group project; when deciding on a course of action, “she must include the possibility that she
may have been asking too much, or that perhaps there were other things happening in the
classmate’s life that may be affecting her work” (93). She finds that often her subjects have
difficulty describing why they made the choices they did in terms of conventional ethics based
on rights and fairness: “There is a clear and readily available language with which to talk about
an ‘impartial’ morality. . . . But these girls struggle and appear confused when they attempt to
apply the terms of this morality to their situations of moral conflict” (98). As their practiced
empathy highlights the complexities of moral dilemmas, impartial moralities are entirely
insufficient.
Finally, just as women and girls may not be accurately represented by conventional
models of learning and problem solving, their different methods of learning and problem solving
may be out of harmony with conventional models of success and achievement. Gilligan notes
how conceptions of achievement are frequently based on competition and personal elevation and
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independence, which fit the ideals that boys are encouraged to strive for, but girls are encouraged
toward different ends: “Since masculinity is defined through separation while femininity is
defined through attachment, male gender identity is threatened by intimacy while female gender
identity is threatened by separation” (8). Gilligan and Brown describe how the importance of a
sense of connection with others sometimes results in “the reluctance to know what one knows
and the fear that one’s experience, if spoken, will endanger relationships and threaten survival”
(41). Gilligan suggests that women are placed in a double bind in which success by conventional
terms is also failure, as success can create distance and disruption in relationships (14-15).
Taylor, Gilligan, and Sullivan likewise find that “When girls speak about their hopes for
the future, relationships are central—as both help and hindrance” (174). The girls interviewed
typically describe their goals in terms of who inspires them, who can help them, and who they
can help in turn. In terms of how relationships may be a hindrance, the researchers note certain
distinctions among racial groups: “The Latina and Portuguese girls’ concerns center on
prescribed duties and roles for women in marriage. . . . The black girls focus primarily on how
being responsible for children could keep them from other pursuits” (178). In most cases,
though, girls seem to struggle with the prospect that they may have to choose between personal
goals and interpersonal responsibilities.
In Feminist Reconstructions in Psychology: Narrative, Gender, and Performance,
however, Mary Gergen finds that women’s stories of success contain the keys to a different
model for success. Gergen writes, “In the Womanstories . . . the achievement is described in
relational terms, with more stress on mutuality than supremacy” (64). Contrasting more
traditional competitive models, “the Womanstory emphasizes continuity with others’ goals, not
opposition to them. In fact, it is possible for one’s opponent to be seen as a necessary part of
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one’s own success” (64). She finds also that the resolution to the struggles described by Taylor,
Gilligan, and Sullivan seems to be a recognition of the interdependence of relationships and
work, a refusal to draw traditional demarcations between their work worlds and their private
lives (66).
There can be no doubt that the conventions of women’s life writing reflect the patterns
researchers have found in women’s learning, reasoning, problem solving, and goals. The
parallels are numerous and impossible to miss – differences in conceptions of self in relation to
groups and communities, different perspectives on the quest, striving toward a multiplicity of
perspectives, etc. The following section will explore modes of thought particular to transgender
people as well as those particular to same-gender-loving people.

Queer Ways of Learning

There are a number of reasonable explanations for why the body of psychological and
philosophical research on the distinct reasoning patterns of same-gender-loving and transgender
people is significantly smaller than that of women. For one, stereotypes regarding the differing
minds of women and men reach back through the entire history of Western civilization, waiting
to be explained or debunked, while the understanding of same-gender-love as an identity at all
only dates back to the nineteenth century. It is also worth noting that much of the research
described in the previous section focuses on the learning and group dynamics of children and
adolescents. The roadblocks to studying queer children and even teenagers are quite obvious, in
that most queer children and many queer adolescents may not yet have vocalized their sexual
orientations or gender identities. For that matter, for much of the twentieth century and even
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today, the stigma surrounding queer identities pressures adults as well to hide their identities,
problematizing the search for research subjects. For all of these reasons, unlike research on
women’s thinking, academic work concerning queer epistemologies has been far more
theoretical than observational and, as explained earlier in this chapter, heterosexist stigma itself
and its damaging effects has dominated a great deal of the extant observational research.
However, such research may still be very useful when viewed through the right lens.
After all, if experiences more common to women at particular points in time and place –
motherhood, domestic life, specific oppressions – make certain patterns of thinking more
common to women, then experiences more common to queer people – wrestling with
homophobia and transphobia – likely make certain patterns of thinking more common to queer
people. Michael Sadowski considers this possibility in In a Queer Voice: Journeys of Resilience
from Adolescence to Adulthood. He points out, as many psychologists have, that “for many
youth, anti-LGBTQ language and harassment have a dampening effect on their presence and
performance in school” (3) but, probing deeper than surface level, he also finds interesting lenses
through which to view queer experience, exploring “ways of thinking and being that may be
considered queer” (13). Those ways of thinking and being are often shaped by intolerance.
Sadowski argues that queer people are “survivors of trauma. Much of what took place in their
homes, schools, and communities—including incessant harassment; attempts to convert them
from homosexuality; and verbal, physical, and sexual abuse—can be considered nothing less”
(153). As such, part of the answer to the question of what constitutes queer patterns of thought
involves considering what patterns of thought are typical of trauma survivors. Sadowski suggests
these patterns might include a heightened capacity to read the personalities of others to intuit
who might be a safe confidante, a paradoxical sense that in order to have social relationships, one
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must sacrifice or conceal significant aspects of self (6), and a greater propensity toward speaking
in carefully coded language (154). Sadowski’s primary purpose, of course, is to argue for
changes to reduce or eliminate the systematic trauma endured by queer youth, but within that
argument are interesting observations regarding the thinking of queer people who have survived
that trauma.
Mary Jane Rotheram-Borus and Kris A. Langabeer pose similar questions in
“Developmental Trajectories of Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Youths.” Much as Belenky et al.
questioned whether women follow a developmental model different from men’s, RotheramBorus and Langabeer investigate “whether adolescents who self-identify as gay, lesbian, or
bisexual experience similar developmental trajectories as heterosexual-identified youths” (98).
Much of their essay focuses on the question of whether LGB youths’ dominant developmental
task during adolescence is establishing a personal identity (as it is for heterosexual youth), but in
the course of doing so, they suggest the possibility that “youths may also receive benefits and
build unique strengths associated with being gay, lesbian, or bisexual, despite the negative social
sanctions regarding their sexual orientation” (118). They are quick to point out that there is a
need for further observational research on these benefits; however, they theorize:
In a different and more intensive manner than heterosexual youths, gay, lesbian, and
bisexual youths must develop skills to judge and anticipate acceptance from peers and
adults, seek information on their own regarding lesbian/gay culture, and examine their
values, attitudes, and beliefs regarding sexuality and their sexual orientation. There are
likely to be benefits, as well as costs, to youths who initiate this search process and who
at an early age commit to a set of behaviors and relationships with respect to their sexual
orientation. There has been little focus on whether there is a heightened or early selfawareness, increased maturity or independence, or increased self-esteem for being able to
negotiate the norms in more than one social world simultaneously. (118)
These suggestions about the little explored mental strengths developed by LGB youths make a
great deal of sense. To survive a situation in which a person is fundamentally different from their
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community in a potentially dangerous way may indeed heighten understanding of self due to
contrast with others, sharpen the sense of empathy for finding allies, and encourage
independence.
While Rotheram-Borus and Langabeer focus exclusively on young same-gender-loving
people, I would use the same framework to theorize regarding potential psychological strengths
of young transgender people. As most, though not all, transgender people report a sense of their
gender identity distinct from that assigned based on birth sex at a very young age, it stands to
reason that transgender people have a heightened interpersonal as well as intrapersonal
intelligence. Young and closeted transgender people – to an even greater degree than young and
closeted same-gender-loving people – necessarily invest a great deal of energy in selfinvestigation prompted by the sense of dissonance between their assigned gender and their
intuited gender. They must also become skilled and conscious performers able to convincingly
enact and embody false identities and presentations based on observing those around them.
Furthermore, a young transgender person both receives the socialization based on their
assigned gender and at the same time intuits a different gender. This experience has more than
one significant result. First, as I described differing patterns of gendered reasoning as resulting
from socialization, one may naturally wonder, though same-gender-loving women are likely to
overlap significantly with heterosexual women as they have undergone similar socialization from
similar perspectives in their early years, what of transgender people? The simple answer is that
transgender women should be expected to think as women and transgender men as men. Though
not all transgender people identify strictly as men or women, many do, and though not all
transgender people report knowledge of their gender identity in early childhood, most do. This
early knowledge cultivates a heightened awareness of socializing forces. Though observational
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research on (most commonly) pre-transition transgender children poses obvious challenges, I
find it logical to theorize that transgender children are likely to absorb a great deal of the
socialization they witness imposed on other children who are assigned to the gender with which
they identify as well as from media intended for those children. Add to this the understanding
that gender socialization continues into adulthood, and it becomes safe to expect transgender
women to have similar patterns of thinking to cisgender women and transgender men to have
similar patterns of thinking to cisgender men. Naturally, I would welcome additional research
data to better explore this hypothesis.
Second, transgender people are well poised take on a slightly more complex variation of
the “outsider within” standpoint. In “Learning from the Outsider Within: The Sociological
Significance of Black Feminist Thought,” Patricia Hill Collins ascribes African American
women an “outsider within” status and argues, “Bringing this group–as well as others who share
an outsider within status vis-a-vis sociology–into the center of analysis may reveal aspects of
reality obscured by more orthodox approaches” (15). She writes of the value of marginalized
perspectives, of the special capacity of a person of an oppressed gender, class, or racial group to
understand social systems in ways that privileged groups cannot. Collins considers this theory
primarily in terms of academic potential as she notes that such perspectives may produce
“distinctive analyses of race, class, and gender” (14-15). Clearly, however, there are implications
beyond academics. To posit that “benefits of outsider within status include the ability of the
‘stranger’ to see patterns that may be more difficult for those immersed in the situation to see”
(15) is to point out that the privilege enjoyed by persons in dominant social groups has the effect
of blinding them to aspects of their own social reality – aspects which only the oppressed have
the ability to see. Applying this theory to a transgender perspective, we may logically theorize
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that a transgender person will likely be more apt to question – if not to voice their questions –
and think critically regarding why social institutions sort people into the categories they do,
particularly in relation to gender. Transgender experience prompts not only awareness of both
gender socializations but a heightened awareness of the flawed, sex-essentialist system which
arbitrarily excludes them from the position of their intuited gender. If the experience of a person
of color in the United States or specifically of a black academic confers special perspective as the
“outsider within,” trans experience confers a special perspective as what we might call the
“insider without.”
As Jack Halberstam11 has argued in more than one major work, the ability to see, think,
and live outside of constrictions of social institutions is one of the most foundational qualities of
queer thinking. In A Queer Time and Place: Transgender Bodies, Subcultural Lives opens by
explaining that queer ways of life have developed “in opposition to the institutions of family,
heterosexuality, and reproduction. They also develop according to other logics of location,
movement, and identification” (1). As for much of the twentieth century, the time of formation
for what we currently understand as gay identity and culture, to be openly gay meant to be barred
from traditional institutions and spaces both literal and figurative, a queer way of life came to
encompass “subcultural practices, alternative methods of alliance, forms of transgender
embodiment, and those forms of representation dedicated to capturing these willfully eccentric
modes of being” (1). As a result of learning and embodying those practices, queer people begin
to see and think using “nonnormative logics and organizations of community, sexual identity,
embodiment, and activity in time and space” (6). Queer people:

11

Halberstam has published under both “Judith” and “Jack.” He personally and professionally uses the name “Jack
Halberstam,” but publishes certain works under the name “Judith.”
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will and do opt to live outside of reproductive and familiar time as well as on the edges of
logics of labor and production . . . [They] live (deliberately, accidentally, or of necessity)
during the hours when others sleep and in the spaces (physical, metaphysical, and
economic) that others have abandoned, and in terms of the ways they might work in the
domains that other people assign to privacy and family. (10)
Heteronormative traditions place certain activities in certain spaces and starkly delineate who
belongs in which space and how they may function there. Queer thinking disrupts those
boundaries by thinking of alternatives and repurposing space.
In The Queer Art of Failure, Halberstam elaborates on his belief that queer thought
involves the ability to imagine “other forms of being, other forms of knowing, a world with
different sites for justice and injustice, a mode of being where the emphasis falls less on money
and work and competition and more on cooperation, trade, and sharing” (52). It is important to
note, however, that finding other ways of living does not mean supplanting the existing system
with another equally restrictive one; rather, Halberstam asks “Can we recognize the new without
discarding the old? Can we hold on to multiple frameworks of time and transformation at once?”
(71). Queer thinking is about not simply imagining new ways of living and working, but
accepting the multiplicity of positive ways of living and working.
Elizabeth Freeman echoes many of these ideas in Time Binds: Queer Temporalities,
Queer Histories as she considers how heteronormative institutions standardize time and how
queer thinking disrupts those standards. Inventing a great deal of her own vocabulary, Freeman
describes how:
In chronobiopolitics, this process [of standardization of time] extends beyond individual
anatomies to encompass the management of entire populations: people whose individual
bodies are synchronized not only with one another but also with larger temporal schemae
experience belonging itself as natural. In a chronobiological society, the state and other
institutions, including representational apparatuses, link properly temporalized bodies to
narratives of movement and change. These are teleological schemes of events or
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strategies for living such as marriage, accumulation of health and wealth for the future,
reproduction, childrearing, and death and its attendant rituals. (4)
For example, in heteronormative culture, there are particular hours of the day designated for
work, for recreation, and for sleep. There are stages of life designated for school, for work, and
for retirement as well as those designated for being single, for marriage, and for child rearing. In
a variety of ways, queer people can be out of sync with heteronormative culture, which prompts
different ways of thinking about work, about relationships, about growth and development,
illuminating the fact that these standardized life narratives are not as inevitable as they may
seem. Freeman believes that a queer perspective should be used “to jam whatever looks like the
inevitable” (173). Likewise considering how queer lives often follow different patterns, different
stages, Halberstam argues that by existing standards, queer thinking might be considered young
thinking, but a particular kind of youth with “the potentiality of a life unscripted by the
conventions of family, inheritance, and child rearing” (In a Queer Time and Place 2). Consider
that by heteronormative standards, even deviance itself is scripted as an experimental phase to
occur in adolescence and young adulthood before the reassertion of traditional ways of being. By
living a life which mainstream culture would consider deviant by nature, “queer subcultures . . .
map out different forms of adulthood, or the refusal of adulthood and new modes of deliberative
deviance” (174).
These passages from Freeman and Halberstam seem to focus primarily on the temporal
and developmental differences arising from existing beyond the borders of the traditional family,
experiences perhaps common among many same-gender-loving people and many transgender
people. In considering differences in temporality and stages of life, however, there are specific
aspects of transgender experience which are distinctive. During transition, unavoidably one
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becomes adolescent regardless of whether the transition occurs at age 15 or 25 or 50.
“Adolescent” can be taken both literally and figuratively in the common case of physical as well
as social transition when, due to hormone replacement therapy, one effectively re-experiences
puberty. Many transgender narratives contend with the paradox of simultaneously being middleaged and a teenager. However, this adolescence is also distinct as it involves not only the
learning of and socialization into a new role but the conscious and subconscious unlearning of
old patterns of gender performance. Though it may seem obvious, it bears mentioning that, by
necessity, transgender people cultivate an aptitude for transformation.
Transformation including unlearning of the old is undoubtedly as much at the heart of
queer thinking as innovation. Halberstam argues that part of queer thinking is to “suspect
memorialization” (The Queer Art of Failure 15), that is, to distrust the often unspoken but
pervasive belief that because something is or has been that it should be or must be. He writes,
“forgetfulness can be a useful tool for jamming the smooth operations of the normal and the
ordinary . . . [which] take on an air of inevitability and naturalness simply by virtue of being
passed on from one generation to another” (70). Traditional heteronormative thinking commonly
concerns itself with reproduction, not only in terms of family and children, but in terms of
institutions; moving from one stage of development to the next often implies guiding younger
people through those stages with the expectation that they will follow the same path. Often,
personal reproduction and institutional reproduction go hand in hand, in that an adult’s
“reproductive time” and “time of inheritance” “connects the family to the historical past of the
nation, and glances ahead to connect the family to the future of both familial and national
stability” (In a Queer Time and Place 5). Freeman describes this process in highly political
terms, connecting heteronormativity to “chrononormativity, or the use of time to organize
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individual human bodies toward maximum productivity” (3). She argues that the
heteronormative development model is centered around maximizing productivity and
reproductivity at particular stages of life, thus we are socialized to believe that “this sequence of
socioeconomically ‘productive’ moments is what it means to have a life at all” (5). This
pervasive belief is perhaps why, as Halberstam explains, queer development, which eschews
such reproduction, may appear to outsiders like a refusal to develop at all:
Queer culture, with its emphasis on repetition, horizontality, immaturity and a refusal of
adulthood, where adulthood rhymes with heterosexual parenting, resists a developmental
model of substitution and instead invests in . . . ‘sideways’ relations, relations that grow
along parallel lines rather than upward and onward. This queer form of antidevelopment
requires healthy doses of forgetting and disavowal and process by way of a series of
substitutions. (The Queer Art of Failure 73)
Such substitutions might include complex nonbiological kinship groups in place of biological
families, different relationship rituals in the absence of opportunities for traditional courtship and
marriage, etc. In the long term, living in queer culture encourages a mindset of adaptation.
Just as women have a different conception of goals and achievement from men, those
living in queer culture likewise develop different definitions from those living in straight culture.
Wueer thinking encourages us to “start seeing alternatives to the inevitable and seemingly
organic models we use for marking progress and achievement; it also asks us to notice how and
whether change has happened” (Halberstam 70-71). Just as I earlier described how for women
success in conventional terms can also be failure, in queer thinking, failure by traditional
definitions can also be success:
failure [can be] a way of refusing to acquiesce to dominant logics of power and discipline
and as a form of critique. As a practice, failure recognizes that alternatives are embedded
already in the dominant and that power is never total or consistent; indeed failure can
exploit the unpredictability of ideology and its indeterminate qualities. (88)
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In this respect, queer thinking and feminine thinking share a great deal of common ground, as
both reject a competitive model of achievement, though perhaps in subtly different ways.
Halberstam writes, “Winning is a multivalent event: in order for someone to win, someone else
must fail to win, and so this act of losing has its own logic, its own complexity, its own aesthetic,
but ultimately, also, its own beauty” (93). By traditional standards, to be queer at all means to
have failed to properly enact one’s gender and sexuality; queer thinking thus includes the ability
to reinterpret “failure.” Those who wish to understand and foster queer thinking should learn to
recognize success by queer standards. Fostering queer thinking means to “resist mastery” (11) as
mastery means to meet existing standards perfectly, and it means to “privilege the naïve or
nonsensical” (12) as these are signs of innovation and experimentation.
In “Finding a Sexual Identity and Community: Therapeutic Implications and Cultural
Assumptions in Scientific Models of Coming Out,” Paula C. Rust details the problems that occur
when psychologists attempt to apply heteronormative developmental models onto queer subjects.
She finds that therapists often “assume that coming out is a linear goal-oriented process, a
conception that more accurately reflects the way individuals view their coming out in retrospect
than the way they actually experienced it” (229). A heteronormative perspective considers
coming out the same way it considers straight cisgender development, as a “series of stages or
steps, with the last stage constructed as a ‘goal’ toward which movement through the other stages
is directed” (229-30). Such models do not recognize that coming out is continuous, life long, and
its particulars are highly dependent on the individual (245). She points out that, even more
problematically, “in all such models presented in the literature, homosexual or gay – and
sometimes lesbian – identity is posited as the end stage of the coming out process . . . [implying
that] other outcomes, such as bisexual identity or a refusal to adopt a sexual identity, reflect
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immaturity” (239). The language Rust uses here certainly echoes the distinctions between
straight thought and queer thought which Halberstam explores, the misinterpretation of queer
thought as inherently immature or undeveloped. Though Rust writes specifically about samegender-loving people, transgender people face similar misunderstandings during transition. Trans
people contend with pressures from both the medical community and culture at large to adopt a
stable, fixed, and normative gender identity as the end result of transition, as opposed to
identifying as nonbinary, gender fluid, or otherwise deviant by the standards of the target gender.
Thus, there are a number of facets of queer experience which encourage a focus on the
present and a resistance against fixed goals. Freeman points out that queer sexuality itself, with
no pretense of reproduction and thus a sole focus on pleasure, runs counter to straight
conceptions of sexuality, in which “specific sexual practices came to be seen as ‘foreplay,’
acceptable en route to intercourse but not as a substitute for it” (8). Halberstam points out that the
dangers facing the queer community from persecution and disease can create a kind of joyful
fatalism, as “the constantly diminishing future creates a new emphasis on the here, the present,
the now, and while the threat of no future hovers overhead like a storm cloud, the urgency of
being also expands the potential of the moment” (In a Queer Time and Place 2). In either case, a
mindset develops in which activities which are merely steps along the way to end goals in
heteronormative thinking are goals in and of themselves in queer thinking: experimentation,
fluctuation, constant change rather than stasis. This mindset conflicts with heteronormative
thinking, in which “we pathologize modes of living that show little or no concern for longevity.
Within the life cycle of the Western human subject, long periods of stability are considered to be
desirable” (4). Rust encourages psychologists treating patients in the midst of coming out to
understand that coming out is “an ongoing process of attempting to maintain an accurate self-
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description of one’s sexuality in a world of sexual meanings that vary over time and across
context. Maturity is not synonymous with stasis, and change is not an indication of immaturity”
(246). Once again, I would add that psychologists treating nonbinary and gender fluid
transgender people would certainly benefit from the same advice.
The distinct patterns of thought fostered by queer existence certainly impact the shape
and style of queer life narratives in many ways, from a clear responsiveness to persecution and
danger to a resistance to traditional categorization to a tendency toward the implausible and the
fantastic. All of these are simultaneously realities of queer life, patterns of queer thought, and
conventions of queer life writing.

Conclusion and Synthesis

Anyone discussing the thinking and reasoning patterns specific to a particular gender or
sexual orientation or culture should take enormous care to avoid essentialism, to highlight the
role of socialization lest that discussion should devolve into sexism and stereotyping. However,
any discussion of psychology or epistemology should take enormous care to avoid
overgeneralization of how humans think and learn lest that discussion should become
androcentric and heteronormative for lack of appropriate nuance.
As a result of socialization and experience, women at this historical moment are more
likely to gain knowledge as a group process, through discussion and dialogue and collaboration,
rather than independent observation and judgment based on established criteria. They are more
likely to recognize multiple sources of knowledge, to take pride in empathy, and to be critical of
experts who do not follow those same patterns. Women are more likely to consider strong
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knowers those whose who are adaptable and reflexive. They are more likely to recognize truth as
intuited, to think of learning and knowing as personal and emotional things. Women are more apt
to solve problems with strategies based on fulfilling needs rather than following rules. Their idea
of success is more often based on maximizing benefits for communities rather than individuals.
The experience of living as a same-gender-loving or transgender person also produces its
own set of thought patterns. Navigating a homophobic and transphobic culture can foster a
survivor mentality, heightening one’s ability to read others’ emotions and trustworthiness in a
particular kind of empathy. Queer people commonly have a greater degree of self-awareness as
well as conscious awareness of social systems. They are more commonly adaptable in problem
solving and ways of living. Queer epistemology is often characterized as an epistemology of
youth, of focus on the present moment and valuing the capacity for change more highly than
stasis or stability. Likewise, queer people maintain the ability to actively forget, to resist
reproduction and generational mimicry. In terms of goals and achievement, they are more likely
to resist mastery in conventional terms, to chart new paths toward new ends and new ways of
finding happiness.
Just as the previous chapter described certain similarities between women’s life
narratives and queer life narratives, so one may notice certain recurring patterns between
women’s thinking and queer thinking. In both cases, problem solvers foreground “needs” rather
than “rules.” Women and queer people alike seem more geared toward innovative, “outside of
the box” thinking. In many respects, both might be considered to experience a kind of
“epistemology of the other” as a result of marginalization. However, if this chapter offers no
other insights, most central should be understanding the dangers in overgeneralizing how people
think and learn. It should go without saying that within the groups described here, there are
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naturally further taxonomies of social classification impacting experience and thus impacting
reasoning based on race, ability status, religion, citizenship, and a variety of other factors.
Ultimately, this chapter in combination with the previous one should make abundantly
clear the following:


As it stands, the material realities of women’s lives differ from those of men, and
the material realities of queer lives differ from those of heterosexual cisgender
people.



Those different circumstances and socializing forces encourage different modes
of thinking, learning, and problem solving.



Those different modes of thinking, learning, and problem solving manifest in
different narrative conventions in the essays, autobiographies, and memoirs of
women and queer authors.

The central implication of these points is that educators would be wise to pay attention to
the life writing of women and queer people to glean insights into how their students think and
how they can design curriculum which is more accessible and beneficial. In the final chapter, I
will explore the varied ways that this understanding can be employed to better facilitate learning
for women and queer students.

CHAPTER 5: TEACHING AND LEARNING
AS WOMEN’S NARRATIVES AND QUEER NARRATIVES

The role of every educator in every discipline, from tutors to instructors to administrators
overseeing curricula, whether in History or Visual Arts or Mechanical Engineering, is to craft an
experience for students. These experiences created by educators are imbued with special
significance on both a personal and an institutional level. On a personal level, educational
experiences define the parameters by which we view and understand the world around us and
even ourselves. On an institutional level, educational experiences have an enormous impact on
our potential for financial and political power. The great importance of these experiences makes
all the more troubling that, as so many have pointed out, they most commonly centralize gendernormative, straight, white men in a variety of ways. In “The Hidden Curriculum: Gender in the
Classroom,” Susan Basow describes how educational experiences marginalize women and girls
both in subject matter and in classroom dynamics. She explains, for example:
Even with the availability of newer nonsexist materials, many schools still use materials
in which males play the dominant role. . . . History books still primarily chronicle the
activities of men in terms of lines of succession, wars, conquests, politics, and so on. . . .
Women are still treated as outsiders in ‘regular’ history or in terms of exceptions to the
rule. (119)
Just as women are portrayed as marginal in class materials, they are treated as marginal in the
class itself: “Boys tend to receive more praise and more reprimands than do girls, and girls tend
to receive teacher approval mainly for being quiet and compliant” (122). These kinds of
marginalization pervade every level of education from early childhood to university.

159

We have many lenses through which to view these inequalities, but the language of
narrative offers a particularly potent and meaningful paradigm for conceptualizing both the
problem and the solution. Narrative thinking, the inevitable manner in which we structure our
understanding of ourselves and our world in terms of story, is a powerful function of the human
mind, and educators who ignore it do so to the detriment of their students’ learning. To employ
narrative pedagogy means to tap into this intellectual resource on multiple levels, both by
delivering subject matter in narrative terms (a practice I have termed “micro-level” narrative
pedagogy) and by considering learning experiences as narratives in which students are character
agents (which I have termed “macro-level” narrative pedagogy). However, to more fully unlock
that potential, we must recognize that every narrative, including those we teach and those our
students enact, belongs to a genre; these genres vary both in terms of which students will best
recognize and process them and which students are more likely to assume central roles within
them. Transforming education for our students means changing the genre of our classroom
narratives on both a micro level and a macro level.
To understand which narrative genres will be most recognizable and accommodating to
particular groups of students, we must become familiar with the genres of narrative that such
groups read and write, particularly when narrating their own lives. Autobiography is not a
singular genre but rather a category of genres which differ tremendously based on (among other
things) the intersecting backgrounds of the author: gender, sexual orientation, race, class,
citizenship, religion, etc. Beyond any doubt, the genres our educational system features most
prominently grow out of a straight, white, male, Western, upper-class tradition of literature.
Women’s life narratives and queer life narratives feature very different conceptions of self and of
relationships, follow different patterns of plot development, provide different degrees of self-
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reflexivity and contextualization among other authors, and allow for different kinds of ambiguity
between fact and fiction while ultimately still pursuing truth.
The significance of these differing conventions in genres of life narrative lies once again
in the understanding that thinking is narrating; as described in chapter 2, our patterns of thought
and our patterns of narrative reflect one another. The same material realities of life which
encourage women and queer people to write narratives with different stylistic and structural
conventions from straight male authors likewise foster different patterns of thinking, problem
solving, and personal development: learning through dialogue and empathy, accepting multiple
sources of knowledge, resisting categories, repurposing objects and spaces, breaking cycles of
reproduction, recognizing oppressive systems and seeing beyond them.
Synthesizing the understandings that humans learn through absorbing and enacting
narratives and that people of different backgrounds think and therefore narrate by different
conventions, we can recognize that a critical feminist narrative pedagogy which uses women’s
life writing and queer life writing as models upon which to craft educational experiences has
enormous potential to redress inequalities in education. This final chapter serves to explore these
possibilities first by reviewing other educators’ applications of psychological research on
women’s thinking,12 then by outlining several practical examples of critical feminist narrative
pedagogy on both micro and macro-levels in multiple academic fields.

12

There is a wealth of educational research exploring possibilities for applying gendered psychology to pedagogy.
There is little in the way of parallel research on applying queer psychology to pedagogy. While a field of “queer
pedagogy” does exist, it directly parallels feminist pedagogy in terms of its aims and methods; it is defined by
political and social goals rather than a relationship to psychology. The pedagogical research I explore in the
following section might be considered a sub-field of feminist pedagogy focused on women’s psychology, and a
parallel subfield of queer pedagogy focused on queer psychology simply does not yet exist.
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Existing Applications of Women’s Ways of Knowing
and the Ethic of Care in Education
Among researchers in pedagogy, recognition of the implications of Women’s Ways of
Knowing and In a Different Voice on educational practice was immediate. A wealth of research
sprang up in response to the fresh epistemological and developmental models offered by Mary
Field Belenky et al. and Carol Gilligan, theorizing different possibilities for application of this
psychological research in the classroom. In fact, Belenky and her co-authors paved the way by
dedicating an entire chapter of their landmark book to considering education. As Belenky et al.
point out, “most of the institutions of higher education in this country were designed by men, and
most continue to be run by men” (Women’s Ways of Knowing 192), and this situation results in a
model of educational progress that conforms to a model of male development.
While the specifics of course planning and curriculum design are certainly part of the
conversation, the problem Belenky et al. describe has as much to do with the tone established by
instructors and administrators regarding the trajectory of academic experience. They point out
that education has been viewed as a kind of initiation process at the end of which one joins a
community of educated people, that “confirmation comes not at the beginning of education but at
the end” (193). This attitude, however, can be intimidating, even forbidding: “For women,
confirmation and community are prerequisites rather than consequences of development” (194).
This observation does not mean that students should be treated as though they have already
achieved academic goals which are still in progress, rather simply that “every woman, regardless
of age, social class, ethnicity, and academic achievement, needs to know that she is capable of
intelligent thought, and she needs to know it right away” (193). In “An Ethic of Caring and Its
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Implications for Instructional Arrangements,” Nel Noddings outlines similar goals and attitudes
as part of teaching based on Gilligan’s ethic of care. As she explains, fully applying the ethic of
care would require many drastic adjustments in the university:
If we were to explore seriously the ideas suggested by an ethic of caring for education,
we might suggest changes in almost every aspect of schooling: the current hierarchical
structure of management, the rigid mode of allocating time, the kind of relationships
encouraged, the size of schools and classes, the goals of instruction, modes of evaluation,
patterns of interaction, selection of content. (221)
The ultimate goal of these changes would be to reinvent university culture not as a top-down
system of gradual initiation but as a lateral community of learning.
Such a community would encourage collaboration and cooperation rather than
competition. In summarizing their interview with Belenky, Evelyn Ashton-Jones and Dene Kay
Thomas write, “in place of the current [competitive model], she envisions a dialogic pedagogy of
cooperation and collaboration. The pedagogy she elaborates is not ‘soft’ but, rather, allows for
both ‘believing’ and ‘doubting’ activities toward cooperative ends” (275-76). While it is hardly
uncommon for curriculum developers to emphasize group work as a necessary skill for success
in the world outside academia, Ashton-Jones and Thomas point out that “collaboration is clearly
more than just a good way to get work done; it is vital to education and crucial to the survival of
the world” (275). This mode of working and learning also addresses the supposed “fear of
success” plaguing some students, as they quote Belenky explaining:
Fear of success tends to be a problem for women only if they perceive the success as
coming at the expense of somebody else. In a win-win situation, where doing outstanding
work is embedded in a collaborative relationship, women don’t seem to have problems
with the idea of success at all. (282)
She finds that a class compatible with women’s ways of knowing would be one which
“constructs truth not through conflict but through ‘consensus’” (223). Noddings concurs while
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also cautioning against a surface-level dialogic structure lacking a true spirit of collaboration:
“True dialogue is open; that is, conclusions are not held by one or more of the parties at the
outset. The search for enlightenment, or responsible choice, or perspective, or means to problem
solution is mutual and marked by appropriate signs of reciprocity” (223). Collaboration is not
simply a means to an end but an end in and of itself: “students are encouraged to support each
other; opportunities for peer interaction are provided, and the quality of that interaction is as
important (to both teacher and students) as the academic outcomes” (223). In “Voices in
Dialogue: Collaborative Ways of Knowing,” Jill Mattuck Tarule writes, “The emphasis in
collaborative learning is on the social context of the classroom as a site for constructing
knowledge” (290). Thus, a collaborative mindset transforms the classroom from a place where
knowledge is simply disseminated to a place where knowledge is created.
This classroom dynamic necessitates a nontraditional point of entry into academic
discourse. Ann Stanton comments on Women’s Ways of Knowing in “Reconfiguring Teaching
and Knowing in the College classroom.” She observes, “At the core of WWK’s message are the
simple but powerful questions Who is the learner? What does s/he bring to the learning
process?” (35). Belenky suggests that to design an education for women, we should “begin by
simply asking: What does a woman know? Traditional courses do not begin there. They begin
not with the student’s knowledge but with the teacher’s knowledge” (198). Of the women
interviewed in Women’s Ways of Knowing, Belenky et al. find that “The kind of teacher they
praised and the kind for which they yearned was one who would help them articulate and expand
their latent knowledge: a midwife-teacher” (217). Such a teacher shares knowledge through
modeling, demonstrating not only a final state of knowledge to emulate, but rather making
visible the learning process itself (214-15). To understand that they can reach their educational
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goals, students need to observe the thought process by which the instructor has reached those
goals: “They need models of thinking as a human, imperfect, and attainable activity” (217). The
authors clarify that the teacher does indeed have a special role, one which “carries special
responsibilities. It does not entail power over the students; however, it does carry authority, an
authority based not on subordination but on cooperation” (227). Likewise, just as collaboration
and cooperation are more than means to an end but rather ends in and of themselves, Noddings
reminds us that these practices also require modeling: “The teacher models not only admirable
patterns of intellectual activity but also desirable ways of interacting with people” (223). Tarule
uses the word “guide” to describe this special role of learning model: “Groups led by a guide are
different from groups led by an authority. The authoritative voice is no longer held by one
person; it is lodged in the discourse” (293). If students are an active part of that discourse, then
inevitably, authority will be shared.
How precisely to manage the special role of the teacher among an engaged community of
learners stands as perhaps one of the most challenging questions we face. In “Women’s Ways of
Knowing/Women’s Ways of Composing,” Janis Tedesco writes, “Knowing when to be coach
and when to be gatekeeper, when to play the doubting game and when the believing game, is a
mature and valuable skill we as teachers must work to construct for ourselves” (254). Ultimately,
students need a teacher to fulfill multiple roles; what must remain constant, however, is that we
“regard the student as a subject of learning rather than an object, as capable of generating
knowledge and of being a source of knowledge for others” (254). During the interview
conducted by Ashton-Jones and Thomas, Belenky remarks that treating a student as a respected
source of knowledge is an essential part of moving students between epistemological positions:
“The student experiences creating an idea that the teacher writes down, learns from, and passes
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on to somebody else. This kind of response can really break a hole in the received knower’s
world view” (286). This practice is also essential for genuine dialogue.
Tarule also elaborates that collaboration and dialogue should be present in all aspects of a
course rather than simply contained in particular activities; she critiques, for example, courses in
which “study groups are acceptable, but talking or working together during a test is cheating”
(292). The question of evaluation springs up frequently in the discourse on collaborative
education – both in terms of how to evaluate collaborative work and how to collaborate in
evaluating work. Belenky addresses this question by suggesting that “women may benefit
especially from systems in which the teaching function and the assessing function are separated”
(208). There are a number of possible ways in which this separation might play out, including
having teaching assistants to evaluate student work. Such separation may help encourage a
collaborative relationship between students and instructors, but it may not always be possible.
She also points out that evaluation and grading are not necessarily hindrances to learning, but
rather the problem lies in “evaluation in the separate (impersonal, objective) mode. Evaluation in
the connected mode requires that the standards of evaluation be constructed in collaboration with
the students” (208-09). In “Transforming Mathematics Education Through Dialogue and Themes
of Caring: A Tribute to Nel Noddings” Bridget Arvold voices her agreement. She explains:
Students who participate in the design of grading rubrics gain a better understanding of
what needs to be learned and why. Students can become stakeholders in the educational
enterprise when they help determine the direction of discourse and provide input on the
learning outcomes that are meaningful to them. (107)
Thus, while grading itself may be necessarily performed by an instructor, the criteria for
evaluation may be developed cooperatively. From setting objectives to building knowledge to
evaluating success, collaboration and cooperation are key.
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In a collaborative, cooperative classroom – or what Belenky refers to as a “connected”
classroom – there is no question that the discourse respects multiple perspectives and sources of
knowledge. Stanton explains the benefits of classroom collaboration with specific reference to
the epistemological positions described in Women’s Ways of Knowing, arguing that the kind of
collaboration and cooperation involved in class activities can be fine-tuned according to the
students’ current way of knowing. For example:
A “subjective” discussion would encourage students to air their opinions or relate their
experiences in an atmosphere of nonjudgmentalness. . . . A “connected” discussion would
go beyond that, pointing out where opinions are different, helping participants discover
the sources of and reasons for the differences, exploring the implications of each position.
(29)
Stanton also describes a situation in which a university applied an understanding of these
knowledge positions on the level of curriculum design. The undergraduate curriculum began
with a required seminar and elective courses “whose purpose is to move students from received
into subjective knowing,13 encouraging them to gain a voice” (37) followed by a common course
and additional complementary courses designed to offer different perspectives on the common
course, “with the aim of moving subjective knowers into procedural knowing” (37),14 and in the
final stage, students take an additional seminar with an interdisciplinary focus requiring students
to “[reflect] on the meaning of their education, creating new knowledge, and considering how to
carry their knowledge responsibly into the world beyond college (moving toward constructed
knowing)” (37). This curriculum design definitely stands as the most comprehensive application
of Women’s Ways of Knowing that I’ve encountered.

13

“Receptive knowers” consider knowledge to be plain facts dispensed from authorities while “subjective
knowers” recognize themselves as an authority.
14
“Procedural knowers” understand that multiple sources of knowledge exist and develop methods of determining
which knowledge source is to be trusted.
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Other educators have focused on applying these epistemological positions, particularly
the respect for multiple perspectives and sources of knowledge, in individual courses. Naturally,
this goal may present greater challenges in some disciplines than in others. However, Arvold
insists such a mode is attainable even in science and mathematics. She critiques what she feels is
“a traditional presentation of sterile formalist mathematics [which] reflects a teacher’s beliefs
about the nature of mathematics and who can learn mathematics, and stifles the opportunity for
dialogue” (104). Rather, she suggests, “caring relationships in mathematics education need to
build upon respect for alternative views of mathematics and multiple ways of knowing
mathematics” (106). For example, planning content according to students’ goals both centers the
students and establishes connection between the content and the world outside the university.
Arvold writes, “Through participation in real world activities teachers and students could
develop an ethic of caring and come to know mathematics and other disciplines as multi-faceted
and interconnected” (108).
Researchers agree that connecting the content of any given course with other disciplines
as well as with students’ own communities is essential for women learners. Belenky reminds us
that we must “encourage students to use their knowledge in everyday life” (219). Such
encouragement can be embedded both in classroom instruction and in curriculum design. In
“Caring and Agency: Noddings on Happiness and Education,” Hanan Alexander describes what
should be the goal of university curriculum planning: creating “programs of study that will
enable [students] to fulfil their potential with dignity by making meaningful contributions to their
families and communities” (489). Crafting such programs necessarily means resisting “false
dualisms, such as those between intelligence and emotion, theory and practice, or vocation and
academic studies” (488). To the detriment of all students but particularly women, academic study
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is too often presented as abstract and divorced from everyday, practical concerns. As Arvold
describes the common problem, “excessive efforts at abstraction, objectivity, and detachment in
our schools inhibit the genuine dialogue that would allow students and teachers to engage in
activity that creates its own direction and objectives” (102). This division between academic
study and practical life discourages student engagement and inhibits dialogue. Arvold argues that
in order to resolve the disconnection, teachers must “abandon a goal of disseminating sterile
mathematics to students and come to realize that students need a more comprehensive
understanding of mathematics both to enrich their lives and also contribute in today’s society”
(107). As a result, the subject matter becomes not only more relevant to students but also more
accessible.
Such an approach – practical and concrete – also once again centers the student.
Moreover, it centers the student not only as a student but as a human being. Alexander writes,
“An education worthy of the name must necessarily be first and foremost about human
flourishing” (488). This goal is indeed the essence of applying the ethic of care to education,
which Noddings has written on extensively in Happiness and Education. Just as Belenky
described that, for women in particular, community, belonging, and affirmation were prerequisites to educational success rather than end results (as in the traditional masculine
conception of educational progress), Noddings argues that the traditional conception of education
over-emphasizes suffering as part of the learning process with happiness as a possible result,
when instead education is most effective when conceived as a joyful process. Noddings writes:
The best homes and schools are happy places. The adults in these happy places recognize
that one aim of education (and of life itself) is happiness. They also recognize that
happiness serves as both means and end. Happy children, growing in their understanding
of what happiness is, will seize their educational opportunities with delight, and they will
contribute to the happiness of others. (261)
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She argues that education today is overwhelmed by what she describes as “aims-talk” (74), by
which she means the tendency to draft educational objectives solely on the basis of specific
knowledge and skills to be shared. Rather, she believes that “happiness should be an aim of
education, and a good education should contribute significantly to personal and collective
happiness” (1).
While happiness should be the aim of education for all students, scholars have pointed
out the particular value of a caring-based approach for students who have been marginalized:
women, people of color, those disadvantaged by socioeconomic status, physical or mental
ability, etc. The goal of increasing happiness necessitates recognizing and addressing
unhappiness. In “Caring and the Teaching of English,” Brian White finds that among educators
who teach based on an ethic of caring, “‘the imperative to become a teacher’ included a call to
stand with others in their suffering” (323). He explains that truly caring entails engrossment or
“intense interest, even absorption in the life, the thoughts, and the experiences of the cared-for”
(304) and inclusion, “that is, to see the world through their eyes” (305). To be absorbed in the
lives, thoughts, and experiences of our students, to see the world through their eyes, means
listening to their stories and teaching in a manner that is attentive and responsive to those stories.
The following section details plans for lessons, units, courses, and programs which are structured
by the conventions and style of the stories of women and queer people.

Applications of Critical Feminist Narrative Pedagogy
Though this project is necessarily grounded in theory – narrative theory, feminist theory,
queer theory – my ultimate goal is that these ideas will be practical and useful for educators. In
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this section, I will articulate a number of examples of narrative pedagogy based on the life
writing explored in the previous chapters. These examples will cover a variety of disciplines and
range from the micro level of classroom activities to the macro level of curriculum design. For
each, I will identify the type of course or program which I have investigated by reviewing
departmental websites from a wide variety of institutions (some state universities, some private,
and some community colleges), and I will reference a representative sample of course syllabi or
departmental websites explaining their objectives. I will describe the experience I have designed
to fulfil those objectives and specify both its basis in autobiographical literature and the
marginalized thinking patterns which it brings to the center.

Care-based Solutions in Political Science
The role of governments – particularly the U.S. government – in establishing public
policies both foreign and domestic is a common topic in Political Science courses at many
universities. For example, Rebecca Deen’s syllabus for Presidential Leadership in Domestic
Policy Making at University of Texas at Arlington promises that the course will “begin . . . by
thinking about leadership . . . [and] what constitutes leadership. We will learn about different
theories of leadership, and about various characteristics of effective leaders” (1). In U.S. Foreign
Policy, Timothy C. Lim at California State University expects that students will “develop [their]
capacity to both explain the foreign policy-making process in the United States, and to better
understand the underlying patterns, logic, and implications of American foreign policy in the
world at large” (1). In Gina Yannitell Reinhardt’s syllabus for Introduction to Public Policy at
Texas A&M, she explains: “You will also learn some practical tools in conducting policy
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analysis . . . [and] utilize these tools yourself in analyzing a policy question” (1). All of these
courses share the goal of considering the purpose and effectiveness of policy-making.
In order to achieve that goal, I would incorporate a writing assignment which prompts
students to argue for or against a specific policy change through a narrative which assumes the
voice of a person in a marginalized group which would be directly impacted by that policy. The
narrative should be grounded in research demonstrating an understanding not only of the group
in question but also of relevant policy-making practices. Students should strive for a balance
between a personal voice, collective representation, and professional language. They should
consider their audience to be politicians who will directly impact the implementation of the
policy in question.
This writing assignment is an example of micro-level narrative pedagogy designed
according to the conventions of women’s autobiography. It requires students to write in a
personal voice and yet decenter the self, to represent a group as a participant. Students may be
encouraged to write as “we,” utilizing the voice of the multiple individual. Such writing is
somewhat experimental compared to the traditionally analytical forms to which students are
more accustomed. It encourages a sense of partnership between author and audience. The kind of
thinking encouraged by this assignment is first and foremost the application of the ethic of care;
the solutions to the policy problems the students discuss will necessarily focus on fulfilling the
needs of the marginalized group. As students themselves will often not be a part of the group in
question, the assignment also requires a high degree of empathy and the acknowledgement of
multiple knowledge sources from multiple backgrounds.
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Narrating Group Belonging in Sociology

Sociologists study human behavior in terms of groups and organization, and courses in
sociology encourage students to develop this lens. Clovis L. White’s Sociological Analysis of
Society at Oberlin College for example explores social institutions and socialization to help
students in “developing a sociological imagination . . . to broaden [their] understanding of the
dynamics associated with social behavior” (1). Similarly, Introduction to Social Psychology at
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee is a course which “examines the influence of society on the
individual as well as the influence of the individual on society” (Pylman 1). More specifically, in
Contemporary Sociological Theory, Richard Williams at Rutgers University intends his students
to learn different approaches to studying society such as “from a MACRO (institutional) or a
MICRO (individual) level while also focusing on either VALUES (concern with others) or
INTERESTS (concern with self) as motivations for human behavior” (1). Understanding humans
both as individuals and as groups is a recurring theme in a variety of sociology courses at
multiple levels.
To help students begin to think in terms the relationships between individuals and groups,
teachers may utilize a class activity either in writing or in small group discussion in which
students would be prompted first to consider the various groups to which they belong (with a
variety of examples provided), then to narrate how they became part of one of these groups or
came to understand what it meant to be part of one of these groups, and finally to describe how
they in turn impact and shape that group through their own words and behavior. This activity
encourages consideration of socialization and group dynamics and the institutions surrounding
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them. Alternatively, this activity could be expanded into an out-of-class writing assignment
which would require the use of sociological theory to analyze the student’s group.
This activity is designed as a piece of micro-level narrative pedagogy inspired by
narratives of gender transition. Rather than simply explaining a group to which they belong and
the characteristics of that group (which could easily become a highly essentialist and limited
exercise), the focus of the assignment is on the dynamic aspect of becoming part of a group and
becoming conscious of the socialization inherent in group belonging. Such a focus encourages an
explorative and critical lens regarding the student’s own identity and the institutions in which
they operate, requiring the development of self-awareness and system-awareness. I would also
note that this activity applies certain principles of women’s thought patterns as it directly
connects to students’ experience and encourages them to utilize that experience, fostering the
sense of knowing as personal and intuited as well as reasoned.
Women’s Studies as Women’s Stories
Introductory courses in Women’s Studies are often sites of awakening for students in
their late teens and early twenties, inspiring students to see beyond the biological-essentialist
messages they have grown up surrounded by and to recognize the formerly hidden systems of
privilege and oppression in the world around them. Emily Deering Crosby at the University of
Pittsburgh explains in her syllabus for Introduction to Gender, Sexuality, and Women’s Studies
that students will address questions like “What is sex? What is gender? What is sexuality? How
are these concepts related to culture?” (1). In Laura Ciolkowski’s Introduction to Women’s and
Gender Studies, students learn about “the structures and co-production of gender, ethnicity, race,
class, religion, nationality and/or sexuality” (2-3). Vicki Reitenauer’s Introduction to Women’s
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Studies syllabus promises that students will “investigate gender-based oppression and its
relationship to other forms of oppression, and we will explore the many ways that we might
understand and deal with the reality of oppression in our world” (1). The content and basic
concepts of these courses are naturally essential precursors to more advanced courses in theory
and application of feminist ideologies.
For teachers already well-versed in the basic concepts, it can be easy to forget how
shockingly revelatory and radically transformative these introductory courses can be for students
with no previous exposure. A well-designed course should be attentive to the personal journeys
of the students. One way in which to do so would be to require students to journal on a weekly
basis describing that journey. Weekly or bi-monthly prompts might begin by asking students to
consider the ideas they’ve been taught about gender and masculinity and femininity and reflect
on the challenges they have faced relating to gender thus far in their lives. As the semester
proceeds, prompts could ask students to describe things they have observed in the media, in
products, in institutions, which reinscribe gender and how they address them in their own lives.
Students should be prompted to consider how they have been influenced by misogyny and
androcentrism, the pressure to masculinize to be taken seriously and respected. They should be
given opportunities to consider how the content of the course invites them to reconcile parts of
themselves they have been led to believe are weak or inadequate. Nearer to the end of the
semester, prompts should ask students to reflect explicitly on how learning the course material
has challenged them or inspired them to challenge others. Final prompts should certainly ask
students to consider how they will proceed, how they will incorporate their new understandings
into their lives and relationships, how they will apply what they have learned.

175

This activity could be considered both micro-level and macro-level narrative pedagogy. It
is micro-level in that it involves students narrating their own process of learning and
development. It is macro-level in by designing these writing assignments as a semester-long
process, the instructor necessarily plots specific conflicts and challenges for students to
experience and overcome. The specific prompts I have described are inspired by the structures of
women’s autobiographies, specifically the model described by Maureen Murdock. Unlike
Campbell’s masculine version, Murdock’s “heroine’s journey” does not begin with a “call to
adventure” out of safety and security, but rather a recognition of the semi-visible dangers which
have always surrounded the heroine. The model follows a progression in which the heroine first
manages those dangers by closing off parts of herself (the feminine), and gradually learning that
survival by self-denial is not enough, prompting an integration of the complete self. This is a
journey which students first exposed to feminism take; the activity simply gives them
opportunity to make it explicit in narrative.

Finding Alternatives in Business

Schools of business feature courses in several interrelated fields such as accounting,
marketing, and entrepreneurship. Naturally, courses designed to prepare students for small
business ownership must in part concern themselves with finding the resources necessary for a
startup or a traditional venture. Steve Sachnoff’s course, Entrepreneurship, at Loyola University
of Chicago organizes students into groups to “discuss how to generate new business ideas,
recognize opportunities, evaluate the opportunities, and design a firm to bring the ideas to life”
(1). In New Venture Creation at Auburn University, Jim Corman offers “analysis of the
competitive, market and financial aspects of starting a new company” to teach students the
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“practical applications of analyzing opportunities, building a team and gathering the necessary
resources to start a company” (1). Melissa Graebner’s Introduction to Entrepreneurship at
University of Texas at Austin similarly promises to teach students the basics of “identifying a
winning business opportunity, gathering funding for and launching a business, growing the
organization and harvesting the rewards” (1). These courses all include instruction in how to find
and recognize financial opportunities and gain access.
Late in the semester, after students have already been taught about funding through
traditional channels and traditional techniques of resource management, I would suggest a final
course unit in which students are prompted to create a business plan in which such traditional
channels are closed to them or in which traditional techniques will not work; banks have refused
them loans, commercial real estate is beyond their price range, etc. Students would be required to
creatively generate alternatives, likely impacting their business goals and strategies, forcing
adaptation and innovation. Students would likely begin to consider their own, however limited,
assets, which might be repurposed from personal to professional life, in some senses merging the
two. Students would need to consider how to compete with those business which do rely on
traditional funding and resource management models, ideally developing strategies which
capitalize on the unique possibilities which may exist when living and working outside the lines.
Students should journal on their progress throughout the unit, and after the plan is complete, they
will produce a reflective piece of writing describing the challenges they faced and how they
strategized to overcome them.
The unit I described features both macro-level and micro-level narrative pedagogy based
on the features of autobiographies by same-gender-loving people. Journaling throughout the unit
and reflecting at the end constitute the micro level. On the macro level, students take on the role
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of the “other” or “outsider” in the world of business, requiring the ability to see beyond
institutions and find alternative ways of surviving and flourishing, the repurposing of spaces and
objects. Nor does the unit develop such abilities in students by ignoring that traditional sources
of funding exist – it in fact highlights that students are competing with centralized, privileged
business owners who do have access to traditional funding and resources, prompting the question
of to what extent this “other” business can or should resemble traditional business and to what
extent otherness itself could become an asset.

Counseling Communities in Psychology

Students who pursue psychology do so both to understand how the human mind works
and to help those suffering from psychological distress. Courses in psychology achieve such
understanding through many different methods. In Introduction to Clinical and School
Psychology, Karen Haboush at Rutgers University exposes students to “different models of
professional practice and career paths in schools and clinical mental health settings” (1). Allan
Zuckoff’s Basic Counseling Skills at University of Pittsburgh is designed to “teach students the
fundamental skills common to all forms of effective counseling” including “to support personal
growth and coping with difficult life events” (1). In Behavior Analysis and Behavior Change,
Mary Beth Rigsby at Winthrop University expects that students will “demonstrate knowledge of
the basic principles and procedures of behavior modification to include behavioral assessment,
applied behavior analysis, behavior therapy, [and] cognitive-behavior therapy” (1). Each of these
courses seeks to prepare students for roles working directly with patients.
While role play is already commonly featured in psychology classrooms – in which one
student will play the psychologist and another a patient with specified needs or problems in need
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of counseling or diagnosis – I would suggest certain dramatic alterations to this basic activity. In
a more challenging and complex but far more authentic version of the traditional role-play, each
student would play a single character who is both a therapist and a patient in therapy; each would
be assigned a character dossier detailing their character’s life circumstances and difficulties.
Students will switch at designated times between who is currently functioning as the therapist
and who is functioning as the patient, while maintaining their character consistently. This
maintains the necessary professional separation between counselor and patient while
demonstrating the challenging reality that every counselor is a human being with a life and
problems of her own. Between sessions, students should confer with other students also acting as
psychologist characters as well as with the instructor. To enhance the impact, students should
keep two separate journals of the experience written in two distinct voices: a set of case notes
and a personal diary. Unlike traditional psychological roleplay, students should be discouraged
from considering proper diagnosis or treatment as end goals. Rather, the goal is immersion in the
experience itself.
This adaptation of usual role play activities combines macro-level (as students proceed
through an extended improvised narrative) and micro-level (as students keep case notes and
personal journals) narrative pedagogy based on features of women’s autobiographies. First and
foremost, the activity does away with the imaginary barrier between the professional self and the
personal self while still practicing the necessary clinical professionalism in a more authentic
way. Like women’s autobiographies, this extended activity takes on a cyclical pattern as students
maintain a character but shift between roles and functions. It focuses on the process of
counseling rather than on an end goal of diagnosis or treatment. It requires high degrees of
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empathy and adaptability. It utilizes discussion for knowledge building. It requires complex,
multi-directional reflection through narration in two voices.

Reconsidering Movements and Genres in Literature

Courses and curricula in literature are organized in a variety of ways. Some, such as
Susan Copeland’s American Literature I at Clayton State University, which is built to explore
American literature between the late sixteenth and mid nineteenth centuries (1) are organized
chronologically and thus center a study of “major literary movements, figures, and works in
American Literature” (2). Other chronologically organized courses are designed to explore the
works of authors of particular backgrounds, such as at Illinois Valley Community College, where
Kimberly M. Radek’s Women in Literature explores “how gender roles develop and change and
how women's views of themselves are reflected in their writing.” Other courses (often
considered “special topics”) focus on literature surrounding specific events or themes, such as
Neel Ahuja’s Literature of 9/11 at University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, which explores “a
diverse array of themes related to the 9/11 attacks as depicted in poetry, novels, graphic novels,
film, and music.” All of these are potentially useful patterns for organizing courses within
curricula or organizing content within a course.
Literature courses, however, could do more to combine these modes of organization,
centering questions of genre in relation to sociocultural background. For example, in a course
primarily organized by literary movements, students might read F. Scott Fitzgerald or William
Faulkner to explore defining works of modernist fiction in America, and they would also read
Zora Neale Hurston or Djuna Barnes to reconsider how we define modernist fiction from the
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perspective of women, of queer people, and of people of color. A course already focused on
authors of a particular background should take a more explicitly intersectional focus. For
example, a course on African American literature should center questions of how the African
American experience was defined by rural African Americans as well as urban African
Americans, by heterosexual African Americans as well as queer African Americans, by African
American women as well as African American men. Naturally, a course exploring the literature
surrounding a particular event, such as perhaps that of the American Civil War, should serve to
explore how that event was viewed by people of different backgrounds: men, women, rich, poor,
black, white, etc.
In a sense, these are literary pedagogies which reach beyond any particular narrative
model; rather, it is based on the mode of inquiry of this very project. This project explores life
writing with the question, “What is life writing as defined by women, as defined by queer
people?” So too should courses ask, “What is this genre of literature, this theme in literature, this
literary movement, as defined by this group and this group and this group?” This method of
exploration, however, might be most closely based on lesbian literature, which tends to
incorporate multiple perspectives, multiple lenses, often involving a great deal of reinterpretation
and restructuring of subject matter within a narrative, resulting in a narrative which resists easy
categorization.

Coming Out in First-Year Writing

Most universities and community colleges require students to complete a program in
basic rhetoric and composition. The courses constituting these programs are naturally designed
to help students find a professional and scholarly writing voice with which to communicate
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throughout the rest of their academic careers. At James Madison University, the first-year
writing program promises students will “confidently understand the role of the writer, the
purpose of documents, and the contexts and audience expectations within which documents are
produced” (“First-Year Writing Program”). DePaul University’s program teaches language and
literacy as “social processes. Language is, at heart, collaborative; hence dialogue with others is
key to helping students situate themselves as writers, readers, and thinkers in the world” (“FirstYear Writing Program”). At Michigan State University, program designers have deemed that
“inquiry is central to the curriculum, which moves students from reflection on experience to
analysis of cultural and institutional values and discourses” (First-Year Writing). These programs
all share similar missions which necessarily involve students considering their own changing
roles and identities as part of a community of writers and learners.
I suggest an assignment sequence for the first course in such a program which explicitly
centralizes these investigations of self, community, and social institutions. The first major
assignment would be a basic piece of professional writing such as a job application letter or
business memo. The second piece would be a personal narrative in which students are prompted
to explore an aspect of themselves which has been hidden or misunderstood. The third piece
would require students to take a journalistic approach (through a combination of interviewing
and experiential investigation) to either explore the community of people who share that identity
with the central goal of uncovering further diversity within it or to explore another group’s
misunderstood, marginalized, or oppressed identity. The final major essay assignment would
prompt students to analyze a piece of media which represents and influences perception of either
of the identities which were the subjects of their earlier essays.
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This progression of activities is an example of macro-level narrative pedagogy inspired
by the plot structure of gay autobiography, specifically the coming-out story. Like the
protagonist of a coming-out story, the student progresses from expression of a practiced public
identity to revelation of a private, personal, and misunderstood identity before critically
investigating the meaning of that identity in the context of others who share it and of the
surrounding institutions which shape public perception of it. For each assignment, students learn
to shift and adjust their written voice according to the purpose and audience of the writing task,
and at the same time, these activities require students to undertake a journey of self-discovery
and community-discovery as same-gender-loving people do with the result of developing greater
self-awareness and system-awareness, learning to negotiate between a public and private self,
and comprehending identity as multifaceted and intersectional.

Multiple Perspectives in History

History professors tend to organize courses around exploring particular time periods in
particular locations, specific historical events, or (more commonly in special topics courses)
themes. For example, in The American Revolution, Pauline Maier at Massachusetts Institute of
Technology covers topics including “English and American backgrounds of the Revolution;
issues and arguments in the Anglo-American conflict; colonial resistance and the beginnings of
republicanism; the Revolutionary War; constitution writing for the states and nation.” Martha
Hanna’s Empire, Revolution, and Global War: European History Since 1600 at University of
Colorado, Boulder concludes “by analyzing World War I and II, the emergence and impact of
Communism and fascism, and the Holocaust” (1). A more thematic course, Mary Murphy’s The
Culture & History of Food in America at Montana State University details “the production,
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consumption, and cultural meanings of food in the United States from the colonial period to the
twentieth century” (1). All of these courses illuminate major events and influences as they have
impacted those who lived through them as well as future generations.
Considering, however, that historical events impact different social groups in different
ways (and that the study of history has often been concerned primarily with how those events
have impacted the most privileged groups), I suggest a course schedule which differs from
standard chronological approaches. Rather, a history course dedicated to a particular time period
or close set of events might proceed first through a unit exploring the period or events from the
traditional vantage point of examining powerful figures in government and industry, examining
major documents and well-publicized works. Then, the course could cycle back through two or
three additional units exploring the period or events from the vantage points of those traditionally
marginalized in history as well as in the study of it: women, people of color, the lower classes,
immigrants, children, etc. Depending on the period, this method may require utilizing a more
varied selection of primary source material including fictional and artistic works to gain access to
otherwise lost perspectives. Such a structure would not only provide are more complex view of
the subject at hand but also calls attention to the problems of traditional historiography which
centralizes powerful and privileged views.
To sequence a history course in this way utilizes macro-level narrative pedagogy with the
lesbian narrative as a foundational structure. Lesbian narratives commonly eschew
straightforward chronology in favor of a cyclical pattern. Lesbian autobiographers blur the lines
between fiction and fact in the ultimate pursuit of greater understanding and seek out many
possible vantage points and methods of approaching the same topic. As could be said of queer
narratives and queer thinking in general, they resist easy answers and simple causal trajectories,
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favoring complex and multivalent approaches to subject matter. It hardly needs saying that the
benefits of training the mind to think in this way reach far beyond the study of history.

Transitioning into Professional Life

Certain academic programs feature integrated professionalization experiences designed to
bridge the gap between academic study and on-site vocational training. For example, Antioch
University’s “Elementary, Early Childhood, Special Education Teacher Certification Course
Sequence” is like many others which begin with courses in theory and foundational knowledge
and gradually build toward a culminating internship in the form of a student teaching
assignment. Students pursuing a career in nursing at institutions such as the University of Ottawa
spend their first two years in lectures and workshops studying anatomy, psychology, and
pharmacology, while in the third and fourth year supplementing these courses with “practicums”
at local healthcare facilities (“Bachelor of Science in Nursing”). Similarly, students training in
clinical mental health counseling at schools such as John Carroll University begin with two
semesters of coursework on human development, group procedures, and counseling theory
followed by two semesters of field experience (“Course Sequence”). All of these programs
follow a similar pattern of beginning with courses on theoretical groundwork and concluding
with internship experiences in which students learn from professionals already in the field.
Considering curriculum development, I would suggest two adjustments in structure and
one adjustment in attitude. In terms of structure, first, I believe such highly beneficial
professionalization programs should be adapted for use in a far greater number of academic
programs. Many departments leave networking and professionalization up to separate “Career
Services” facilities within universities when the professors and administrators within any given
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department are undoubtedly those with the greatest insight into pursuing work in their specific
field. There are very few academic programs that would not benefit from the addition of some
variety of internship along the lines of student teaching or nursing practicums. Second, while I
applaud the active, hands-on practicum that serves as the conclusion of these programs, I believe
that an experience consisting of observation and discussion should be a part of the very first
semester of any career-oriented program. This adjustment would allow students both to get an
early preview of the reality of the career they intend to pursue, allowing them to more easily
envision themselves in that career as they pursue it, and to build connections that may one day
help them as they shift into that career. Finally, in terms of attitude, I believe that in addition to
the obvious understanding that students should learn from the experience of professionals,
facilitators should explicitly encourage students to be attentive to problems entrenched within the
current system and to consider how those problems might be addressed. Reflection-based
assignments should prompt students in equal measure to consider what professional behaviors
they might emulate and what professional behaviors they might change.
These macro-level curriculum design ideas are most directly inspired by the structure of
the gender transition narrative. Recall that such a narrative typically opens on a post-transition
subject, thus opening the journey of transformation with a view of the goal state. Stories of this
genre follow a path in which protagonists simultaneously learn through observation and
experimentation but also, like any queer narrative, critique the very systems they enter into, in
this case from the multidirectional perspectives particular to those in transition. After all, every
college student is in a process of transition, and educators would do well to consider that most
students are not simply attempting to transition from an uneducated state to the state of “college
graduate.” Rather, they are transitioning to being professionals with careers, which may often be
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overlooked by many educators particularly in the humanities who may balk at the conception of
all education as career training. Naturally, education is more than career training; it is training in
critical thinking, communication, and cultural understanding. That a humanist education is more
than career training, however, does not mean that it must simultaneously be less than career
training. As tuition costs across the country rise and job markets become increasingly
competitive, career goals far outweigh goals of personal development in students’ minds. To
highlight career goals from the earliest point in their education will improve both retention
within the university and eventual career success beyond it.

Summary and Reflection

This chapter demonstrates the practical application of the synthesis of life writing studies,
narrative pedagogy, and the study of gender and sexuality. While a great deal of pedagogical
scholarship has already addressed the incorporation of narrative into pedagogy, I believe the
methodology I have utilized here is unique in using narrative pedagogy as a tool to centralize the
epistemologies and strategies of communication and problem solving characteristic of women
and queer people, thus centralizing women and queer people themselves.
To review that method:


Utilizing my research from chapters 3-4, I charted the life writing genres I had
explored (women’s life writing, gay and lesbian life writing, transgender life
writing), listing for each the characteristics of the genre, and aligning those
characteristics to styles of learning, communication, and problem solving
common to the authors.
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For any given course or program, I considered the goals and outcomes listed on
the syllabus or department website in relation to the existing assignment sequence
and course schedule with an eye for how these existing courses and programs
might centralize masculine or heteronormative thinking, treating those trends as
opportunities for transformation.



I returned to my chart to consider how the authors I studied or members of the
groups they represent would best achieve the goals and outcomes on those syllabi
and program websites. I then designed activities or sequences which either invited
students to narrate along the conventions of women’s and queer narratives or
which treated students as protagonists in women’s and queer narratives.

I followed this method to emphasize that the use of critical feminist narrative pedagogy
does not necessarily require that educators abandon the goals and outcomes they have considered
essential thus far (though responsiveness to students’ decided goals may well drive such
changes). Rather, teachers in any discipline can utilize this method to both revitalize their
classrooms with narrative and transform their courses for the benefit of marginalized students.

Conclusions and the Future of Narrative Pedagogy
In The Culture of Education, Jerome Bruner writes, “How one conceives of education,
we have finally come to recognize, is a function of how one conceives of the culture” (x).
Students’ experiences in schools of every level set their expectations for the worlds they will
inhabit beyond it, and moreover, “school is a culture itself, not just a ‘preparation’ for it, a
warming up” (98). As educators, we do not simply prepare our students to function in the culture
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outside of the university, we prepare them to impact and shape it themselves, and thus as
generations pass, we create that culture through the culture we create in our classrooms and on
our campuses. Unavoidably, we share a tremendous responsibility to consider what culture we
will create.
In outlining a pedagogy which centralizes the learning styles of women and queer people
through attentiveness to their life writing, I mean to contribute to creating a culture which
centralizes the experiences and reasoning of these marginalized groups. To be sure, this is a
movement already in progress. The experiences of heterosexual cisgender people are gradually
coming to bear greater resemblance to the experiences of queer people generations ago. Patterns
of thinking and communication which have previously been considered inferior due to their
designation as feminine are beginning to see recognition even in traditionally masculine spheres.
In other words, the center and the margins are already becoming less distinct.
In Composing a Life, Mary Catherine Bateson describes the faulty assumptions at work in
privileging traditional models of success and achievement:
Assumptions about careers are not unlike those about marriage; the real success stories
are supposed to be permanent and monogamous. These assumptions have not been valid
for many of history’s most creative people, and they are increasingly inappropriate today.
(6)
Consider these insights in relation to our understanding of the distinct qualities of queer life
narratives and queer thinking, which do not prioritize permanence or stability as goals or ideals.
Bateson does not explicitly reference queer experience here, but she does connect these ideas to
education. She writes, “The recognition that many people lead lives of creative makeshift and
improvisation surely has implications for how the next generation is educated and what we tell
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our sons and daughters” (16). Indeed, it suggests that centralizing these patterns of queer
thinking is widely beneficial, not only for queer students.
Bateson’s language implies a shift in the life patterns of even people of centralized
groups to greater resemble the experiences of the marginalized. Shifts in criticism on gender and
life narrative may offer some confirmation of this theory. In Women’s Autobiography, published
in 1980, Estelle C. Jelinek describes women’s autobiographies as more multidimensional and
fragmentary compared to men’s autobiographies, which she characterizes as linear and orderly
(16); just two decades later, Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson respond that this “model of
coherence for men’s autobiographies . . . from the perspective of the late nineties, seems difficult
to maintain” (Women, Autobiography, Theory 9). Smith and Watson point out a number of
prominent male life writers such as Richard Wright and James Baldwin whose works do not
conform to traditional linear models. While it should be noted that Wright and Baldwin are both
men of color, perhaps suggesting that marginalization in one form or another prompts nonlinear
thinking, Smith and Watson’s argument nevertheless suggests that the patterns of men’s life
writing are coming to bear greater resemblance to the patterns of women’s life writing, which
implies a shift in reasoning as well.
According to John Gerzema and Michael D’Antonio, authors of The Athena Doctrine:
How Women (and the Men Who Think Like Them) Will Rule the Future, such shifts are
enormously beneficial. Gerzema and D’Antonio describe a survey project in which a diverse
sample of approximately 32,000 people in countries around the world were asked to label
various human personality traits as “masculine” or “feminine” and another 32,000 were given the
same list of traits and asked which were most valuable or important for people in positions of
leadership. Overwhelmingly, the results demonstrated that “many of the qualities of an ideal
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modern leader are considered feminine. Most important, the responses show that we seek a more
expressive style of leader, one who shares feelings and emotions more openly and honestly”
(11). Gerzema and D’Antonio write, “In a highly interconnected and interdependent economy,
masculine traits like aggression and control (which are largely seen as ‘independent’) are
considered less effective than the feminine values of collaboration and sharing credit” (11).
Likewise, Sally Helgesen and Julie Johnson’s The Female Vision: Women’s Real Power at Work
explores why the patterns of reasoning characteristic of women are vital to the business world.
The authors argue that “what women see—what they notice and value and how they perceive the
world in operation—is a great underexploited resource in organizations” (xiii). Like Gerzema
and D’Antonio and like Bateson, Helgesen and Johnson also frame their argument in terms of the
shifts in twenty-first century global culture: “Given the interconnected nature of today’s global
environment . . . we can no longer afford—as individuals or as citizens of the planet—to operate
from an artificially restricted pool of data that ignores the diverse richness of what human being
perceive” (14). On both an individual level and an institutional level, “feminine” thinking is
gradually coming to take center stage.
Thus, consciously centralizing women’s reasoning styles in pedagogy is not simply a
matter of making schools more accommodating for women students but rather of better
educating students of all genders. It is readily apparent when reviewing the reasoning patterns
described in Women’s Ways of Knowing that these are useful reasoning patterns for everyone.
For example, Belenky argues:
What is often called the “female mode” [of writing] can be so much more complex
because it’s always trying to hold everybody’s perspective. It allows for an extended
dialogue and, thus, for coming to clearer, sharper understandings of the essence of things.
(Ashton-Jones and Thomas 289)
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For that matter, consider again Mary Jane Rotheram-Borus and Kris A. Langabeer’s theories that
same-gender-loving youth may develop greater skill at adapting to the norms of multiple social
worlds simultaneously or Jack Halberstam’s arguments regarding how queer people develop
aptitudes for innovation and transformation. Heterosexual and cisgender students can certainly
benefit from developing those aptitudes as well.
While this dissertation has focused on exploring the applications of women’s life
narratives and queer life narratives as structural bases for curriculum design, I believe that the
mode of pedagogical inquiry I have described here has further applications for centralizing the
thought patterns of other groups as well. Just as women and queer people have been
marginalized in schools, so too have people of color, non-citizens, people of low socioeconomic
status, and those with physical or mental disabilities, to name only a few. My method of
exploring the life narratives of a marginalized group in conjunction with psychological and
pedagogical research regarding that group and then considering how to adapt educational
experiences to better reflect those life narratives can be followed to benefit a wide variety of
students. There are many particular genres of life experience which may be more recognizable or
useful for different students – narratives of trauma and survival, narratives of addiction and
recovery, immigration narratives, prison narratives, etc. Just as Patricia Hill Collins argues for
the value of the perspectives and insights of the marginalized and oppressed, I believe there will
always be an intrinsic benefit to bringing stories we have ignored or neglected into sharper focus.
I believe, as Jerome Bruner does, that “pedagogy is never innocent. It is a medium that
carries its own meaning” (63). Our actions as educators inevitably play a part in either the
perpetuation or the dismantling of longstanding systems of privilege and oppression. The stories
we choose to tell and the stories we choose to create in our classrooms will decide not only the
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culture of our schools but the culture beyond our schools. We owe it to our students to create a
story that empowers them to learn and grow, to succeed by their own definitions, and to improve
the world around them.
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